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Abstract
Thousands of websites providing an array of diversified online services have been the crucial
factor for popularising the Internet around the world during last 15 years. The current model
of accessing the majority of those services requires users to register with a Service Provider
- an administrative body that offers and provides online services. The registration procedure
involves users providing a number of pieces of data about themselves which are then stored
at the provider. This data provides a digital image of the user and is commonly known as
the Identity of the user in that provider. To access different online services, users register
at different providers and ultimately end up with a number of scattered identities which
become increasingly difficult to manage. It is one of the major problems of the current
setting of online services. What is even worse is that users have less control over the data
stored in these providers and have no knowledge how their data is treated by providers. The
concept of Identity Management has been introduced to help users facilitate the management
of their identities in a user-friendly, secure and privacy-friendly way and thus, to tackle
the stated problems. There exists a number of Identity Management models and systems,
unfortunately, none of them has played a pivotal role in tackling the problems effectively
and comprehensively.
Simultaneously, we have experienced another trend expanding at a remarkable rate: the con-
sumption and the usage of smart mobile devices. These mobile devices are not only growing
in numbers but also in capability and capacity in terms of processing power and memory.
Most are equipped with powerful hardware and highly-dynamic mobile operating systems
offering touch-sensitive intuitive user-interfaces. In many ways, these mobile devices have
become an integrated part of our day-to-day life and accompany us everywhere we go. The
capability, portability and ubiquitous presence of such mobile devices lead to the core objec-
tive of this research: the investigation of how such mobile devices can be used to overcome
the limitations of the current Identity Management Systems as well as to provide innovative
online services.
In short, this research investigates the need for a novel Identity Management System and the
role the current generation of smart mobile devices can play in realising such a system.
In this research it has been found that there exist different inconsistent notions of many
central topics in Identity Management which are mostly defined in textual forms. To tackle
this problem, a comprehensive mathematical model of Identity and Identity Management
has been developed. The model has been used to analyse several phenomenons of Identity
Management and to characterise different Identity Management models.
Next, three popular Identity Management Systems have been compared using a taxonomy of
requirements to identify the strength and weakness of each system. One of the major findings
is that how different privacy requirements are satisfied in these systems is not standardised
and depends on a specific implementation. Many systems even do not satisfy many of those
requirements which can drastically affect the privacy of a user.
To tackle the identified problems, the concept of a novel Identity Management System, called
User-controlled Identity Management System, has been proposed. This system offers better
privacy and allows users to exert more control over their data from a central location using
a novel type of provider, called Portable Personal Identity Provider, hosted inside a smart
mobile device of the user. It has been analysed how the proposed system can tackle the stated
problems effectively and how it opens up new doors of opportunities for online services.
In addition, it has been investigated how contextual information such as a location can be
utilised to provide online services using the proposed provider. One problem in the existing
Identity Management Systems is that providers cannot provide any contextual information
such as the location of a user. Hosting a provider in a mobile device allows it to access
different sensors of the device, retrieve contextual information from them and then to provide
such information. A framework has been proposed to harness this capability in order to offer
innovative services.
Another major issue of the current Identity Management Systems is the lack of an effective
mechanism to combine attributes from multiple providers. To overcome this problem, an
architecture has been proposed and it has been discussed how this architecture can be utilised
to offer innovative services. Furthermore, it has been analysed how the privacy of a user can
be improved using the proposed provider while accessing such services.
Realising these proposals require that several technical barriers are overcome. For each
proposal, these barriers have been identified and addressed appropriately along with the re-
spective proof of concept prototype implementation. These prototypes have been utilised to
illustrate the applicability of the proposals using different use-cases. Furthermore, different
functional, security and privacy requirements suitable for each proposal have been formu-
lated and it has been analysed how the design choices and implementations have satisfied
these requirements. Also, no discussion in Identity Management can be complete without
analysing the underlying trust assumptions. Therefore, different trust issues have been ex-
plored in greater details throughout the thesis.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction and Motivation
Currently there are millions of websites around the world providing a plethora of different
online services (also known as web-based services or simply web services). These services
are accessed via the Internet using different protocols. Originally, the protocols for digi-
tal communication were designed to exchange information efficiently and reliably. At that
budding stage, the identities of communicating parties could be assumed, and there was no
need to verify these formally. This led to the omission of an Identity Layer in these pro-
tocols for the formal verification of the identity of a user [1]. As the web and web-based
services evolved, the verification of a user’s identity became crucial, particularly for a Ser-
vice Provider (SP; the administrative body that offers and provides services) which needs to
identify users in order to provide the relevant services only to the authorised users.
To overcome this limitation, the process of authentication was subsequently added which
became an integrated part of web services. The authentication process is preceded by the
process of Registration which involves users providing data about themselves which is then
stored at the respective SP. The data regarding a user portrays the digital image of the user
in a provider and is commonly known as the Identity of the user in that SP. With the rapid
expansion of the Internet from the 1990s, the number of web services, as well as the user-
base, was expanding rapidly with more and more identities being created, and as a result
their management became challenging, both for SPs and for users. Identity Management
(IdM, in short) was introduced by the industry to facilitate online management of user iden-
tities. Different groups worked on their own projects resulting in various incompatible IdM
solutions. Additionally, several research initiatives in academia were undertaken leading to
different prototypes of Identity Management Systems. Many of these systems not only differ
in their architectures but also use different protocols and serve different purposes. They are
extensively used by organisations to provide online services. Among them, the popular sys-
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tems are mature and stable in their functionalities and provide services in a secure manner;
unfortunately, they fail to comply with a number of different privacy requirements. More-
over, when a novel SP emerges in the landscape of online services, a new identity is issued
to the user. The after effect is that the user ends up with a number of identities scattered
across multiple SPs. The management of these identities becomes increasingly difficult for
any single user as the number of SPs keeps increasing. Furthermore, users have less control
over their data which are stored at different providers and lack knowledge regarding how
their data is being treated.
Simultaneously, we have experienced another trend expanding at a remarkable rate the con-
sumption and the usage of mobile devices including smartphones and tablets. In 2014, there
were nearly 7 billion mobile subscribers around the world which is 95.5% of the world popu-
lation [2]. In 2013, nearly 1 billion smartphones were sold and for the first time smartphones
outsold feature phones (non smartphones) [2]. Also, the sale of other smart mobile devices
such as tablets are rising steadily with almost 200 million tablets sold in 2013 [2]. Most
of these mobile devices are being used to access the Internet which has contributed to the
increase in global mobile data traffic by 69% in 2014 and the forecast was that the global
mobile data traffic would increase 10-fold between 2014 to 2019 [3]. Another compelling
fact is that mobile devices are not only growing in numbers but also in capability and capac-
ity in terms of processing power and memory. Most are equipped with powerful hardware
and highly-dynamic mobile operating systems offering touch-sensitive user-interfaces. In
many ways, these mobile devices have become an integrated part of our day-to-day life and
accompany us everywhere. It is fascinating to note the evolution of the mobile device during
its short span of life, compared to the Personal Computer (PC). From a mere telecommuni-
cation device to an all-round multimedia gadget, mobile devices are rapidly reaching a point
where the services of telecommunications, media and information technology are converg-
ing seamlessly. The portability, power, intuitive software and ubiquitous presence of mobile
devices lead to the core objective of this research: the investigation of how such mobile de-
vices can be used to overcome the limitations of current Identity Management Systems as
well as to provide and consume innovative online services.
This thesis investigates the need for a novel Identity Management System that offers better
privacy and allows users to have more control over their data from a central location. Addi-
tionally, the thesis investigates the role that the current generation of smart mobile devices
can play in realising such a system. This thesis argues and shows evidence that the existing
Identity Management Systems have limitations regarding different aspects of privacy and do
not allow users to have complete control over their own data. Furthermore, the manage-
ment of different scattered identities will become more and more difficult for any user as she
accesses more novel online services. There exists a notion of User-centric Identity Manage-
ment in the literature that has been proposed to tackle these problems [4]. In reality, findings
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in this thesis suggest that the existing systems based on the concept of User-centric Identity
Management do little to improve the situation and the privacy problems are still prevalent.
Hence, in this thesis, a novel Identity Management System, called the User-controlled Iden-
tity Management System, is proposed. The proposed system allows users to have complete
control over their own data and to improve the privacy of the user while accessing online
services.
To realise such a system, a proposal for a novel Identity Provider (IdP in short and IdPs in plu-
ral) which is hosted inside a user’s smart mobile device is put forward. This thesis explores
the ways the power and novel capabilities of these devices can be harnessed to implement the
proposal of a novel Identity Provider and the User-controlled Identity Management System.
In addition, the thesis also outlines the additional benefits such a system offers and how such
benefits can be utilised to offer innovative online services. No discussion in Identity Man-
agement can be complete without analysing the underlying trust assumptions. Therefore,
different trust issues have been explored throughout the thesis.
1.2 Thesis Statement
The statement of this thesis is that smart mobile devices can be used to realise the novel
User-controlled Identity Management System which will:
1. tackle several outstanding shortcomings, especially regarding privacy, in existing Iden-
tity Management Systems,
2. offer users complete control over their data from a central location, and
3. provide additional functionalities that can be utilised to offer innovative online ser-
vices.
Since each Identity Management System is bound by a set of trust assumptions, realising
the User-controlled Identity Management System using mobile devices will also require the
formulation of a set of trust assumptions that must be satisfied by the system.
1.3 Research Objectives
The core research goals of this thesis are to identify the shortcomings of existing Identity
Management Systems, to rectify these shortcomings by proposing, designing and developing
a novel Identity Management System and investigating how such a system can be used to
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provide innovative online services. To achieve these goals, the following research objectives
have been formulated.
Research Objective 1 (RO1): Building a consistent vocabulary for Identity Manage-
ment. The first objective is to review the existing work and literature on Identity Manage-
ment in order to compile a consistent vocabulary. Different projects have assumed different
interpretations of many similar topics related to Identity Management which introduce incon-
sistencies. To ensure consistency throughout the thesis, it is essential to build up a vocabulary
related to Identity and Identity Management.
Research Objective 2 (RO2): Mathematical Modelling of Identity Management. The
second objective is to develop a mathematical model of Identity and Identity Management.
As mentioned earlier, there remains an inconsistency in different central topics of Identity
Management. The main reason behind this inconsistency is the lack of a mathematical model
on the core issues of Identity and Identity Management. To tackle this, a formal mathematical
model of Identity and Identity Management has been developed.
Research Objective 3 (RO3): Comparative Analysis of existing Identity Management
Systems. The third objective is to compile a set of requirements of an ideal Identity Man-
agement System. This set of requirements will be used to provide a comparative analysis of
a few popular existing Identity Management Systems and to identify the strength and weak-
ness of each system. Based on the result of the analysis, a system will be chosen for the
subsequent research.
Research Objective 4 (RO4): User-controlled Identity Management System. The fourth
objective is to propose a User-controlled Identity Management System that will be used to
rectify different problems in existing systems.
Research Objective 5 (RO5): Framework for Context-aware Federated Services. The
fifth objective is to propose a framework that will combine two popular trends of online ser-
vices, context-awareness and federated services, using the proposed User-controlled Identity
Management System.
Research Objective 6 (RO6): Attribute Aggregation in Federated Services. The sixth
objective is to propose an improved architecture for attribute aggregation in federated ser-
vices and to investigate how it can handle different privacy issues using the proposed Identity
Management System.
Among these objectives, the first three (RO1 - RO3) are for developing terminologies related
to IdM based on mathematical principles and for identifying shortcomings in the existing
systems. The fourth objective (RO4) is to propose a system to tackle the identified shortcom-
ings. The final two objectives (RO5 and RO6) are to investigate how the proposed system
can be used to offer innovative online services.
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1.4 Contributions
The key contributions of the thesis are the following.
Mathematical Model of Identity and Identity Management. A novel mathematical model
of different core topics covering a wide range of topics related to Identity Management has
been developed. This is the first model of this kind where, at first, each atomic related issue
is treated separately to highlight the inter-relationship between each issue and then all these
issues are combined to build up the whole model of Identity. The proposed mathematical
model has been used to tackle the issue of inconsistency in different central topics of Identity
Management. In addition, the applicability of the model has been illustrated by utilising it
to characterise the behaviour of an Identity Management System and to characterise three
popular IdM models mathematically. Furthermore, the model has been used to analyse three
issues related to Identity Management: the effect of multiple identities, data ownership and
Identity Theft. The model has been useful to analyse crucial problems in existing online
services.
Dynamic Identity Federations. A mechanism for managing a dynamic federation in a fully
automatic fashion using SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) has been proposed.
This approach can be easily adopted by any SAML implementation and requires no modifi-
cation of SAML. A proof of concept has been implemented to show the applicability of the
mechanism through use-cases.
User-controlled Identity Management Systems. The need for a more privacy-friendly
Identity Management System is advocated. Then, a proposal of a User-controlled Identity
Management System is put forward to allow users to have better control over their data. To
realise such a system, a novel Identity Provider called Portable Personal Identity Provider
(PPIdP) has been developed and a proof of concept using the mechanism of dynamic fed-
erations has been implemented. It has been analysed how the PPIdP can be used to rectify
several problems of existing Identity Management Systems.
Context-aware Federated Services. To demonstrate how a PPIdP can be used to provide
context-aware federated services, a framework for accessing such services has been designed
and developed. Both context-aware and federated services have been popular trends in online
services in recent years. The proposed framework is the first attempt to combine these two
trends that shows how the additional capabilities of a PPIdP can be leveraged to provide
innovative context-aware federated services. The implemented proof of concept shows the
applicability of this approach through different use-cases.
A Hybrid Architecture for Attribute Aggregation. Finally, a hybrid architecture for ag-
gregating attributes from heterogeneous identity providers is presented. The existing mech-
anisms of attribute aggregation are complex and require preliminary steps which are not
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intuitive. The proposed approach improves upon the existing work; in particular, it does
not require any preliminary steps or complex user interactions. The implemented proof of
concept shows the applicability of this approach through different use-cases. Also, it has
been examined how the privacy of a user during attribute aggregation can be improved by
integrating the PPIdP with the proposed architecture.
1.5 Publications
The research in this thesis has led to the following publications:
1. Md. Sadek Ferdous, Gethin Norma, Audun Jøsang and Ron Poet. “Mathematical
Modelling of Trust Issues in Federated Identity Management” . In the proceedings of
the 9th IFIP WG 11.11 International Conference on Trust Management (IFIPTM-15),
Hamburg, Germany, 26-29 May, 2015.
2. Md. Sadek Ferdous and Ron Poet. “Managing Dynamic Identity Federations using
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)” . Journal of Theoretical and Applied
Electronic Commerce Research (JTAER). 10(2):53U˝76. 2015.
3. Md. Sadek Ferdous and Ron Poet. “CAFS: A Framework for Context-Aware Fed-
erated Services” . In the proceedings of the 13th IEEE International Conference on
Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (IEEE TrustCom-14),
Beijing, China, 24-26 September, 2014.
4. Md. Sadek Ferdous, Gethin Norman and Ron Poet. “Mathematical Modelling of Iden-
tity, Identity Management and Other Related Topics” . In the proceedings of the 7th
International Conference on Security of Information and Networks (SIN-14), Glasgow,
UK, 9-11 September, 2014.
5. Md. Sadek Ferdous and Ron Poet. “A Hybrid Model of Attribute Aggregation using
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)” . Submitted to the Journal of Com-
puter Security (JCS), 2014.
6. Md Sadek Ferdous and Ron Poet. “Analysing Attribute Aggregation Models in Feder-
ated Identity Management” . In the proceedings of the 6th International Conference on
Security of Information and Networks (SIN-13). Aksaray, Turkey, 26-28 November,
2013.
7. Md Sadek Ferdous and Ron Poet. “Portable Personal Identity Provider in Mobile
Phones” . In the proceedings of the 12th IEEE International Conference on Trust,
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Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (IEEE TrustCom-13). Mel-
bourne, Australia, 16-18 July, 2013.
8. Md Sadek Ferdous and Ron Poet. “Dynamic Federation using Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML)” . In the proceedings of the 3rd IFIP WG 11.6 Work-
ing Conference on Policies & Research in Identity Management (IFIP IDMAN 2013).
London, UK, 8-9 April, 2013.
9. Md Sadek Ferdous and Ron Poet. “A comparative analysis of Identity Management
Systems” . In the Security Track of the IEEE International Conference on High Per-
formance Computing and Simulation (HPCS). Madrid, Spain, 2-6 July, 2012.
1.6 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 provides a short introduction to three popular Identity Management Systems and
reviews related work on different topics of Identity Management that have been chosen for
further exploration in this research.
Chapter 3 builds up the consistent set of terminologies related to Identity Management and
presents the mathematical model of Identity Management. The model is then used to char-
acterise several aspects of Identity Management Systems as well as to characterise different
Identity Management models. In addition, the model is used to analyse four application sce-
narios showing how it can be applied to examine a few problems in existing online services.
This chapter addresses RO1 and RO2.
Chapter 4 presents a comparative analysis of three popular Identity Management Systems
where each system is compared side-by-side using a set of requirements. For this, a taxon-
omy of requirements for an ideal Identity Management System has been formulated. This
chapter addresses RO3.
Chapter 5 presents the proposal for creating federations in a dynamic fashion. The existing
mechanism for creating a federation makes it difficult to manage and is not scalable. This
problem has been tackled with the given proposal. In addition, the implementation based on
the proposal has been extensively used in the subsequent chapters to realise different proof
of concepts.
Chapter 6 introduces the core proposal of a User-controlled Identity Management System
using the Portable Personal Identity Provider and explains how this can be used to tackle
some of the stated problems in existing systems. In addition, this chapter explores different
use-cases using the PPIdP, analyses different security, privacy and trust issues involved, the
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advantages the developed system offers and the current limitations it has. In doing so, this
chapter addresses RO4.
Chapter 7 discusses the framework for context-aware federated services. This chapter illus-
trates how the PPIdP can be leveraged to build up the framework that combines these two
trends, Context-aware and federated online services, for offering novel use-cases of online
service access. Thus, this chapter addresses RO5.
Chapter 8 presents the hybrid architecture for aggregating attributes from multiple hetero-
geneous identity providers, examines different issues and requirements while designing and
developing such an architecture and discusses the implemented proof of concept using sev-
eral use-cases. Hence, this chapter addresses RO6.
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by summarising the conducted research. It revisits the
novel contributions of the research and investigates how the research objectives have been
achieved. The chapter also discusses the limitations of the work and proposes a number of
directions for future research.
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Background
2.1 Introduction
The need for managing user identities was first realised by service providers as the number of
their user-bases increased. That need motivated the industry to design and develop different
systems to manage the identities of users. Such a system is commonly known as an Identity
Management System (IMS). The majority of research on Identity Management is heavily
reliant on these systems. Hence, this chapter starts with a short introduction to the three
most popular IMSs.
Next, the existing work on different aspects of Identity Management that have been selected
for this research are reviewed. The motivations behind each of these aspects have been
briefly discussed in Chapter 1. However, the motivation for choosing these aspects will
become clearer in subsequent chapters.
2.2 Popular Identity Management Systems
Different Identity Management Systems are based on different IdM models and utilise dif-
ferent protocols. There are three classes of entities involved in each Identity Management
System:
1. Identity Providers (IdPs) - entities that are responsible for managing digital identities
of users and providing identity related services to Service Providers,
2. Service Providers (SPs) - entities that are responsible for providing online services to
the users, and
3. Users (Clients) - entities that receive services from SPs.
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Entities from these classes interact with each other using a respective protocol so that on-
line services can be offered and ultimately provisioned. Currently, several IMSs exist. In
this section, a short introduction to the three most popular Identity Management Systems is
presented: SAML-based Systems [5], OpenID [6] and OAuth [7].
2.2.1 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)-based IMS
SAML-based IMSs are based on the Federated User Identity model [4] and utilise the Secu-
rity Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [5]. In this system, involved parties need to create
a virtual association, known as a federation, before they can interact with each other. SAML
is an XML (EXtensible Markup Language)-based standard for exchanging authentication
and authorisation information between different autonomous application domains [5]. It is
based on the request/response protocol in which one party (an SP) requests particular iden-
tity information about a user and the other party (an IdP) responds with the information. The
whole language comprises of four key concepts: assertions, bindings, profiles and protocols.
A SAML assertion is the declaration about a user by an IdP for an SP. In its most general
form, an assertion states the following [5, 8]: “The assertion A issued at time T by issuer
(IdP) I about the user U holds as long as conditions C are valid.”
An assertion can contain three different types of statements:
1. Authentication statements - which are used to state that the user has been authenticated
by the asserted IdP at the specified time,
2. Attribute statements - which are used to specify the attributes of the user and
3. Authorisation statements - which are used to assert that the user is permitted a certain
action on specified resources under certain conditions.
The SAML protocol is used to define the rules on how to pack the above SAML statements
inside the request/response packet and to process them on receipt. The SAML binding is
used to map the SAML protocol into a communication protocol such as HTTP (Hypertext
Transfer Protocol) or SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) by which the SAML elements
are transported. Simply, bindings define the mechanisms by which SAML elements are
placed inside any HTTP or SOAP packet. A SAML profile combines all of the above men-
tioned SAML elements and describes how they can be used to implement a use-case. The
most important use-case is the Web Browser SSO (Single Sign On) profile which will be dis-
cussed later. The SSO facility allows a user to authenticate once and then to access multiple
services without further authentications.
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A SAML protocol flow based on the Web Browser SSO Profile where both the IdP and the
SP are part of a federation and use the HTTP Post binding is collected from [8], illustrated
in Figure 2.1 and discussed below:
1. A user wants to access a service provided by an SP and hence submits a service access
request to the SP.
Figure 2.1: Protocol flow in SAML.
2. The SAML interface in the SP captures the request and checks if the user is already
authenticated (or authorised) at the SP. If yes, the user is allowed to access the service.
If not, the following steps take place.
3. The user is redirected to the Discovery Service, also known as the Where Are You
From (WAYF) Service, where a pre-configured list of trusted IdPs is shown to the
user. The user selects one of the IdPs and an authentication request is sent to the IdP.
4. The IdP captures the request and checks if the user is already authenticated. If so, step
5 is ignored.
5. The authentication of the user takes place. There are many authentication mecha-
nisms (such as username/password, Kerberos, X.509 certificates, etc.) supported by
the SAML which depends on the respective IdP.
6. Once authenticated, a response containing a SAML assertion with user attributes is
sent back to the SP.
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7. Upon receiving the response, the assertion is extracted and validated. If valid, the user
is considered authenticated. Next, user attributes are extracted from the assertion and
the user is re-directed to the requested service.
8. The SP checks if the user is authorised to access the service using the extracted at-
tributes. If so, the user is allowed to access it. If not, the request of the user is denied
and an error message is displayed to the user.
To enable the protocol flow discussed above, a notion of trust needs to be established between
an IdP and an SP inside a federation. A SAML SP needs to trust that the IdP will authenticate
a user using appropriate security mechanisms and release attributes to the SP as per the
contractual agreement [9]. Similarly, the IdP has to trust that the SP will not abuse the
released attributes and use them only for the stated purpose as per the agreement. This
notion of trust between the IdP and SP in SAML is established by exchanging the respective
metadata of the IdP and SP and then storing such metadata at the appropriate repositories.
This enables each party to build up the so-called Trust Anchor List (TAL). This exchange
takes place in an offline fashion after a technical contract between the IdP and SP is signed.
Moreover, this has to be done before any interaction takes place between the said IdP and SP.
Once the exchange of metadata is complete, the IdP and SP are said to be part of the same
federation. Metadata is an XML file in a specified format that contains:
• an entity descriptor (an identifier for each party),
• service endpoints (the locations of the appropriate endpoints for an IdP and an SP
where the request will be sent to and where the response will be consumed respec-
tively),
• a certificate,
• an expiration time, and
• contact information.
Metadata serves three purposes as explained below.
• Firstly, it allows each entity to discover the required service endpoint of another entity
for sending SAML requests/responses.
• Secondly, the embedded certificate can be used by an SP to verify the authenticity of
any SAML Assertion.
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• Thirdly, metadata behaves like an anchor of trust for each party. During the discovery
service at an SP, the list of IdPs returned to the user only contains those IdPs whose
metadata can be found in its repositories (in other words in the TAL) and only those
IdPs are considered trusted. An SP will allow a user to select only those IdPs which
are trusted. Similarly, an IdP will respond only to those requests that are initiated from
an SP whose metadata can be found in its TAL.
The life-cycle of a SAML-based federation consists of four major steps that define how a
federation is created, maintained and updated. The steps are: federation, federation provi-
sioning, maintenance and revocation. These steps are dependent on how the TAL is built and
maintained. For example, when the metadata of two entities are inserted into their respective
TAL, it indicates that both entities are now federated with each other, thus symbolising the
federation step. Identifying and discovering the IdP from the TAL of the SP exemplifies the
federation provisioning stage whereas the maintenance stage is required when the metadata
of an entity stored in the TAL of another entity needs to be modified (e.g. due to changes in
the location of service endpoints, etc.). Lastly, removing the metadata of two entities from
their respective TAL exemplifies the revocation. More about the life-cycle of a federation
will be discussed in Chapter 3.
There are a number of different libraries for SAML for building up a SAML-based IMS
with Shibboleth [10] and SimpleSAMLphp [11] being the two most widely used libraries
developed using Java and PHP respectively.
2.2.2 OpenID
OpenID is a decentralised Identity Management System which provides SSO solutions for
web services over the Internet [12]. It aims to assist users by alleviating the need for main-
taining and using different identities to access different web services as well as to aid an SP
by removing the need to manage its user-bases. It is based on the Open Unfederated Identity
Model (discussed in Chapter 3). With a user-base of more than 1 billion users, it is one of the
most widely used IMSs and is used by many web service providers including AOL, BBC,
Google, IBM, MySpace, Orange, PayPal, Verisign, LiveJournal and Yahoo [12, 13].
Like SAML, OpenID protocol has three different classes of actors (entities): Users, OpenID
Providers (also simply known as Providers) and Service Providers, known as Relying Parties
(RPs) in OpenID terminology. A user is an entity that wants to access a protected service
provided by an RP. An OpenID Provider allows a user to create an identity. The provider
is also responsible for authenticating a user who wants to access the protected service from
an RP and provides an assertion regarding the user to an RP. An RP is essentially a service
provider providing services to a user and consumes an assertion given by a provider to decide
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Figure 2.2: Protocol flow in OpenID without exchanging keys.
if a user can access the service. There are a number of libraries for all major web technologies
and programming languages such as Apache, C#, Coldfusion, Haskell, Java, JavaScript, Perl,
PHP and Python [14].
To understand the protocol flow of the OpenID, it is considered that a user wants to access
a service from an OpenID RP. Before engaging into the protocol flow, the first step for the
user is to create an OpenID identifier (also known as just OpenID) at an OpenID Provider.
An OpenID is essentially either a URL (Uniform Resource Locator) or an XRI (Extensive
Resource Identifier) and analogous to an email address in the sense that an OpenID is univer-
sally unique. Many large popular web service providers such as Google, Yahoo, LiveJournal,
Blogger, flickr, AOL and WordPress can be used as OpenID Providers since they allow their
users to use their respective identifiers (usernames) to be used as OpenIDs. There are also
many dedicated OpenID providers such as claimID, myOpenID, myid.net and VeriSign. The
main point is that any provider can act as an OpenID provider by deploying the required
libraries and users can choose any OpenID Provider for accessing a service. The protocol
flow in OpenID is illustrated in Figure 2.2 and is discussed below:
1. A user visits an RP to access one of its services.
2. The RP needs to authenticate the user. As it supports OpenID, it has a special button
tagged as Sign in with OpenID. Once clicked, this will allow the user to enter her
OpenID.
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3. The user enters her OpenID and clicks the Login button.
4. The RP uses that OpenID to discover the OpenID provider.
5. Once the provider is discovered, the RP may initiate an optional Key Exchange step
in which the RP and the provider exchange a shared secret key to be used to verify the
signature of the RP in a response message (see below).
6. Once the provider is found, the user is redirected to that respective provider using an
OpenID authentication request message via HTTP redirect.
7. When the provider receives that authentication request, it needs to authenticate the user
if the user is not already authenticated. For authenticating the user, the provider can
choose any suitable mechanism.
8. Once the user is successfully authenticated, the provider sends an authentication re-
sponse to the RP.
9. The RP now needs to validate the response by verifying the signature embedded inside
the response. It can do it in two ways. If both parties have agreed to use a pre-arranged
key in Step 5, the RP can use that key for verification. Alternatively, the RP needs to
send back this response to the provider where the signature will be verified.
10. Then the provider will send back the verification response to the RP.
11. If the verification response is positive, the user will be authenticated at the RP and will
be allowed to access the service.
12. As the user is now authenticated at the provider as well, she can use the corresponding
OpenID for accessing any OpenID enabled services provided by different RPs without
any authentication at the provider. She will just need to provide her OpenID at an
RP, the RP will redirect her to the provider, the provider will find that she is already
authenticated at its end and so it will just send the authentication response to the RP
and the usual flow will take place. In this way, the SSO functionality is achieved in
OpenID. However, it is important to remember that if the user chooses to use a different
OpenID, she will need to authenticate herself at the respective provider.
2.2.3 OAuth
OAuth is one of the fastest growing community-based specifications that has been designed
to provide mechanisms to circumvent some of the limitations related to the access delegation
in the traditional model of accessing services [15]. To exemplify these limitations, it is
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assumed that a user wants to delegate her authorisation right to other users so that they
can access some of the first user’s resources. For this, the user has to share her identifier
(username) and the secret credential (password) with all other users. If any of these users acts
maliciously, the identity of the user is fully compromised. Again, sharing such information
with another user allows the second user to gain the ultimate authorisation right (such as
read, write, update and delete). A malicious user can abuse that right. Finally, the revocation
of this right in the traditional model is rather troublesome. Once the user detects a malicious
user and wants to revoke the authorisation right of that entity, the user has to change the
secret credential which means that the user needs to re-distribute the secret credential again
to other honest users to delegate her access rights.
OAuth provides a flexible solution to this problem that allows any user to delegate her access
right in a more user-friendly and secure way. The original specification, known as OAuth 1.0,
was finalised in April 2010 and is specified in RFC 5849 [16, 17]. However, it subsequently
went through a complete modification and evolved to a new version called OAuth 2.0 [7],
which is a completely new protocol.
OAuth protocol comprises of four different classes of entities [7].
Resource Owners. Resource owners (or owners in short) own and control the protected
resources and are capable of granting (delegating) limited access rights to third parties for
accessing protected resources under tight control. They take the role of Users in the tradi-
tional model.
Clients. Clients are third party applications that can make requests to access protected re-
sources on a user’s behalf. To make such a request, they have to receive an authorisation
clearance (known as the authorisation grant in OAuth 2.0) from the corresponding resource
owner.
Authorisation Servers. Authorisation servers are responsible for granting access tokens to
clients after receiving valid authorisation grants.
Resource Servers. Resource servers host protected resources and are capable of accepting
and responding to requests for accessing resources using access tokens. In many settings,
resource and authorisation servers may be the same entity.
The number of legs is used to describe the number of entities involved in an OAuth interac-
tion [18]. For example, if all four classes of entities are involved in an interaction, the flow
is described as 4-legged. In case, if the authorisation and resource server is one combined
entity, the flow can be described as 3-legged. A flow that is more than 4-legged is also pos-
sible if there is more than one client and one of the clients has the capability to delegate the
authorisation right to other clients.
An abstract protocol flow is illustrated in Figure 2.3 and is discussed below:
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Figure 2.3: Protocol flow in OAuth.
1. A resource owner wants to delegate access rights to a client so that the client can access
some protected resources of the owner, hosted at the resource server.
2. The flow starts with the client asking for authorisation of the owner to access those re-
sources. The client can make this request directly to the owner or via the authorisation
server using the HTTP re-direct method. In this abstract flow, it is assumed that this
request is direct.
3. If the owner grants this authorisation request, a credential known as the authorisation
grant is returned to the client. Depending on the type of method the client is using
to request authorisation and on the methods the authorisation server can support, the
grant will be one of the four available grants types.
4. The client then authenticates itself to an authorisation server and requests an access
token using the authorisation grant.
5. The authorisation server validates the grant and if valid, issues an access token.
6. The client requests an access to the protected resources by presenting the access token
to the resource server.
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7. The resource server validates the access token and if valid, the access request is granted
and the requested resource is returned to the client.
2.3 Dynamic Federation Management
Despite several advantages that SAML offers, one major constrain is the method by which
trust is established and maintained. To enable federations using SAML, trust among partic-
ipating organisations has to be pre-configured by system administrators (as discussed previ-
ously). Pre-configuring trust before any interaction hinders the establishment of a federation
between two prior unknown parties in a dynamic fashion. Moreover, a well-known problem
of SAML is that it becomes increasingly difficult to manage a SAML federation once the
number of entities starts to increase [19].
There have been several proposals and drafts to overcome the problem of scalability and
dynamism of SAML. The most influential work [20], called Distributed Dynamic SAML,
prescribes that to trust any dynamically exchanged metadata, the metadata must be signed
and the certificate that can be used to verify the signature must be included within the meta-
data. Assuming a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) issues the embedded certificate, each
participating organisation will hold the root CA Certificates which can be used to validate the
certificate chain in its TAL. Then, the trust on the metadata can be derived by just verifying
the signature in the metadata using the embedded certificate with the traditional Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI). The result of this proposal is the formulation of a working draft of the
SAML Metadata Interoperability Profile which is a profile for a distributed SAML metadata
management system [21, 22]. Based on the proposal and the working draft, an implemen-
tation of dynamic SAML has been developed by UNINETT [23] in their SimpleSAMLphp
project [24, 11]. The SimpleSAMLphp is a native php-based implementation of the SAML
protocol stack that can be used to quickly deploy a SAML IdP or SP. The proposal and the
working draft and the SimpleSAMLphp implementation will allow the establishment of fed-
erations more quickly than previously possible. However, several crucial questions regarding
trust assumptions at different parties have not been explored thoroughly. For example, each
party validates the certificate of other parties using PKI to establish trust. However, is the
established trust sufficient for any IdP to release sensitive user attributes to an SP which has
been added dynamically, since there may not be any legal contract between them? And also,
since there may be no legal binding, can an IdP trust that an SP would not abuse the released
attributes in any way? Similarly, an SP will need to consider if it can trust any attributes that
have been provided by a dynamically added IdP even though the SAML assertion containing
those attributes are properly verified.
Furthermore, the SimpleSAMLphp implementation requires that the metadata of an IdP is
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already present at an SP so that the WAYF (Where Are You From) Service can display a
list of IdPs to the user. Once the user selects an IdP, a SAML authentication request will
be sent to the IdP. If the IdP has the capability to add an SP dynamically (e.g. an IdP
deployed with SimpleSAMLphp), it can retrieve the metadata of the SP dynamically and
store it temporarily in case the entity ID of that SP is not found in its TAL. To make this
possible, the SimpleSAMLphp implementation requires that the entity ID of the SP has to
be a URL from where the metadata can be fetched. In summary, SimpleSAMLphp only
allows an IdP to retrieve any SP metadata, not the other way around. It can be regarded as a
semi-automatic federation where an IdP has to be pre-configured at an SP and thus does not
fully address the problem of dynamic federations.
There are some existing works that also provide proposals for dynamic federations. In [25],
the authors propose a SAML extension to accommodate reputation data in XML format. Ac-
cording to their proposal, trust has to be negotiated based on that reputation data before any
entity can join the federation. Each entity will maintain a dynamic list called the Dynamic
Trust List (DTL), instead of the static TAL, which will contain the list of joined entities in the
same federation with their reputation data and will be updated dynamically as the federation
evolves. To realise their proposal, a novel exchange protocol was developed to request and
respond to reputation data. Even though the authors have used the term dynamic federation,
their proposal does not consider how two entities can be federated automatically. Instead it
deals with the issue of enabling trust before two entities are federated and how this trust can
evolve over time as they interact with each other. Hence, their proposal differs considerably
from the true meaning of a dynamic federation.
The authors in [26] proposed a dynamic federation architecture, called DFed, based on
SAML and Automatic Trust Negotiation (ATN) to establish trust between participating par-
ties at run time. The DFed framework consists of different Dynamic Federation Service
Providers (DFSPs). Each DFSO can act as an IdP and SP and consists of different com-
ponents such as Gate Keeper (GK), Directory Services, Trusted DFSP Repository, SAML
Agent and ATN Agent. A GK is responsible for the SSO Protocol, a Directory Service is
responsible for storing attributes and policies, a DFSP repository stores the information of
others federated SPs, a SAML Agent is responsible for carrying out the SAML Protocol and
an ATN agent is responsible for ATN protocol and trust negotiation. When a user tries to
access services from one DFSP (DFSP1) using the DFed protocol, she is shown the list of
other federated DFSPs. If she chooses any of these DFSPs, she is forwarded to the selected
DFSP (DFSP2). Upon completing the authentication at DFSP2, she will be returned back to
DFSP1. At this point, the DFSP1 can request additional attributes of the user to take any au-
thorisation decision. If the user wants to use another unfederated DFSP (DFSP3), she needs
to provide its ID which is then used to start a trust negotiation protocol between DFSP1 and
DFSP3. Upon completing the trust negotiation process, two DFSPs are federated automati-
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cally and the user can use DFSP3 to access services from DFSP1. An implementation based
on SAML was presented to show the applicability of their proposal. The main limitation of
the proposal is that it is required to alter SAML extensively in order to accommodate the
interaction between different DFSPs. Furthermore, the discussion regarding the trust nego-
tiation procedure is vague since it is not clear what type of information is needed during the
trust negotiation procedure and how the negotiation procedure establishes different level of
trust.
There is another solution proposed in [27] where trust values are calculated based on the
modified Dijkstra algorithm and to calculate a distributed reputation based on the PageRank
algorithm from Google and use the trust and reputation value to create dynamic federations.
Like in [25], their proposal deals with the issue of dynamic trust establishment between
different entities and does not consider how they can be federated dynamically. Furthermore,
this also requires a major change of the SAML Protocol to integrate and utilise such trust
values during protocol flow.
2.4 User-controlled Identity Management Systems
In this researche, the concept of a User-controlled Identity Management System is proposed
for tackling several problems of existing Identity Management Systems and for allowing
users to have more control over their own attributes. To enable this, a user-controlled Portable
Personal IdP, which is hosted in a mobile device of the user, is introduced. Being a novel
topic, there in no published literature on the User-controlled Identity Management System.
The closest to the theme of the User-controlled Identity Management System is the concept
of the Portable Identity Provider which is a special type of IdP. The initial concept of such an
IdP can be found in [28] where the authors proposed their idea of Identity-aware Devices. An
identity-aware device contains a local IdP hosted inside a Trusted Processing Module (TPM)
in the device. The local IdP is coupled with a telecom provider which acts as the principal
IdP. The user needs to create an account with the telecom provider and link the local IdP
with the principal IdP. The linking procedure allows the local IdP to fetch some crucial user
attributes from the principal IdP and store them safely in the local storage. Using the local
IdP, the user can release those attributes to access services from an SP which is a part of
the same federation as the principal IdP. Being part of the same federation as the principal
IdP, the SP can validate the released attributes using existing technologies such as SAML.
The idea of the user-controlled IdP is similar to this approach with one major difference: this
approach requires a user to heavily rely on the principal IdP, i.e. the telecom operator whereas
the proposed concept advocates the need to decouple the reliance on any other external IdP.
Another work related to this theme can be found in [29] in which a portable Liberty Al-
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liance1-enabled IdP installed in a mobile phone is presented. The IdP is installed on the
phone and is accompanied by a Relay Server which is maintained by a Mobile Operator.
The relay server is responsible for providing the URL of the IdP. During authentication, the
user provides the URL to the SP which uses it to send authentication request from the re-
lay server which in turn forwards the request to the IdP. The IdP then authenticates a user
using the PIN (Personal Identification Number) of the SIM (Subscriber Identity Module).
The advantage of such a portable IdP is that the authentication information is not transmitted
over the network. However, there is no discussion on how the federation is established and,
with the absence of a federation, how an assertion can be validated. Moreover, the mobile
operator has to establish a relay server meaning the operator has to offer a new service for it.
Without any business prospect on their part, many operators may not be interested in bearing
the associated cost. Moreover, apart from authenticating a user, this approach does not state
how user attributes will be transmitted to an SP.
In [31], the author proposes a form of device-centric identity which allows a user to authorise
a device to use a cryptographic key to identify the user and allow access to online services.
The user can add new devices or remove old ones from the list of authorised devices. In
essence, the authorised device can act as an IdP. The proposal is only an outline and how
such a proposal can be envisaged is not explained.
Current popular smartphone Operating Systems such as Android [32], iOS [33] and Windows
[34] are associated with their respective identity providers. For Android, the IdP is Google
Account [35], AppleID [36] for iOS and Windows Live ID [37] for Windows. Among them,
Apple ID and Windows Live ID are mostly used to access services associated with Apple
and Windows respectively. Only Google has a Federated Login service based on the OpenID
protocol to allow users to use their Google accounts to access services offered by other
service providers [38]. Users carrying a mobile phone having a Google account can access
supported online services while on the move. Even though it adds an element of portability,
the Google IdP is not installed in a mobile phone and acts just like any third party IdP holding
user attributes. Hence, it cannot be tagged as a user-controlled IdP.
Also, it is worth noting that every Identity Management System is bound by a set of func-
tional, security, privacy and trust requirements. Unfortunately, none of the works mentioned
in this section provides a thorough analysis of these requirements. In this thesis, these re-
quirements will be introduced and analysed at appropriate chapters.
1More precisely the “Identity Federation Framework” (ID-FF) formulated by the Liberty Alliance (LA, in
short) consortium [30]
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2.5 Context-aware Identity Management
A large number of works can be found in the literature focusing on how contexts can be in-
tegrated either into an authentication framework or into an authorisation framework. There
are only a handful of works that deal both issues of authentication and authorisation together
and the number of works that analyse the effect of context awareness in all aspects of iden-
tity management is almost negligible. Each of these aspects is discussed in the following
subsections.
2.5.1 Context-aware Authentication
A context-aware authentication mechanism uses the context of a user for authenticating the
user. There are numerous such mechanisms. Here, a few of the most influential works are
reviewed.
In [39], the authors have presented a secure and usable context-aware user authentication
mechanism to be used in a hospital environment. The mechanism consists of several compo-
nents such as clients, context monitors and context servers. A client is essentially a service
provider equipped with a smartcard reader. Each user is provided with a smartcard with the
capability to execute an applet. The applet is initialised with an RSA key pair generated
using the identifier and password of the user. The identifier, the password and the private key
are stored in the smartcard whereas the respective public key is stored in the context server
along with the user identifier. A context monitor consists of different external sensors that
determine the location of a user. Each context monitor is connected to the context server
which is aware of the locations of all context monitors. To determine the location of a user,
the context server uses either an RFID tag belonging to a user or the WLAN signal emitted
by devices belonging to a user. Using these components, the authentication protocol is as
follows. A user comes nearby to a context monitor and the monitor detects the presence
of the RFID tag. The identifier of the RFID tag is transmitted to the context server which
determines the identifier of the user using the identifier of the RFID tag. The server also
determines the location of the user using the identifier of the user and the location of the
monitor. Next, the user inserts her smartcard into the reader. The reader reads the encrypted
identifier from the card and transmits it to the server via the client. The server decrypts the
user identifier and then uses it to determine the user’s location. The location is transferred
back to the client and then the client determines if the user is allowed to access a service.
The proposed mechanism is assessed to be secure against different attacks. The proposal
has only considered the identifier to determine the identity of a user ignoring other attributes
which may constitute the identity of the user. In addition, the proposal did not consider how
it could be used for identity management.
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A framework for authenticating a user based on the proximity to external sensors is presented
in [40]. The authors argued that detecting a user inside a building could be quite tricky and
suggested on using proximity sensors. The paper illustrates two situations discussed below.
The first scenario is known as the Personal Beacon Authentication in which a user can be
authenticated using her mobile device and an external sensor known as the Personal Beacon.
The beacon and the mobile device can communicate with each other using Bluetooth or
near-field magnetic communication. The beacon uses a PKI for authenticating a user where
the administrator of the beacon generates the pair of RSA keys and obtains a certificate
containing the public key signed by a CA. The root certificate of the CA is installed in
the mobile device. When the mobile device comes near to the beacon, the authentication
mechanism is activated. If the device and the beacon communicate for the first time, an
initial phase, known as the enrolment phase, takes place where the mobile device obtains
the certificate containing the public key of the beacon. The mobile device validates the
certificate by using the root certificate. Once validated, the enrolment phase concludes. This
allows the mobile device to participate in a challenge-response protocol for authentication
with the beacon every time they are nearby. For this, the device generates a random value
(A) and passes to the beacon for signing. Upon receiving the random value, the beacon
generates another random value (B) and concatenates two random values (A||B). Then, the
concatenated random values are signed by the beacon and returned to the device. The device
validates the signature of the concatenated random values and retrieves B which is then
returned to the beacon. Once the beacon receives B, the user of the device is considered
authenticated. After authentication, how the user accesses services is not explored in the
paper.
The second scenario is known as the Organisation Authentication Beacon in which a device
does not have any location information. Instead, the location information is retrieved from
the installed proximity sensor known as the organisational beacon. Like before, a mobile
device and an organisational beacon communicate using Bluetooth. The administrator of
the beacon sets up the X.509 certificate whereas the root certificate is installed in the device.
During communication, a Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection is established using the
X.509 certificate. The location information is securely transmitted using this TLS connection
from the beacon to the device. Upon receiving the location information, the device switches
itself to the authenticated mode. What is achieved in this mode is not further explored in the
paper.
The proposal and its implementations did not consider mutual authentication since the iden-
tities of the beacons are verified using certificates whereas the identity of the device remains
unverified. The lack of identity verification of a user will allow every user nearby to the
beacon to access same services without any personalisation. Furthermore, an SP will not be
able to provide restricted services to a user without knowing her identity. Also, the paper did
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not consider how this setting could be explored for identity management.
Another paper that describes how contextual data can be used for mutual authentication of
users can be found in [41]. The authors have proposed a mechanism consisting of two enti-
ties: users and context providers. The context of a user consists of several information such
as: time, location and activity. A context provider is responsible for providing secure and
verifiable contexts of a user retrieved using different external sensors. Two users authen-
ticate each other by retrieving their respective contextual data from the respective context
provider and exchanging them with each other. The proposed mechanism utilises Identity
Based Encryption (IBE) for secure exchange of contextual information and a combination
of timed fuzzy logic and private set intersection for privacy-preserving calculation of con-
fidence that determines if a user can be considered authenticated to another user. Since the
proposal deals with mutual authentication of two users, it is impractical to be integrated with
online services. Furthermore, the authors did not consider the suitability of their proposal
for identity management.
In [42] Hsieh et al. have presented an One Time Password (OTP) authentication scheme
that utilises contextual information such as time and location of a user device. A service
provider, regarded as the Application Server in the paper, utilises such contextual information
to provide services to a user. The user is identified using the International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI), a unique identifier for the mobile device of the user whereas an OTP is
generated by concatenating the location of the mobile device retrieved using the GPS sensor
of the device and the time of service request. According to the proposal, this information
is transferred in encrypted format to the service provider where the provider decrypts and
retrieves such information using PKI. Unfortunately, the proposal is quite sketchy in the
sense that the authors did not elaborate the mechanism by which PKI could be established
for their proposal and the location could be extracted from the concatenated OTP. In addition,
the absence of any security analysis undermines the credibility of the proposal. Furthermore,
it is not clear if this approach could be used for identity management.
In order to strike a balance between security and usability, the authors in [43] present a prob-
abilistic model for authenticating a user (generally the owner) in a mobile device. The model
utilises two factors: active authentication factor and passive factor. An active authentication
factor symbolises the existing mechanisms for authenticating a user in the current genera-
tion of smart mobile devices, namely, PIN, Password and No-PIN, whereas, a passive factor
represents the context of a user, namely, in the form of locations and the time of a day. The
model automatically chooses an active authentication factor based on the combination of a
specific location or time. For example, the model relaxes the restriction of using a PIN or
password when a user is at her home or at her workplace, however, imposes the restriction
of a PIN or password for other places. Another example is that a PIN can be used at a user’s
home or workplace and a password can be used for other places. A user can set her preferred
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mode of active authentication factor for different contexts. The proposed model has been
implemented in a smartphone app which has been used for an extensive user study. The
result of the study suggests an enhancement in usability without compromising security. The
focus of this work is to authenticate a user on a mobile phone and hence, it does not con-
sider the issue of identity management using contexts. Moreover, since the authentication is
conducted on a mobile device, it is impractical for integrating into online services.
2.5.2 Context-aware Authorisation
A context-aware authorisation mechanism uses the context of users to authorise (in other
words, to control accesses) them for accessing a service. Among many such mechanisms, a
few of the most influential ones are presented.
One of the earliest works to propose how contextual information can be incorporated for
access control scenarios is Generalized Role Based Access Control (or GRBAC) [44] which
is an extension of the popular Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model [45]. In this ap-
proach, three different types of roles are defined: Subject Roles (denoted as SRole), Object
Roles (denoted as ORole) and Environment Roles (denoted as ERole). Subject roles, similar
to the concept of roles in RBAC, represent the role of an individual in a system. Object roles
represent different security related properties of an object in a system. Finally, environment
roles represent contextual information that expresses the time of day, weather conditions and
other spatial and temporal values. Similar to RBAC, GRBAC defines policies that determine
which operations (denoted as op) are permitted in a transaction. A transaction is defined as a
tuple of <SRole, ORole, ERole, op> which expresses that a subject having SRole is permitted
to perform operation op on an object with ORole under the conditions of ERole contextual
information. Compared to the commonly used RBAC model, GRBAC is more expressive
which makes it suitable for context-aware authorisation schemes. Based on the concept of
GRBAC and environment roles, an architecture has been presented in [46] which illustrates
the applicability of leveraging contextual information in the form of environment roles to
control accesses in a smart home environment. The authors represent environment roles in
different forms. For example, the roles of users in the smart homes are represented using
a hierarchy of family such as father, mother and siblings. Temporal roles are represented
using a hierarchy of day and time whereas spatial roles are represented using internal loca-
tions within the smart home such as the first floor, second floor, bedroom, kitchen and so on.
Based on these environment roles, the authors have implemented a system that utilises the
transaction tuple of GRBAC for controlling accesses to different resources inside the smart
home. The smart home has been equipped with sensors to capture the environment roles
and the user has the ability to specify policies that dictates which resources are accessible
by which roles under what contexts. Even though both these works are influential in nature
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in the domain of context-aware authorisation, one major problem is that environment roles
introduce complexities in administering policies which in turn makes it difficult to ensure
that the policies are conflict free. In addition, a large number of environment roles makes the
system very difficult to manage manually.
To tackle this problem, Zhang and Parashar have proposed a Dynamic RBAC (DRBAC)
model [47] by extending the traditional RBAC model. The model adjusts static roles and
permission assignments dynamically using contextual information. The DRBAC consists of
several components:
• USERS representing the set of entities who try to access services from a service provider.
• ROLES representing the set of roles that users can assume in a service provider.
• PERMS representing the set of permissions for accessing one or more resources in the
provider.
• ENVS representing the contextual information of a user in the system.
DRBAC defines different rules to assign roles (from the ROLES set) to a user (from the
USERS set) and permissions (from the PERMS set) to resources and uses policies to deter-
mine which user having what roles can access which resource(s). One of the striking features
of DRBAC is its capability to capture the changes of the environment in the system and of
the user and to enforce permissions accordingly. For example, a user having roles r1 and r2
can assume role r1 only if she is at location l1 and can assume role r2 only if she is at loca-
tion l2. Depending on the roles at a particular context, the user is allowed to access particular
resources. One limitation of the proposal is its lack of any explanation on how the location
of a user would be detected by the provider. In addition, there is no discussion if the proposal
can be used for identity management.
None of these works consider how to verify the authenticity and validity of contextual in-
formation. To overcome this limitation, a context sensitive access control architecture was
defined in [48]. The architecture introduces several components including Context Owner
(CO), Context Provider (CP), Context Broker (CB), and Context-aware Service Provider
(CASP). A CO is the owner of the contextual information that is collected from different
sources. It is solely responsible for deciding when, why, how and where contextual infor-
mation is released, and who can store such information. A CP is responsible for ensuring
different contextual information is released as per the requirements of the CO of the re-
spective information. A CASP is responsible for providing services to a user, based on her
context. The authors provide a detailed protocol flow using their architecture and explain the
mechanism for verifying the validity and authenticity of contextual information. The major
problem of the architecture is the reliance on several external parties which may be difficult
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to implement for federated services considering different security domains and trust issues.
Also, it is unclear how their proposal can be used for identity management.
The authors in [49] have proposed a model describing how contextual information can be
included during an authorisation process in highly dynamic environments. Contextual in-
formation is provided by different devices which are regarded as observers. The validity of
the contextual information is verified by a trusted third party. The defined model consists of
contextual conditions which are tuples of the form (<context, operation, object>) and dic-
tates which entity with which context can perform which action on which object. A user
is authorised to perform the specified operation on the respective object only if the context
is valid. The authorisation decision also includes several conditions that are combined us-
ing logical rules. Their model of tuple is similar to the eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) model [50] and does not provide any additional advantages over the
XACML model.
2.5.3 Context-aware Authentication and Authorisation
Frameworks presented in this section utilise the context of a user for authentication as well
as for authorisation while accessing a service. Like before, among many existing works, a
few of the most influential ones are discussed below.
Based on the concept of GRBAC in [44] and the architecture presented in [46], a framework
called Context-Aware Security Architecture (CASA) and its proof-of-concept implementa-
tion are presented in [51] which demonstrates how contextual information of a user can be
utilised for authentication and authorisation of the user in a smart home environment. The
framework can be used to develop secure context-aware services and consists of different
components such as Policy Editor, Security Management Service (SMS), Authorisation Ser-
vice, Authentication Service, Environment Role Activation Service (ERAS) and Context
Management Service (CMS). The policy editor allows any administrator to assign roles to
users and write policies using the Generalized Policy Definition Language (GPDL) [44] for
controlling accesses to different resources. The SMS is responsible for storing and man-
aging roles and policies and providing them to other components whenever required. The
authorisation service is responsible for enforcing authorisation decisions during service ac-
cess requests. For this, the policies are retrieved from the SMS and it is determined if the
user having a particular role can access the requested service. The authentication service
is responsible for authenticating a user using either a push or pull method. In the push
method, a user submits her credential during each service access request whereas in the pull
method a user is authenticated when a particular service needs authentication. The ERAS
is responsible for activating different environment roles depending on different states of the
environment which are collected from the CMS. Finally, the CMS is responsible for collect-
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ing and disseminating states of the environment using different sensors. The authors have
presented a detailed discussion regarding the implementation of the CASA and how it can be
utilised to develop other context-aware applications. Even though this is one of the earliest
works that showcased the potential for secure context-aware services, one main drawback is
its limited focus within the domain of a smart home. This makes it difficult to deploy it in
other scenarios such as online services.
The authors in [52] argue that the existing RBAC model fails to meet the need for a flex-
ible, on-demand and dynamic authentication and authorisation solution for the healthcare
domain. To mitigate this problem, the authors have presented a dynamic and context-aware
infrastructure which can fulfil different security and privacy requirements. Their proposal
recognises five different types of contexts: time of an access request, location in the form of
IP address, physical or semantic location (e.g. inside hospital), user ID used to identify an
entity, object type representing the type of resource or service requested and object ID used
to identify the requested resource or service. The infrastructure has three main components:
an authentication engine, an authorisation engine and a context service. The authentication
engine is responsible for authenticating a user and supports different modes such as user-
name/password and biometric (e.g. fingerprint, iris, signature and voice). The authorisation
engine is responsible for authorising a user and enforcing policies while accessing services.
It allows administrators to setup policies using WS-Policy [53] which is an XML-based stan-
dard to specify access control rules for different resources. Users are categorised in different
roles and policies define which role having which permission can access which resources.
The context service component is responsible for evaluating a context type and is invoked by
the authorisation engine. The implementation details are quite sketchy and it is unclear how
different contexts are collected and disseminated. Also, the proposal does not discuss how
the authenticity of contexts can be validated. In addition to this, it is unclear if their proposal
can be adopted for online services
An agent-based framework for authentication and access control in context-aware services
is presented in [54]. The framework uses an additional entity called an authentication and
access control agent which is actually a trusted third party. The context is represented using
different information: the location of a user and services, environmental information (such
as temperature, brightness and loudness), different roles of a user, different network types
(such as office LAN, public LAN and home LAN), etc. The agent is responsible for collect-
ing contextual data from different servers such as a location management server, presence
management server and user profile management server, for obtaining the user’s identity
from an IdP, authenticating a user or the user’s terminal and obtaining a user’s attributes.
The administrators can define authorisation policies. Based on the identified contexts, the
attributes of the user and the conditions defined in the policy, the user is granted or rejected
to access a service. However, there is no discussion how services can be deployed. The inter-
2.5. Context-aware Identity Management 29
actions between the authentication and access control agent and the service providers are not
very clear. Also, the architecture relies heavily on external servers which, in one hand, will
be difficult to manage to provide federated services and, on the other hand, will be difficult
to manage the privacy of the user across many external servers.
An attribute-based framework for authentication and authorisation in mobile environments
has been presented in [55]. Here, attributes are represented as the context of a user which
can be utilised to authenticate as well as to authorise the user during a service access request.
Examples of contextual attributes are different properties - such as time, temperature and lo-
cation - of the environment from which a user makes a request to access a service, the nature
(e.g. premium or basic) of the service requested and the proof of a specific transaction in
the form of an e-receipt and e-token. The framework consists of several components: Client,
Attribute Provider (AP), Service Provider (SP), Attribute Verifier (AV) and Certificate Au-
thority (CA). A client represents a user and her compatible mobile device. The user can use
the mobile device to access services. The mobile device is responsible for gathering contex-
tual attributes of the environment and storing the attributes securely in a Trusted Processing
Module. This allows the device to release the stored attributes to an SP in such a manner
that the SP can verify the authenticity of the gathered attributes. An AP is responsible for
disseminating contextual attributes of an environment using different sensors. An SP is re-
sponsible for providing services to a user. An AV is responsible for verifying the authenticity
of attributes. For secure interactions between all entities, a PKI using a CA is deployed. The
protocol flow assumed by this framework is as follows. A cafe has deployed this framework
to allow its buyers to avail premium services from an SP. Let as assume that a user visits
the cafe and buys a coffee from the cafe. As a proof of her purchase, an e-receipt is stored
in the TPM of the mobile device. While enjoying the coffee, the user decides to access the
said services from the SP. She uses her device to fetch contextual attributes of the cafe from
the AP which are then stored in the TPM of the device. The e-receipt and the contextual
attributes are then released to the SP. The SP validates the e-receipt which proves that the
user is a client of the cafe. Then, the attributes are forwarded to the AV for validation. A
successful validation proves that the user is currently at the cafe. The result of the validation
is sent back to the SP. At this point, the SP allows the user to access the requested services.
The main limitation of the proposal is its lack of any discussion regarding implementation. It
is not clear how the AP will be installed and maintained in the environment. Since installing
and maintaining APs in different environments will be expensive, it is unclear which entity
(the cafe or the SP) will bear the associated cost.
An interesting work where contextual information such as roles and locations are used for au-
thenticating and authorising a user has been presented in [56]. The approach uses passive and
active authentication cues for authenticating a user. The active authentication cues are user-
names/passwords, while the passive authentication cues are contextual information, namely
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roles and the location of the user. An access control mechanism is proposed in which the
role and location information are combined in creating policies to determine what resources
can be accessed by which users. The access control system and the policies are based on the
XACML model. The role of the user is retrieved from the system using the user-supplied
username once the authentication is completed. The location of the user is determined by
allowing the user to forward the location information which is retrieved from a QR Code
(Quick Response Code) using a mobile phone. The proposed architecture consists of several
components such as Core Access Management Module(CAMM), User Database and Policy
Store, Client Mobile Device, Authentication Site and Additional Context Cues (ACC). The
CAMM is responsible for generating and managing QR codes in different indoor locations
and for gathering usage analytics such as the popular positions among users for authenticat-
ing users via QR codes as well as all authentication attempts via different QR codes. The
database and policy store is responsible for storing attributes of users and policies that define
access control rules. Each user needs to utilise a mobile device equipped with the Wi-Fi
capability to make authentication requests, a camera to scan QR codes and corresponding
software to decode any scanned QR code. An authentication site is the physical place where
QR codes are displayed and users scan the codes to make authentication requests. The ACC
is responsible for gathering additional contextual information, for example, the calendar in-
formation of a user. A typical use-case using this architecture is as follows. A QR code is
displayed at an authentication site. A user uses her mobile device to scan the QR code. After
decoding the code, an authentication request is sent automatically to the server. At this point,
the user needs to submit her username and password for authentication. Once authenticated,
attributes of the user (e.g. roles and other information) and associated policies for the au-
thentication site are retrieved from the store. The server evaluates the policies to determine
if the user can access a resource in that authentication site. This is another work in which
the focus is limited in controlling accesses in a physical location. This makes it difficult to
deploy for online services.
2.5.4 Context-aware Identity Management
The only work to discuss the issue of context-awareness in Identity Management can be
found in [57] where the authors have proposed and implemented a framework for selecting
appropriate partial identities of a user depending on her context. To design the framework,
the authors raised a few crucial questions closely related to the issues of context-awareness
of identity management:
• What data can sufficiently constitute a partial identity of a user including her contextual
information?
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• What will be the source of this contextual information and how such data can be col-
lected in a standardised way?
• Which partial identity should be used in a particular situation?
• How the information regarding the selected partial identity can be propagated in a
privacy-friendly manner?
These questions have been utilised for formulating requirements and based on the require-
ments a novel framework has been proposed. The framework consists of three major com-
ponents: i) Contextual Information, ii) Personal Identity Manager and iii) Privacy Manager.
The contextual information component consists of three sub-components: Context Provider,
Context Server and Context Request. A context provider resides in a mobile device of a user
and is responsible for retrieving contextual information, such as times and outdoor locations
via GPS and indoor locations via Ultra-wide Band (UWB) signal, from different sensors and
providing them to other components. In addition, the context provider is equipped with an
interface to allow a user to set up meaningful semantic contexts such as at work, at home,
etc.. The context server is responsible for storing contexts of different users. For this, it
queries for contexts from the context provider of each user and stores them at its end. The
context requester also resides in a mobile device of a user and is responsible for retrieving
contexts of a user from the context provider or contexts of other users from the context server.
The personal identity manager consists of three sub-components: personal information mod-
ule, contextual information module and policies and rules module. The personal information
module is responsible for storing information regarding personal identities in an XML file.
A user’s identity has been categorised in three different types: personal identity (PID), cor-
porate identity (CID) and social identity (SID). Essentially, each such identity represents a
partial identity of a user and a user can add any information and define it to be a part of a
certain partial identity. The contextual information module is responsible for retrieving the
user’s contextual information from the provider and presenting such information in a graph-
ical interface. The policies and rules module provides an interface to the user for setting
up rules and policies that dictate which conditions must be satisfied to request and access a
certain partial identity.
The privacy manager module consists of three sub-components: the profile information mod-
ule, privacy manager decision module and profile zoning module. The profile information
module allows a user to select her attributes to define different profiles. For example, a user
may select her official email address, office phone number and schedule calendar to be in-
cluded in the office profile whereas her personal email address and mobile phone number
for the personal profile. Finally, the privacy manager decision and profile zoning modules
consult with different modules to determine which profile can be released to which entity.
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Even though the proposal is promising, it lacks substantially in several aspects. Firstly, the
relevance between a partial identity and a profile has not been clarified. It is unclear if a
profile is a sub-category of a partial identity. In addition, what information constitutes a par-
tial identity is never thoroughly analysed and hence, the first question remains unanswered.
Secondly, the focus of the proposal is somewhat narrow as its applicability has been inves-
tigated in MANET (Mobile Ad-hoc Network) where different users can share their profiles
using contextual information. It has not been investigated how this proposal can be utilised
for accessing online services. Thirdly, the implementation is vague in the sense that only the
interfaces for different components have been presented and discussed, ignoring the protocol
that has been used during user interactions. The lack of discussion regarding practical use-
cases and protocol flow makes it a bit difficult to understand the usefulness of the proposal.
Finally, the inclusion of external components makes this framework impractical to be used
with the existing architecture of federated services without analysing the underlying trust
requirements between themselves.
2.6 Attribute Aggregation
Attribute Aggregation is the mechanism to combine attributes from multiple identity providers
while accessing a single online service. There are different models, either in the form of
proposals or implementations, currently available. A detailed discussion regarding existing
attribute aggregation models can be found in [58, 59]. In addition to discussion of differ-
ent models, the authors in [59] have provided an analysis on several challenges of attribute
aggregation and identity management. One of the limitations of both works is the lack of
any comparative analysis among the available attribute aggregation models which makes it
difficult to understand how each model performs against others in different aspects and to
identify the strengths and weaknesses of each model. Moreover, none of them has considered
the need for an analysis of different (functional, security, privacy and trust) requirements.
To fill in this gap, the authors in [60] have presented a survey of requirements required
for attribute aggregation from multiple sources. The requirements have been formulated by
distributing questionnaires in different international communities of security professionals.
The questionnaire consists of several questions in different aspects such as general, privacy,
control, protocol and trust. Based on the responses from security professionals, a list of
requirements is formulated. Then, the list of requirements has been used to compare four
existing aggregation models and to identify their strengths and weaknesses. However, the
trust, functional, security and privacy requirements have not been properly categorised and
many trust, functional, security and privacy requirements have not been even considered.
Based on the requirements identified in [60], the authors in [61] have presented a proposal
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and implementation of a novel Attribute Aggregation model, called Linking Service, for
Federated Identity Management with the aim to counteract the weaknesses in the existing
models.
Even so, it has been found in this research that all existing proposals have some limitations.
Many of these models are theoretical in nature and have no implementation. The models that
have been implemented either require complex user interactions or are based on unrealistic
assumptions. This is one of the key reasons why the process of attribute aggregation has not
yet been popular in online services. The findings will be presented in Chapter 8 where the
issue of attribute aggregation will be discussed thoroughly.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter provides a short introduction of three popular Identity Management Systems.
These three Identity Management Systems have been used in Chapter 4 for a comparative
analysis. Based on the comparative analysis, a system has been chosen for this research.
Additionally, this chapter also reviews the existing works on selective aspects of Identity
Management which have been chosen for this research. From the review presented in previ-
ous sections, the following conclusions can be drawn:
• A SAML-based federation suffers from a serious limitation: a federation cannot be
created in a dynamic fashion. This makes it hard to scale and maintain as the number
of parties starts to increase in the federation. The existing work allows a federation
to be created dynamically in a semi-automatic fashion, requires a major change of
SAML or only discusses how a federation can be created, ignoring other aspects of
maintaining a federation.
• The concept of User-controlled Identity Management System is new and hence there
exists no reference of any existing work on this concept. The closest, in relation to this
concept, that can be found is the concept of the Portable Identity Provider. However,
such an IdP is still reliant on the external IdP and thus it will be not under the full
control of the user.
• There exist a substantial amount of works that investigate how contextual information
can be integrated with the authentication and authorisation process. However, there is
only one work that discusses the issue of context-awareness with respect to all aspects
of Identity Management. Unfortunately, the proposed approach has several limitations
and will be hard to deploy in existing architecture of federated services.
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• Attribute Aggregation being a novel topic, also has a very few existing works. Most
of these works are theoretical in nature meaning they have not been implemented. The
aggregation models that have been implemented have serious limitations: they require
complex user interactions or are based on unrealistic assumptions.
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Chapter 3
Identity Management: Basic
Terminologies and Models
3.1 Introduction
A number of groups have worked in isolated projects resulting in various incompatible Iden-
tity Management Systems. Not only these systems are inconsistent with each other, but
different groups came up with different notions and semantics of many central topics related
to Identity Management. For example, some fundamental issues of Identity Management
such as Identifiers, (Digital) Identity and Partial Identity are treated in different ways in
[62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67]. The term Identity is defined as “the equivalent to the physical
presence of that entity” in [62], whereas [64] defines Identity as “the set of permanent or
long-lived temporal attributes associated with an entity”. The same concept of Identity is de-
fined by “the dynamic collection of all of the entity’s attributes” in [63]. The first definition
is a mere abstraction, whereas the second and third have significantly different meanings.
Such differences on core topics introduce inconsistencies and such inconsistencies in turn
introduce confusion, making it difficult to gain an understanding of Identity Management.
To rectify the situation, an effort has been undertaken to develop a consistent vocabulary
related to Anonymity, Unlinkability, Undetectability, Unobservability, Pseudonymity and
Identity Management. The goal is to build a common language which can be used as a
point of reference in any future research project. The result of this work is an evolving
document [67]. Though appreciable, their focus is somewhat narrow as it only deals with
those definitions that are related to privacy aspects of Identity Management. The domain of
Identity Management is much broader, and thus the document in [67] is not comprehensive
in nature. A more general effort with the similar goal can be found in [63] that provides
definitions on different issues related to Identity Management omitting the relation between
each definition, and thus making it difficult to apprehend the whole concept. In addition,
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definitions in [63] are given in textual forms which can lead to both misinterpretation and
misunderstanding.
A mathematical model formally defining the different issues of Identity Management would
extend and enhance the textual definitions by removing discrepancies, reducing confusion
and allowing a solid understanding, based on mathematical foundations. A paper toward this
direction can be found in [68]. Unfortunately, similarly to [67], this work focuses mainly
on the privacy aspects of Identity Management. Therefore, as noted in [69], a mathematical
modelling of the general aspects of Identity Management is still missing. To fill in this gap,
a comprehensive mathematical model of Identity and Identity Management has been built
using a compiled set of textual terminologies as the basis.
This chapter presents the compiled set of textual terminologies which are accompanied by
their respective mathematical notations. In this manner, the mathematical model of different
core topics related to Identity Management is gradually built up by mathematically defining
atomic issues of Entity, Domain, Attribute, Identifier, Partial Identifier, Partial Identity and
Data. Then, these concepts are combined to build up a mathematical model to define Digital
Identity. Next, the devised model of Digital Identity is used to define a basic model of
Identity Management and show how the digital identity model can be used to characterise the
behaviour of an Identity Management System. And finally, three applications are discussed
to illustrate how the model can be used to analyse different scenarios related to Identity
Management and to characterise three popular IdM models mathematically.
3.2 Entity, Identity, Identity Management and Other
Related Terminologies
3.2.1 Entity
An entity is a physical or logical object which has a separate distinctive existence either in
a physical or a logical sense [70]. Both animate and inanimate objects can be considered as
entities. Different disciplines interpret the term Entity in different ways and with different
meaning. In the scope of this thesis, a person, an organisation or a machine (computer)
operated by any person or organisation, a network, a network element, a software program,
a hardware and a web service will all be denoted as entities. An entity can be classified in
different ways. The following definitions classify different entities and have been collected
from [71].
Physical Entity. A physical entity is an entity for which some sort of physical constituent
is compulsory. That is, an entity which exists physically with a separate distinctive
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existence in the physical world can be denoted as a Physical Entity. Every living and
non-living object that surround us are physical entities. However, in the scope of this
thesis, the focus will be restricted to people and hardware as physical entities.
Virtual Entity. A virtual entity is an entity which is or has been the product of the mind or
imagination. Thus, an entity which has no physical existence and exists inside some-
one’s mind or imagination with solely logical meaning can be denoted as a Virtual
(or Logical) Entity. Therefore, any kind of thought, concept, perception, category or
abstraction can be thought of as a virtual entity. Examples are specific roles (such as
the CEO of an organisation or the President of a country), different groups (British cit-
izens), avatars in online games such as Second Life, Computer programs, etc. [71]. In
the scope of this thesis, only organisations and computer programs will be considered
as virtual entities.
Following the imposed restrictions, an entity can be physical or virtual but not both; meaning
the sets for physical and virtual entities are disjoint.
Digital Entity. A digital entity is any entity which primarily exists in some digital domains
(see below), e.g., as digitally encoded information or as a running computer program.
In other words, the digital encoding or representation of an entity (Physical or Virtual)
so that it can have its unique existence in the digital world can be denoted as a Digital
Entity.
The following sets of entities are now formally introduced.
Definition 1 Let E denote the set of all entities. The set of people (or persons) is given by P ,
while the sets of organisations, hardware and software are given by O, H and S respectively.
Furthermore, PE is the set of Physical Entities and VE the set of Virtual Entities.
According to the above definitions, persons, organisations, hardware, and software are all
entities of different types and are disjoint from each other, and their union constitute the
whole set of entities. Therefore the following equations hold:
• E = P ∪O ∪H ∪ S;
• P ∩ (O ∪ S ∪H) = ∅;
• O ∩ (S ∪H) = ∅;
• S ∩H = ∅.
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Since it is assumed that only person(s) and hardware constitute a Physical Entity, therefore
PE = P ∪ H . Similarly, as it is assumed that a virtual entity is either an organisation or
software, it follows that VE = O∪S. From the rules above, the sets PE and VE are disjoint,
i.e. PE ∩ VE = ∅, and the sets of PE and VE are both subsets of E.
In this thesis, the focus is on digital identities (DE ). Therefore, all entities are considered
as digital entities and from this point on, when entities are mentioned, it will imply digital
entities. In this sense, the sets of entities and digital entities are identical in this thesis. For
brevity, the symbol E will be used to denote the set of digital entities.
3.2.2 Domain, Application Domain or Identity Domain
A domain is the encompassing environment under which an entity exists and operates. In
its most general form, a domain is everything that surrounds us, physically and virtually.
However, we human beings tend to divide the whole domain into different smaller domains
using social terms and conditions to define them separately. We then present different images
of ourselves using roles and relationships in different domains. Examples of domains include
Personal, Family, Friends, Work and Country. Such different representations of the same
person are, in fact, common traits of the modern society and allow us to establish, maintain
and nurture different relationships simultaneously [72].
A digital entity allows a person to reflect her digital image into the online world. The online
world can also be divided into several domains, much like the physical world. However,
unlike the physical world, social roles and relationships are not the predominant factors that
divide the domain; it is mainly achieved through the concept of an application domain or
namespace in which each (digital) entity is represented and identified uniquely. An Ap-
plication Domain, also known as the Identity Domain, is essentially the virtual boundary,
namespace or environment in which an entity can be uniquely identified. The scope of an
application domain determines its validity. There are different scopes of an application do-
main: scopes can be local (the application domain is valid inside a department), enterprise-
wide (the application domain is valid inside the whole organisation), national (the applica-
tion domain is valid inside a country) or global (the application domain is valid all over the
Internet). The focus in this thesis is on such an application domain. When a domain is men-
tioned, it will actually imply an application (or identity) domain and hence the terms will
be used interchangeably throughout the thesis. Note that the term Context is used in many
Identity Management literatures to describe the same meaning as the application domain.
Interestingly, the term Context has a specific meaning in the literature of Context-aware Ser-
vices which will be explored later in the thesis. To avoid any ambiguity over the term of
Context between these two disciplines, the term Context will be avoided while talking about
application domains.
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Whenever a digital entity is mentioned, it is important to elaborate the domain it operates in.
A subscript in each notation will denote the domain it operates in. So, Ed denotes the set
of defined entities in domain d. If the domain is clear from the surrounding discussion, the
subscript will be omitted. The notation DOMAIN will be used to denote the set of domains.
A real world analogy would be helpful to understand the modelling. Two systems are con-
sidered: the first is for blogging and the second is for emailing. These two systems, denoted
as BLOG and the EMAIL respectively, represent two different application domains. It is
assumed that each system has two users, i.e. two defined entities: JOHN and RAHIM in
the BLOG, and RAHIM and ALICE in the EMAIL. Therefore:
EBLOG = {JOHN ,RAHIM } and EEMAIL = {ALICE ,RAHIM }
In the following sections, different elements of the model will be explained based on this
example.
3.2.3 Attributes
An attribute is a distinct, measurable, physical or abstract named property belonging to an
entity in a given application domain and whose value can be used to identify that entity (not
necessarily uniquely) within that application domain [73, 63]. Here, the term “identify” is
used with its literal meaning. This term will be defined more precisely in later sections.
According to this definition, each attribute of an entity has a name and a value. The name
of the attribute (or simply the attribute) alone cannot identify an entity, the attribute together
with its value need to be used to identify an entity (not necessarily uniquely). In any appli-
cation domain, the value of an attribute is provided either by each entity or is provided by
a third party on the entity’s behalf. It is assumed that Age is an attribute in an application
domain and its value, say for example, 30, can be used to identify a set of entities using the
query: “Identify those in the application domain whose Age is 30”. This will return a set of
entities which may be empty if there is no entity whose age is 30 or may contain just one
element if there is only one entity with age 30 or more than one element in case there are
more than one entities in the application domain whose age are 30. Similarly, a postcode is
an attribute whose value can be used to identify a set of entities who live within the same
postcode area.
Another important aspect of an attribute in an application domain is its data type which
defines the values the attribute can take. For example, in some application domains, the data
type of the attribute Age could be String, whereas in other application domains the date type
could be Integer. The data type of an attribute, hence, depends on the specific application
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domain. For brevity, data types of attributes will not be considered in this thesis. Instead, the
focus will be on the attribute (in other words, the attribute name) and its value.
The value of an attribute may or may not identify an entity uniquely. In common terminolo-
gies, such values are also known as Data regarding an entity and Personal Data when the
involved entity is a Person. In the mathematical model derived in [68], attribute values are
regarded as Data as well. However, since each datum can be associated with at least with one
entity and can be used to identify entities (not necessarily uniquely), it is semantically more
meaningful to consider data as attributes. For example, reputation data on eBay or Amazon,
a blog entry and comments on a blogging site, photos and statuses on social networking sites
can be used to identify at least one entity. The query “who has positive feedback of at least
95% on ebay” would identify a group of entities with positive feedback of 95% or more and
is much like the query “who lives at the postcode of ‘G3 7AH’ in the UK” identifying the
group of people living in that particular postcode area.
The notation Ad will be used to denote the set of attributes in domain d. Similarly, the
notation AVd will denote the set of attribute values for attributes defined in Ad and provided
by the entities (or by third parties on behalf of the entities) in domain d.
Returning to the example, it is assumed that the domain BLOG has three different attributes:
username, age of the respective entity and the postcode of residence. For the entity JOHN ,
the values of these attributes are john, 32 and G3 respectively, while for RAHIM , the values
are rahim, 21 and G3 respectively. Therefore:
ABLOG = {username, age, postcode}
AVBLOG = {john, rahim, 21 , 32 ,G3}
Note that the set of attributes in different domains may overlap since the same attributes
may exist in different domains. Therefore, for two different domains d1 and d2, there is no
requirement that Ad1 ∩ Ad2 = ∅.
Now, different functions will be introduced to relate attributes and entities to their values in
an application domain.
Definition 2 The partial function atEntityToValued : Ad×Ed → AVd returns the corre-
sponding value of an attribute for a specific entity in domain d.
The reason atEntityToValued is defined as the partial function is that not all entities might
have a value for a respective attribute. Therefore, the function is only defined for the entities
that have a value for those attributes.
This function can be used to define another function atToValueSetd : Ad → P(AVd) that,
for a specific attribute, derives the set of values associated with some entities. Formally, for
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any attribute a ∈ Ad:
atToValueSetd(a)
def
= {atEntityToValued(a, e) | e ∈ Ed & atEntityToValued(a, e) is defined }
(3.1)
Equation 3.1 in turn can be extended to define a function atSetToValSetd : P(Ad) →
P(AVd) that retrieves the set of values for a set of attributes in domain d in the following
way, for any set of attributes Bd ∈ P(Ad):
atSetToValSetd(Bd)
def
=
⋃
b∈Bd
atToValueSetd(b) (3.2)
According to the example:
atEntityToValueBLOG((username,RAHIM)) = rahim
atEntityToValueBLOG((age,RAHIM)) = 32
atEntityToValueBLOG((postcode,RAHIM)) = G3
atEntityToValueBLOG((username, JOHN)) = john
atEntityToValueBLOG((age, JOHN)) = 21
atEntityToValueBLOG((postcode, JOHN)) = G3
atToValueSetBLOG(username)
= atEntitToValueBLOG(username, JOHN ) ∪ atEntityToValueBLOG(username,RAHIM )
= {john} ∪ {rahim}
= {john, rahim}
atToValueSetBLOG(age)
= atEntityToValueBLOG(age, JOHN ) ∪ atEntityToValueBLOG(age,RAHIM )
= {21 , 32}
atToValueSetBLOG(postcode)
= atEntityToValueBLOG(postcode, JOHN ) ∪ atEntityToValueBLOG(postcode,RAHIM )
= {G3}
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atSetToValSetBLOG({username, postcode})
= atToValueSetBLOG(username) ∪ atToValueSetBLOG(postcode)
= atEntityToValueBLOG(username, JOHN ) ∪
atEntityToValueBLOG(username,RAHIM ) ∪
atEntityToValueBLOG(postcode, JOHN ) ∪
atEntityToValueBLOG(postcode,RAHIM )
= {john, rahim,G3}
Next, functions that map attributes and values to the corresponding entities are defined.
Definition 3 The function atValueToEntitySetd : Ad×AV d → P(Ed) maps each attribute
and attribute value pair to the set of Entities which have that respective value for the attribute
in domain d. Formally, for any a ∈ Ad and v ∈ AV d:
atValueToEntitySetd(a, v) = {e ∈ Ed | atEntityToValued(a, e) = v}
This function can be used to define another function atValueSetToEntitySetd : P(Ad×AV d)
→ P(Ed) that retrieves the common set of entities for a set of attributes and values in domain
d. That is, for any Bd ∈ P(Ad×AV d):
atValueSetToEntitySetd(Bd)
def
=
⋂
b∈Bd
atValueToEntitySetd(b) (3.3)
Returning to the example:
atValueToEntitySetBLOG((username, rahim)) = {RAHIM}
atValueToEntitySetBLOG((age, 32)) = {JOHN}
atValueToEntitySetBLOG((postcode,G3)) = {JOHN,RAHIM}
Now, using (3.3):
atValueSetToEntitySetBLOG({(username, rahim), (postcode,G3)})
= atValueToEntitySetBLOG((username, rahim)) ∩
atValueToEntitySetBLOG((postcode,G3))
= {RAHIM} ∩ {JOHN,RAHIM}
= {RAHIM}
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3.2.4 Identifiers, Partial Identifiers, Null Identifiers and Creden-
tials
There are three different classes of attributes. One class can uniquely identify an entity, the
second class can identify at least one entity and the third can identify no entities. These types
are defined as the Identifier, Partial Identifier and Null Identifier respectively. Each type is
explained below. Then, a special attribute called Credential is introduced that accompanies
an identifier value during the identification and authentication process.
Identifier. An Identifier is an attribute whose value can be used to uniquely identify an
entity within an application domain [71, 74]. An entity may have many attributes associated
with itself, however, the most representative attribute whose value can be used to uniquely
identify an entity can be defined as the Identifier of that entity. According to this definition,
an Identifier is similar to the functionalities of a primary key in a relational database table.
There are many attributes in an application domain that may be used to uniquely identify an
entity at a certain point in time. However, when more entities are added into the application
domain, it may happen that one of the new entities has the same value for that attribute as an
existing entity, thus violating the condition that its value can be used to uniquely identify an
entity. To avoid unnecessary complications, each application domain considers one attribute
as the identifier and ensures that its value can be used to uniquely identify an entity as long
as the application domain exists. To determine the chosen identifier for a particular domain,
the following function is defined.
Definition 4 The function identifier : DOMAIN → Ad returns the chosen identifier such
that for any domain d, if i = identifier(d), then the following conditions are satisfied:
• atEntityToValued(i, e) is defined for all e ∈ Ed;
• atEntityToValued(i, e1) 6= atEntityToValued(i, e2) for all distinct e1, e2 ∈ Ed.
The above conditions correspond to the following (required) properties when an attribute has
been selected as the Identifier in a domain.
• Each entity of an application domain must have a value for the identifier;
• The value for the identifier can be used to uniquely identify any entity at any point in
time as long as the application domain exists. More formally, if i = identifier(d) and
v ∈ atToValueSetd(i), then |atValueToEntitySetd(i, v)| = 1.
These conditions can be enforced during the registration process (an essential step of Identity
Management which will be explored later). More precisely, when a new entity is registered
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(added) in an application domain, it has to be ensured that the value of the identifier for that
entity is not null and also unique with respect to the existing values of the identifier for other
existing entities.
It is assumed that the username is the attribute that the exemplary system BLOG has selected
as the Identifier. Therefore, identifier(BLOG) = username.
Partial Identifier. When the value of an attribute identifies at least one entity within a
specific application domain, the attribute is defined as a Partial Identifier [71]. An example
of a partial identifier is Surname. Many people may share the same surname and therefore
it is likely that the surname can identify more than one person. Formally, the set of partial
identifiers can be defined in the following way:
Definition 5 The set of partial identifiers PI d ⊆ Ad\{identifier(d)} in domain d is such
that pi ∈ PI d if and only if atEntityToValue(pi , e) is defined for some e ∈ Ed.
This means, for any pi ∈ PI d and v ∈ atToValueSetd(pi):
|atValueToEntitySetd(pi, v)| ≥ 1
Null Identifier. Null Identifiers are those attributes which do not have any value for all
entities. The formal definition is given below:
Definition 6 The set of null identifiers NI d ⊆ Ad\{identifier(d)} in domain d is such that
ni ∈ PI d if and only if atEntityToValued(ni , e) is undefined for all e ∈ Ed.
From the above definitions, it follows that the sets of Partial and Null Identifiers are disjoint,
i.e. PI d ∩ NI d = ∅.
Returning to the example, all other attributes apart from username in BLOG will be consid-
ered as partial identifiers, that is, PIBLOG = {age, postcode}. There is no null identifier in
the example.
Next, functions to relate identifier, partial identifiers and entities are defined.
Definition 7 The (injective) function idValueToEntityd : AV d → Ed maps a value of the
identifier to the respective (unique) entity in domain d. That is, for any v ∈ atToValueSetd(id
entifier(d)):
idValueToEntityd(v) = e
where e ∈ Ed is the unique entity for which atEntitToValued(identifier(d), e) = v.
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The idValueToEntity function can be used to define a function, idValueToEntitySetd :
P(AV d)→ P(Ed) that retrieves the set of entities for a set of values of the identifier. More
precisely, for Bd ⊆ atToValueSetd(identifier(d)),
idValueToEntitySetd(Bd) =
⋃
b∈Bd
idValueToEntityd(b) (3.4)
Furthermore, the following function is defined to find how each partial identifier can be
mapped to a set of entities.
Definition 8 Let piToEntitySetd : PI d×AV d → P(Ed) be the function that maps each
partial identifier and value to the corresponding entities. Formally, for any pi ∈ PI d and
v ∈ atToValueSetd(pi):
piToEntitySetd(pi , v) = {e ∈ Ed | atEntityToValued(pi , e) = v}
Again returning to the example:
idValueToEntityBLOG(john) = JOHN
idValueToEntityBLOG(rahim) = RAHIM
piToEntitySetBLOG((postcode,G3 )) = {JOHN,RAHIM}
Next, a function to relate the identifier to partial identifiers is introduced.
Definition 9 Let idValueToPiValueSetd : AVd → P(PI d×AV d) be the function that maps
a value of the identifier to the corresponding set of partial identifiers and their values in
domain d. That is, for any v ∈ atToValueSetd(identifier(d)), if idValueToEntityd(v) = e,
then idValueToPiValueSetd(v) is given by the set:
{(pi , v) | pi ∈ PI d, atEntityToValued(pi , e) is defined and equals v}
Following the example, idValueToPiValueSetBLOG(john) = {(age, 31 ) , (postcode,G3 )}.
Figure 3.1 provides a graphical analogy of the relation between the user (entity), the identifier
and the partial identifiers.
Credentials. In the real world, different physical attributes of a person are the attestation of
who she is. Biometrics in the form of photograph, signature, or PIN (Personal Identification
Number) are widely used credentials to be used with an ID or bank card. However, the sit-
uation is somewhat different in the online world as the physical face-to-face recognition is
largely absent. To testify the identity of an entity online, another attribute called a Credential
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Figure 3.1: The relation between the user,
identifier and the partial identifiers.
Figure 3.2: The (total) identity of an en-
tity.
is needed. A generalised definition of Credential can be quoted from the Glossary of the Mo-
dinis Project: “A credential is a piece of information attesting to the integrity of certain stated
facts” [63]. In this thesis, a credential will be considered as an attribute that accompanies
an identifier and can be used to attest the authority of an entity over the supplied identifier
(known as the authentication process, see Section 3.3.1). Such a credential is assumed to
be secret to everyone except to the valid user. The simplest and also the weakest form of
such credentials is a password. Attribute certificates are a common type of credential in the
PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) System. For a more secure authentication process, biomet-
rics such as fingerprints, face recognition, voice recognition, retina scan or secure hardware
tokens such as the OTP (One Time Password) generator could be used.
Let, credd be the attribute that holds the credential for each entity in domain d.
Definition 10 Let checkCredentiald : (identifier(d)×AV d)×(credd×AV d)→ {true, false}
be the function which given the input of an identifier and credential with their corresponding
values returns true if the supplied identifier value equals the original identifier value and
the credential value equals the original credential value or returns false otherwise.
3.2.5 Partial Identity and Identity
The Partial Identity of an entity in an application domain can be defined as the sets of iden-
tifier and partial identifiers and their values within that domain [67]. The formal definition is
as follows.
Definition 11 For a domain d, the partial identity of an entity e ∈ Ed within domain d,
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denoted partialIdentityed, is given by:
partialIdentityed = {(a, v) | a ∈ Ad, atEntityToValued(a, e) is defined and equals v}
Informally, the partialIdentity of an entity e is the set all attributes, including the identifier
and partial identifiers, and their values for which atEntityToValue is defined.
For the running example,
partialIdentityJOHNBLOG = {(username, john), (age, 31), (postcode,G3)}
Now, the identity of an entity can be defined as the union of all partial identities of that entity
in all domains (Figure 3.2) [67]. Since the focus is on digital entities, the defined identity of
an entity should be treated as its digital identity as well.
Definition 12 For any entity e ∈ E, the identity of e, denoted identitye is given by:
identitye = ∪{(d, partialIdentityed) | d ∈ DOMAIN and e ∈ Ed} .
Note that such a combined view of full identity of an entity only makes sense from the first
person perspective of an entity (a user). From an organisational point of view, such a com-
bined view would allow any organisation to gain unlimited control over the user data and
hence is very lucrative, but potentially privacy-invasive as far as the user is concerned. A
more privacy-friendly approach is to share a limited view of user data across organisational
boundaries whenever needed. Such a limited view will be defined below (see the definition
of Profile introduced in the next section). Sometimes, it may happen that two different appli-
cation domains are combined (maybe due to merging of organisations) into a single domain,
it may seem that two entities may end up with the same set of attributes and therefore the
same partial identity. However, it is important to remember that, by definition, the identifier
in an application domain cannot have duplicate values, which means two entities cannot have
the same identifier value. It ultimately ensures that the partial identity sets of two entities in
a single application domain are different since the partial identity sets will have at least one
different attribute value. Therefore, during such merging of application domains, the system
may need to update its sets of identifiers to ensure this consistency.
3.2.6 Profile
In a real world application setting, a user provides the identifier chosen for that particular
application domain along with its value for the user during authentication process (described
later) which can be mapped to a user using the idValueToEntity function to see if the user
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exists into that particular application. Furthermore, the value of the identifier can be used to
retrieve other attributes (partial identity) of the user using the idValueToPiValueSet func-
tion.
The identifier and a subset of partial identifiers along with their values can be combined
to define a profile of an entity for a particular application domain. Therefore, the formal
definition is:
Definition 13 For a domain d, the profile of an entity e ∈ Ed is defined as follows:
PROFILE ed = {(identifier(d), v)} ∪ A
where v = atEntityToV alued(i, e) and A ⊆ idValueToPiValueSetd(v).
That is, the profile of an entity in an application domain is the combined set of the identifier
and its respective value for the entity and a subset of related partial identifiers and their
values. The profile of an entity e in domain d is the combined set of the identifier i and its
respective value for the entity and a subset of partial identifiers and their values retrieved by
the idValueToPiValueSet functions. Only subsets of partial identifiers are included, instead
of the complete set, to illustrate situations when only a few partial identifiers are sufficient
for a service access scenario. More formally, PROFILE ed ⊆ partialIdentityed.
The inclusion of the identifier in the profile deserves further attention. In case the PROFILE
is passed between different domains (which is often the case in traditional Identity Manage-
ment Systems) and the identifier is permanent in nature, meaning it remains the same irre-
spective of the service scenario, it raises the question of privacy invasion since the user can
be tracked or profiled in another domain with this permanent identifier. In such cases, an
Anonym or a Pseudonym (see below) can be used instead of a permanent identifier. Here in
PROFILE , the Identifier is treated in an abstract level to allow accommodating any type of
Identifiers.
3.2.7 Anonymity, Anonym and Pseudonym
Anonymity will allow a user to access services anonymously. For that, the user needs to
utilise an anonym or a pseudonym. An anonym is a non-identifiable attribute that cannot
be associated with an entity and is used by an entity to access a service without revealing
her identity. It can be used only once at an SP and using it more than once turns it into a
pseudonym (see below) [75]. It is mainly used to preserve the privacy of the entity and thus
provides anonymity on behalf of the entity.
On the other hand, a pseudonym is an arbitrary one-time identifier of an entity by which
a certain action or a series of action can be linked to this specific entity without revealing
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the true identity of an entity (a user) [63] at an SP. In this sense, it allows a user to access
a service anonymously and thus preserves privacy of the entity, like an anonym. However,
unlike an anonym, it is not used for one-off scenarios. A pseudonym can be used as many
times as the system allows, thereby allowing linkability and profiling in a specific domain
and undermining linkability and profiling across multiple domains.
3.2.8 Digital Identity Model
Having formalised the required sets and functions to represent a digital identity, they can be
combined into a unified model for digital identity as follows.
Definition 14 The basic components of a Digital Identity Model (DIM) is the tuple:
(E,DOMAIN , A,AV , identifier , 〈Ed, Ad,AV d, credd, atEntityToValued, checkCredentiald〉)
where
• E is the set of entities;
• DOMAIN is the set of domains;
• A is the set of attributes;
• AV is the set of attribute values;
• identifier : DOMAIN → A which returns the chosen identifier for each domain;
• Ed ⊆ E, Ad ⊆ A and AV d ⊆ AV are the sets of entities, attributes and attribute
values in domain d ∈ DOMAIN ;
• credd ∈ Ad is a special attribute that holds the credential for each entity in the domain
d ∈ DOMAIN ;
• atEntityToValued : Ad×Ed → AV d which returns the value of an attribute for a
specific entity in the domain d ∈ DOMAIN ;
• checkCredentiald : (identifier(d)×AV d)×(credd×AV d) → {true, false} which
given the input of an identifier and credential with their corresponding values returns
true if the identifier and credential match and false otherwise for each domain c ∈
DOMAIN .
Using these components and the definitions, the following additional components of a DIM
model can be defined:
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• PI d,NI d ⊆ Ad are the sets of partial and null identifiers respectively in domain d ∈
DOMAIN ;
• partialIdentityed ⊆ Ad×AV d is the partial identity of the entity e ∈ E in domain
d ∈ DOMAIN ;
• PROFILE ed ⊆ Ad×AV d is the profile of the entity e ∈ E in domain d ∈ DOMAIN ;
• identitye ⊆ {(d,P(Ad×AV d)) | d ∈ DOMAIN } is the total identity of the entity
e ∈ E in all domains;
• atValueToEntitySetd : Ad×AV d → P(Ed) maps each attribute and attribute value
pair to the set of Entities which have that respective value for the attribute in the
domain d ∈ DOMAIN ;
• idValueToEntityd : AV d → Ed maps a value of the identifier to the respective
(unique) entity in the domain d ∈ DOMAIN ;
• piToEntitySet : PI d×AV d → P(Ed) maps each partial identifier and value to the
corresponding entities in the domain d ∈ DOMAIN ;
• idValueToPiValueSetd : AV d → P(PI d×AV d) maps a value of an identifier to the
corresponding set of partial identifiers and values in the domain c ∈ DOMAIN .
Other functions that have been discussed can be induced or generated from the basic func-
tions mentioned in the definition.
3.3 Identity Management
The ever increasing number of both online services and users that access each service leads
to an even faster increase in partial identities. Therefore, the issue of managing these partial
identities with identifiers and corresponding credentials is becoming a difficult task. Identity
Management was proposed to facilitate the management of online identities [70]. Before
different aspects of Identity Management are discussed, a definition of the term “Identity
Management” would be useful. Surprisingly, a large variation of definitions of Identity Man-
agement exist, for example in [76, 63, 67, 77]. In [76], Identity Management is defined as
“technologies and policies for representing and recognising entities with their digital identi-
ties” while [63] defines Identity Management as: “the managing of partial identities of en-
tities, i.e., definition, designation and administration of identity attributes as well as choice
of the partial identity to be (re-) used in a specific application domain”. In [67], it is defined
as: “Identity management means managing various partial identities (usually denoted by
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pseudonyms) of an individual person, i.e., administration of identity attributes including the
development and choice of the partial identity and pseudonym to be (re-)used in a specific
application domain or role”.
These definitions are simple to understand; unfortunately they only focus on the identifica-
tion, representation and management of identities and do not cover all the aspects (which will
be described shortly) of Identity Management. The definition provided in the ITU-T X.1250
Recommendation [78] is the closest in spirit to the definition that I believe is appropriate.
Unfortunately, it also fails to capture some other aspects of Identity Management that have
been captured in previous definitions. It seems that none of these definitions captures the full
notions of Identity Management, however, they can be combined to create a comprehensive
definition that satisfies all aspects of Identity Management which is given below.
Definition 15 Identity Management is a set of functions and capabilities (e.g., administra-
tion, management and maintenance, discovery, communication exchanges, correlation and
binding, policy enforcement, authentication and assertions) used for:
• creation and management of identity information (e.g., identifiers, partial identifiers,
credentials);
• assurance of identity information;
• assurance of the identity of an entity (e.g., users/subscribers, groups, user devices, or-
ganizations, network and service providers, network elements and objects, and virtual
objects);
• selection of identity information to be used for authorisation and for service provision-
ing; and
• supporting business and security applications.
A system that is used for managing the identity of a user is called an Identity Management
System (IMS). Each IMS involves following classes of entities:
• Clients/Users. Clients/users receive services from service providers (see below). To
receive a service, a user usually needs her partial identity with the identifier and the
related credential from the corresponding identity provider (see below). Any entity
can be a client, however, it is assumed that each client is a person and will be denoted
by the set U .
• Service Providers. Service Providers (SPs) are organisations that provide services to
users or to other service providers. Examples include mobile phone operators, web
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service providers, etc. [79]. In its simplest form, an SP can be combined with an
identity provider (see below) to act as a single entity. It is also known as the Relying
Party. The notation SP will denote the set of service providers. It is easy to see that
SP ⊆ O, where O represents the set of organisations defined in Section 3.2.1.
• Identity Providers. Identity providers (IdPs) are organisations that store and provide
partial identities to allow users to receive services from an SP. The notation IDP will
denote the set of identity providers. Similarly, IDP ⊆ O. Since, an SP may or may
not be combined with an IdP, there is no requirement that SP ∩ IDP = ∅.
3.3.1 Steps in Identity Management Systems
With the above mentioned parties, each IMS, generally, utilises a set of steps to allow any
user to manage her identity in that specific application domain and to access services from
an SP. The steps are Registration, Identification and Authentication, Authorisation, Service
Provisioning and De-registration. This set of steps is also known as the Life-cycle of an
Identity Management System. The domains in Identity Management consist of the set of
identity and service providers, i.e. DOMAIN = IDP ∪ SP . The subscript in the following
operations specifies the domain (IdP or SP) in which each operation is valid. The steps of
each IMS are discussed and modelled below.
• Registration. Registration is the initial step in which a user, who wants to access services
provided by an SP, registers herself at the respective IdP by providing personal information.
At this step, the user either chooses a unique value for the identifier of the service and a
value for the related credential or the respective values of the identifier and the credential
are generated automatically on her behalf by the IdP. The user may also provide values
(data) for partial identifiers. At the end of this process, the set of entities, attribute values
are updated in the IdP with the newly created/inserted data. The process can be modelled
in the following way. For an idp ∈ IDP :
E ′idp = {e′} ∪ Eidp (add entity (user))
AV ′idp = AV ′ ∪ AV idp (add identifier and other attribute values)
Here, e′ represents the newly created/joined entity and AV ′ represents the newly creat-
ed/inserted data for that entity including the compulsory unique identifier value and op-
tional values for other attributes. E ′idp and AV
′
idp represent the updated sets of entities and
attribute values respectively.
The newly added information does not have any domain attached to it as it does not belong
to any domain related to IdM before the user is registered. Once the user is registered, she
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then becomes a part of the registered domain.
After this registration process, the domain and range of several functions (whose domain
and/or range contain Eidp or AVidp) defined in Definition 14 will be updated to replace the
sets Eidp and AV idp with E ′idp and AV
′
idp respectively to ensure that the newly inserted
entity and data are considered while using those functions. The updated basic functions
are as follows:
– atEntityToValue idp : Aidp×E ′idp → AV ′idp . Assuming that the entity e′ has added the
attribute value av ′ ∈ AV ′ for the attribute a ∈ Aidp , atEntityToValue idp will return:
atEntityToValue idp(a, e
′) = av ′;
– checkCredential idp : (i×AV ′idp)×(cred idp×AV ′idp) → {true, false}. Here, i =
identifier(idp). Assuming that the entity e′ has added the attribute values av ′1, av
′
2 ∈
AV ′ for identifier idp and cred idp respectively and i = identifier(idp), the function
checkCredential idp will return:
checkCredential idp((i, av 1), (cred idp , av 2)) =
{
true if av 1 = av ′1 and av 2 = av
′
2
false otherwise.
Following the previous examples, it is assumed that a new user named FARIDA has reg-
istered herself at the Blog System with attribute values of farida, 25, G12 for attributes
username, age, postcode respectively. Therefore, the updated sets of entities and attribute
values are:
E ′BLOG = {JOHN ,RAHIM ,FARIDA} and
AV ′BLOG = {john, rahim, farida, 21 , 32 , 25 ,G3 ,G12}
Examples of a few functions using these updated sets are:
atEntityToValueBLOG((username,FARIDA)) = farida
atEntityToValueBLOG((age,FARIDA)) = 25
atEntityToValueBLOG((postcode,FARIDA)) = G12
atToValueSetBLOG(username) = {john, rahim, farida}
atSetToValSetBLOG({username, postcode}) = {john, rahim, farida,G3 ,G12}
Examples of other functions are similar and hence are not shown.
Many existing systems allow any user to create more than one account in that respective
system using the same procedures described above. The user must choose a unique value
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for the identifier and can add one or more attribute values as described before during the
registration process. It is important to understand that the system will treat each registered
account as a separate account belonging to a separate user even though there might be
multiple accounts by a single user. This particular property essentially makes it easier to
capture this scenario using the developed model. Following the previous example, it is
assumed that the user (JOHN) wants to register himself at the Blog System as a new user
with attribute values of jack, 26, G11 for attributes username, age, postcode respectively.
This entity is denoted as JOHN ′. Even though the system treats JOHN and JOHN ′ as
separate entities, in reality they are the same entities. As these two accounts belong to two
separate entities in the system, all previously discussed functions are applicable to them as
well.
• Identification and Authentication. This step is required when, upon completing the reg-
istration step, a user wants to access the services offered by an SP. Before any service can
be accessed, the user needs to be identified and authenticated. To be identified, an entity
has to present the identifier. Quoting from the Modinis Document, “Identification is the
process of using claimed or observed attributes of an entity to deduce who the entity is”
[63]. That is, Identification is the process of identifying an entity by determining an associ-
ation between the supplied identifier value and the entity. An example of an identification
process in the real world is to find an association between a person and her claimed name.
It is important to understand that with the absence of an identifier in the real world which
can uniquely identify an entity in a global scale, the identification using names (or other
identifiers) may result in multiple entities being identified. For example, when a name is
used as an identifier, it may identify more than one entities in a specific domain (at offices
or public places, in a city, etc.). On the other hand, the identification process associates
only one entity with an identifier in an application domain (cf. Section 3.2.4). Authenti-
cation is the process of proving an association between an identifier (or an attribute) and
an entity supplying the identifier value. To prove the association, the entity usually has to
supply a credential value that accompanies the identifier value. Again from the Modinis
document, “Authentication is the corroboration of a claimed set of attributes or facts with a
specified, or understood, level of confidence” [63]. The process of identification is usually
followed by the authentication process. In short, identification is the process of finding an
association between an identifier value and the entity and authentication is the process of
proving that the entity has the right to present that identifier value. In many systems, the
process of identification and authentication are combined together into a single step.
To model this step, a very simple algorithmic procedure, called IdAuthenticaionsee Al-
gorithm 1, can be defined that takes the input of an entity, identifier and credential for
the IdP and the user supplied identifier and attribute values and either returns a success-
ful result (indicated by the true value) if the entity (the user) can be identified with the
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idValueToEntity function and checkCredential returns true for the supplied identifier
and credential values or returns an unsuccessful result (indicated by the false value).
Algorithm 1 IdAuthentication(e, i, v1, v2, cred idp). A simple algorithm to check if an entity
can be identified and ultimately authenticated using supplied identifier and attribute values.
Input: e ∈ Eidp , i = identifier(idp), v1 ∈ atToValueSet idp(i), v2 ∈
atToValueSet idp(cred idp)
Output: y ∈ {true, false}
if (e=idValueToEntity idp(v1) and checkCredential((i, v1), (cred idp , v2))=true) then
return true
else
return false
end if
Once the user is authenticated, the corresponding entity is regarded as an authenticated
entity. Formally, a set of authenticated entities is defined as follows:
AUTHN idp = {e ∈ Eidp | IdAuthentiation(e, i, v1, v2, cred idp) = true}
where,
i = identifier(idp)
v1 = value of the identifier i of e
v2 = value of the credential of e
• Authorisation. Authorisation is the process to decide if a certain action on a specific
resource is allowed by an entity in a specific domain based on an identifier value or partial
identifier values [63]. The authorisation usually takes place in an SP. Two other sets are
needed: ACTION sp and RESOURCE sp which signify the sets of actions and resources
respectively in an SP.
The authorisation process takes place only if an entity is already authenticated in an IdP.
Therefore, an entity from the AUTHN idp set is needed. The SP needs to know the identi-
fier and/or partial identifiers along with their values for that entity as well as the particular
action the entity wants to perform on a specific resource. A user profile containing at-
tributes and their values for that entity as well as the user requested action and resource in
question are transferred to the SP using an Identity Protocol (see below). Upon receiving
these values, the SP utilises an access control mechanism to authorise an entity. The mech-
anism may include an Access Control List (ACL) [80] or the Role Based Access Control
(RBAC) model [45]. However, the generic mechanism is to have a list that determines
which entity having which particular identifier or partial identifiers (or roles in RBAC) can
perform which actions on what resources.
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Let ACL be the set of tuples at an SP that defines which entity with which profiles can
access what action on which resource.
ACLsp ⊆
⋃
e∈AUTHN idp
P(PROFILE eidp)×ACTION sp×RESOURCE sp .
Now, another very simple algorithmic procedure, called CheckAuthorisation (see Algo-
rithm 2), can be defined that takes these inputs and either returns a successful result (in-
dicated by the true value) if the tuple consisting of all inputs can be found in the ACL
indicating that the entity with this profile is allowed to perform that action on that resource
or returns an unsuccessful result (indicated by the false value) if the entity is not allowed
to perform that action on that resource.
Algorithm 2 CheckAuthorisation(ACLsp, e, prof , act , res). A simple algorithm to check if
an authenticated entity with its profile is authorised to perform a certain action on a specific
resource.
Input: ACLsp, e ∈ AUTHN idp , prof ⊆ P(PROFILE eidp), act ∈ ACTION sp, res ∈
RESOURCE sp
Output: y ∈ {true, false}
if ((prof , act , res) ∈ ACL) then
return true
else
return false
end if
• Service Provisioning. Once the user is identified, authenticated and authorised to access a
particular service, she can access the service. In terms of Identity Management, accessing
a service is known as Service Provisioning. While a user accesses a service provided by
an SP, the SP may opt to record a log trace that records the type of service access at a
particular time on a particular date by an authenticated and authorised entity. In such log
traces, time and date are important parts to ensure accountability and can be used to find
out the history of a service accessed by an authenticated and authorised entity on a specific
date and time.
Among different services, one exemplary service provided by an IdP deserves further at-
tention which allows an entity e to retrieve and update attribute values. Formally, when
authorised to access this service in domain d, an entity e will have partial control over the
basic DIM component represented by the atEntityToValued (see Definition 2) function
which will allow her to view and update entries (using the atEntityToValued(a, e) func-
tion for all a ∈ AV c). On the other hand, if the entity is not authenticated it will not be
able to either view or update its attribute values, meaning formally the entity has neither
access nor control over the component atEntityToValued.
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• De-registration. The final step in the Identity Management life-cycle is the De-registration
process which allows any user to de-register from an IdP that the user does not wish to
access any more. The de-registration process usually removes the association between an
entity and identifier and also removes the respective entity by deleting the partial identity
from the system. In such, it is the reverse process of registration.
The De-registration process is modelled in the following way. For any, idp ∈ IDP :
AV ′idp = AV idp \ AV ′ (remove data including identifier value)
E ′idp = Eidp \ {e′} (remove entity)
Here, E ′idp and AV
′
idp represent the updated set of entities and attribute values respectively
in idp.
As with the registration process, de-registration also requires the functions (whose domain
and/or range contain Eidp or AVidp) in Definition 14 are updated to ensure that the deleted
entity and corresponding data are not considered.
Following the previous examples, it is assumed that JOHN has de-registered himself from
the Blog System. Therefore, the updated sets of entities and attribute values are:
E ′BLOG = {RAHIM ,FARIDA} and AV ′BLOG = {rahim, farida, 21 , 25 ,G3 ,G12}
Examples of a few functions using these updated sets are:
atToValueSet c(username) = {rahim, farida}
atSetToValSet c({username, postcode}) = {rahim, farida,G3 ,G12}
Examples of other functions will be similar and hence are not shown.
3.3.2 Identity Protocol
From the discussion above, some of the above operations (Registration, Identification, Au-
thentication and De-registration) take place at an IdP and the rest (Authorisation and Service
Provisioning) take place at an SP. Depending on the domain, each of these operations can be
divided into two categories: the operations that take place in an IdP and will be denoted by
IDP_OP and the operations that take place in an SP and will be denoted by SP_OP . The
notations REG , IDFN , AUTHN , AUTHRSN , SRV and DEREG will denote Registra-
tion, Identification, Authentication, Authorisation, Service Provisioning and De-registration
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respectively. So formally,
IDP_OP = {REG , IDFN ,AUTHN ,DEREG}
SP_OP = {SRV ,AUTHRSN }
The notation IDMOP (short for, Identity Management Operations) will denote the combined
set of these five steps. So,
IDM _OP = IDP_OP ∪ SP_OP
IDP_OPd , SP_OPd and IDM _OPd will be used to denote the respective operations in
domain d.
Readers may notice a slight discrepancy in the Authorisation step where sets from different
domains are put together in Algorithm 2. For example, the subset of the profile of authen-
ticated entities (prof ∈ P(PROFILE eidp), where e ∈ AUTHN idp) from the domain of an
IdP are combined together with sets of actions (ACTION sp), resources (RESOURCE sp)
and ACL (ACLsp) from the domain of an SP to define the algorithm 2. This is to signify the
realistic scenario in which the SP needs to utilise some information (authenticated entity and
her identifier, partial identifiers and possibly data item at the IdP) received from the IdP dur-
ing the authorisation phase. In reality, a mechanism called the Identity Protocol is defined to
enable this transfer and is part of every Identity Management System. Each Protocol consists
of two sub-protocols: Request Protocol and Response Protocol which are explained below.
Request Protocol. It flows from an SP to an IdP via a user. The IdP is usually selected
by the user, however, sometimes, the SP can select the IdP on behalf of the user. In a
request protocol, the SP asks the IdP to authenticate the user and requests the authentication
information (the profile of a user).
Response Protocol. This is initiated in response to the Request Protocol and flows from
an IdP to an SP. It consists of the profile (the PROFILE idp set) from the IdP comprising a
user’s identifier (usually an anonym or pseudonym), partial identifiers and optionally other
data. The profile can be automatically selected by the IdP based on a policy defined by the
user or the user can explicitly select the attributes and data for the profile. Upon receiving
the response, the SP extracts the required information from the response and initiates the
authorisation process.
Different Identity Management Systems have different Identity Protocols. Examples of
widely used identity protocols include SAML [5], OAuth [7], OpenID [6] and so on. It
is impractical to try modelling an identity protocol since each protocol uses completely dif-
ferent mechanisms. Hence, the notation PROTOCOL will denote the underlying protocol in
an abstract notion to establish the fact that the system model has an unspecified mechanism
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to pass on identity information whenever required.
3.3.3 The Basic Identity Management Model
The Basic Identity Management (BIM) Model is based on the DIM and consists of SP , IDP ,
the five steps and the Protocol along with sets, functions and relations defined in them that
utilise the DIM.
3.3.4 Trust Issues in Identity Management
The issue of trust is one of the central issues in Identity Management as the parties involved
need to trust each other to some certain extent. An IdP and an SP need to trust each other
regarding the released attributes. On the other hand, a user needs to trust both an IdP and
an SP regarding different scopes. Such trust issues will be explored in greater details in
Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
3.4 Applications
In this section, four possible application scenarios will be explored using the developed
model. In the first scenario, the effect of multiple partial identities of a user will be analysed.
In the second scenario, the issue of data ownership and controllability will be explored. In
the third scenario, the cause of identity theft will be discussed. In the last scenario, how
the model can be used to characterise the behaviour of three popular identity management
models will be shown.
3.4.1 Effect of Multiple Partial Identities
The typical use of online services requires any user to register in multiple identity (or service)
providers by providing different attribute values during the registration process as mentioned
in previous sections. It means that the user ends up with multiple partial identities scattered
across multiple providers. If ne,d denotes the number of attribute values provided by the
entity (i.e. user) e in a domain (i.e. provider) d, then:
ne,d = |partialIdentityed| .
3.4. Applications 60
Supposing d1, . . . , dm are all domains (providers) in which e has partial identities, the total
number of attributes (denoted by Ne) can be derived for the user e as:
Ne =
m∑
i=1
ne,di .
The valueNe signifies the number of attributes that need to be managed by the user e. Ideally,
Ne should have a small value which will allow users to manage their attributes in a convenient
way. Unfortunately, with the proliferation of novel online services requiring users to register
to access those services, the value of Ne keeps increasing. One of the central focuses in
Identity Management research is to reduce Ne. There are two ways Ne can be reduced: i)
by lowering ne,d in each domain d, i.e., only storing smaller number of attributes at each
provider and ii) by lowering m (the number of providers) so that attributes are stored at a
small number of providers. The second option is more suitable for two reasons.
• Firstly, it may not be always possible to know beforehand which attributes might be
required/requested by an SP later on; hence an IdP might prefer to store as many
attributes as possible.
• Secondly, when attributes are scattered across many IdPs, it becomes increasingly
difficult for a user to effectively manage attributes stored in those IdPs.
Also, the same attributes may be stored in multiple places resulting in unnecessary redun-
dancy. Minimising m would enable a user to manage attributes efficiently and hence is the
focus of all existing IMSs. In addition, in many IMSs, a legal contract between an IdP and
an SP dictates the handling of user attributes between themselves. However, there may not
be any legal contract between the user and the IdP and therefore, the handling of attributes
may be governed by the respective Terms and Conditions. The absence of any legal contract
between a user and an IdP means that the handling of user attributes is only bound by a trust
assumption where the user can only hope that the respective party will honour the imposed
trust [9].
Ideally, m=1 would be the most suitable choice as far as a user is concerned. It means that
there is only one IdP storing all attributes of the user and providing them to an SP. With
this goal, Microsoft introduced the Passport System to become the IdP of the Internet [81].
However, the attempt failed and the reason behind this failure is that the inclusion of the
Passport in each interaction between users and SPs were not properly justified and users
were not very confident and comfortable about a third party holding all their attributes [1].
Since then, it has been predicted and envisioned that there will exist more than one IdP with
their specific purposes. For example, a bank IdP can be used for financial activities, the
Governmental IdP for accessing Governmental services, and other IdPs for other services.
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All this means is that the value of m will always be more than 1. The optimal value of m that
will enable users to manage their attributes in the most efficient manner is yet to be found
and might vary from one person to another.
In order to reduce the value of m, it is important to analyse the issue of trustworthiness of
an IdP. By trustworthiness of an IdP it is meant the level of trust another entity has over
that IdP. Even though trust is a subjective opinion, one IdP may be considered as a highly
trusted entity whereas another IdP may be considered as an untrusted (or a low trusted)
entity. There are several factors that are used to determine the trustworthiness of an IdP. One
of the most crucial factors is the registration procedure that any user needs to go through to
register into an IdP. The highly trusted IdP, such as the IdP established by the Government,
financial institutes (e.g. banks) or educational institutes such as universities, will go through
a rigorous registration procedure before any user is registered. For example, one has to
be a citizen/resident of a country to register for a Governmental IdP and one has to prove
her identity by showing a passport or a driving licence to register for a bank IdP. On the
other hand, any user can register herself easily online without proving her identity by simply
filling in a web form for several larger social-network based IdPs such as Facebook, Google,
Twitter, etc. Users do not need to prove their identities and can simply fill in the web form
with superficial or even random meaningless values. Hence, such an IdP can be regarded
as a low trusted or even an untrusted IdP. Since it is difficult to establish and maintain a
highly trusted IdP, the number of highly trusted IdPs will be always low. Thus, the higher
value of m is largely contributed by the large number of low trusted and untrusted online
IdPs (Figure 3.3). This is also evident in the current setting of online services where a user
needs to register for any novel online services which increases the space of such low trusted
and untrusted IdPs. If a mechanism can be found to reduce the number of such IdPs, it can
significantly reduce the value of m.
Figure 3.3: Current identity space.
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3.4.2 Data Ownership and Controllability
The term Data Ownership is used to represent the situation of determining which entity
actually has ownership over a set of data. With the ever-increasing popularity of online
services and the increase of partial identities stored in those service providers, the issue of
data ownership has gained much attention in recent years [82]. “Who owns our data?” -
seems a simple question; the answer to it, unfortunately, is not straightforward and has been
highly debated [82]. For example, the authors in [82] argue that even though a user is the
owner of her personally identifiable information (i.e. partial identity), the ownership expands
to other entities as the user registers into different providers and these entities (providers)
become the owner of such information as well. However, I contradict this view and argue
that a user is the ultimate owner of her partial identity, no matter where that partial identity
is registered. Registering to a specific provider with her partial identity merely enables the
user to access a particular set of services from that provider or using that provider. In such,
the registration process enables a user to access such services from a provider, in no way it
makes the provider the owner of the partial identity. This view is also resonant with what
Facebook defines in their terms and conditions: “You own all of the content and information
you post on Facebook...” [83]. Next, a function that returns the owner of a partial identity is
defined.
Definition 16 The function ownerIsd : partialIdentityd → P(E) returns the set of entities
containing the owners of the registered partial identity in the domain d.
As per the view, ownerIsd(partialIdentityed) = {e} and |ownerIsd(partialIdentityed)| = 1
for any entity e ∈ Ed in domain d, that is, there is only one owner of a partial identity and
the ownerIs function returns a singleton set.
Next, the topic of Data Controllability is explored which is used to represent the situation of
determining which entity has control over a set of data. By control it is meant that an entity
can have read or write access on the partial identity of the same or another entity in a valid
way and can utilise such access for her benefit in one way or another. When an entity is the
owner of the partial identity, she should have full control (read and write access) over her
partial identity. This will allow her to access a particular service from a provider using her
partial identity as well as to update her partial identity when it is required. However, when
an entity is not the owner of a partial identity, allowing the entity with the full control of that
partial identity can have negative consequences. To illustrate this scenario, a function that
returns the entity that controls the partial identity of an entity is defined.
Definition 17 The function hasFullControld : partialIdentityd → P(E) returns the set of
entities that have full control over the partial identity in the domain d.
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For the sake of the security and privacy of an entity, it is desirable that only the owner of
a partial identity should have the full control over the respective partial identity. That is,
ownerIsd(partialIdentity
e
d) = hasFullControld(partialIdentity
e
d), where there is only one
owner of a partial identity, |ownerIsd(partialIdentityed)| = 1. Unfortunately, the current
setting of online services allows a provider to have unprecedented control over the par-
tial identity of a registered user. This allows the provider to mine the user data and build
up a profile for targeted advertisements, which ultimately is the main source of their rev-
enue [84]. This means that the function returns more than one entity for a particular par-
tial identity: hasFullControld(partialIdentityed) = {e, e′} where e′ signifies the provider.
In such, ownerIsd ⊆ hasFullControld instead of the desired condition of ownerIsd =
hasFullControld. This has following serious negative consequences.
• Users have less control over their own data.
• Providers are able to access the user data and can share it with any third party without
the permission of the user. The user has no way of knowing how their data are being
abused.
The revelations of Edward Snowden, an American whistle-blower, revealed an example of
such negative consequences [85]. According to him, National Security Agency (NSA) of the
USA has been performing a massive-scale online surveillance over the user of several big
online service providers such as Facebook, Google and Yahoo. The NSA has forced these
providers to release their user data for the purpose of continuous surveillance. This has been
possible because the provider has unlimited control over their user data. In this thesis, the
mechanisms to counteract these issues will be investigated.
3.4.3 Analysing Identity Theft
Identity theft is one of the major online fraudulent activities and with the proliferation of on-
line services it has been a source of huge financial losses in recent years. It has been reported
by Javelin Strategy & Research that the financial loss due to the identity theft reached nearly
$21 billion only in the US in 2013 [86]. The prediction is that such attacks might grow in
numbers in the upcoming years. The identity theft has been a difficult issue to tackle and
many attempts have been proved fruitless so far. Before using the model to analyse the root
cause of identity theft, a suitable textual definition of identity theft is explored.
The term Identity Theft has been defined in many ways in the literature [87, 88]. The defini-
tion provided by Koops et al. [89] is preferred: “Identity ‘theft’ is fraud or another unlawful
activity where the identity of an existing person is used as a target or principal tool without
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that person’s consent”. The person whose identity is being abused is the Victim and the per-
son who abuses the victim’s identity is the Attacker. This definition is too literal, there is no
mention if the term identity in the definition means the total identity or the partial identity in
a particular domain.
For the time being, it is assumed that it refers to the partial identity of an entity e in a partic-
ular domain d. Now, to steal the entity’s partial identity in a domain, an attacker needs to get
hold of all the attribute values provided by the victim in the domain d which is represented
by set partialIdentityed. This set can be generated if one has access to the basic DIM com-
ponent atEntitToValued (see Definition 2). As discussed in the Service Provisioning step of
Section 3.3.1, an attacker will have sufficient access to this component to obtain e’s profile,
if the attacker is identified, authenticated and authorised as e in domain d. Furthermore, as
explained in the Identification and Authentication step of Section 3.3.1, achieving this is de-
pendent on the attacker getting hold of the values of both the identifier (e.g. a username) and
credential (e.g. a password) of e for domain d. There are numerous ways an attacker can get
hold of these two pieces of information such as using simple or complex social engineering
techniques, having access to a piece of paper containing such information in written format,
deploying advanced phishing techniques, by guessing or brute forcing a password [4, 90].
There have been many attempts to address this problem, which mostly focus on hardening
the credential (e.g. strong passwords which are difficult to guess or brute force, biometrics
which are difficult to forge or hardware tokens to generate one time password), using secure
hardware (e.g. smartcard) or using multi-channel authentication (e.g. using a fixed password
at first and then provide a secondary password received in the mobile phone). Nonetheless,
it does not matter how strong the credential is; if the attacker gets hold of it, there are always
chances of identity theft. It seems that the root cause might be something else. To analyse
that, the following function is introduced.
Definition 18 The function suppliedByd : (ident(d)×AV d)×(credd×AV d) → E returns
the entity who has supplied the value of an identifier and credential pair in the domain d.
Note that, suppliedBy can return an entity who may not exist in that domain.
For any v ∈ atToValueSetd(ident(d)) and v′ ∈ atToValueSetd(credd), current online ser-
vices assume that :
idValueToEntityd(v)=suppliedByd((ident(d), v), (credd, v
′)) .
However, in case of an identity theft, there is:
idValueToEntityd(v) 6= suppliedByd((ident(d), v), (credd, v′)) .
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It may therefore appear that to tackle the identity theft problem it is just needed to introduce
a function having the capability of Definition 18. Unfortunately, developing and deploying
such a function can be extremely difficult, if not impossible, with the current structure of the
Internet where anybody can be “anything”.
3.4.4 Modelling Popular Identity Management Models
In this section, it will be analysed how the Basic Identity Management Model can be ex-
tended to characterise the behaviour of three popular Identity Management models: Isolated
User Identity (SILO) Model, Federated User Identity (FED) Model and Open Unfederated
Identity (OUI) Model. Since an IMS can effectively consist of several identity domains
(of IdPs and SPs), the notation DOMAINmi will denote a single identity domain i for an
IdM Model m whereas the notation DOMAINm will denote the combined identity domain
consisting of several single identity domains i for an IdM Model m.
Additionally, the notation IDPm and SPm will be used to denote sets of IdPs and SPs re-
spectively in a specific Identity Management Model m. Before starting, a function will be
defined to determine the set of SPs shared by a single IdP in a specific IdM Model.
Definition 19 The function sharedBym : IDPm → P(SPm) maps an IdP to the set of SPs
that utilise the service of that IdP for Identity Management operations in a specific Identity
Management Model m.
Isolated User Identity (SILO) Model
The Isolated User Identity model, also known as the SILO model, represents the most com-
mon and the simplest IdM model [4]. There are only two parties involved in the scenario:
service providers and users. Each service provider has its own identity domain, i.e. has its
own IdP and manages its namespace locally. Each SP provides the partial identity to its
users who wish to receive its services. Even though this model represents the simplest form
of IdM from the service provider’s perspective, it does not allow interoperability, meaning,
users from one service provider cannot access services from other service providers. This can
create an immense burden for the users as they need to remember many identifiers (e.g. user-
ids) and related credentials (e.g. passwords) and soon those become unmanageable when
the number of such SPs starts to increase. Currently, all major and leading online service
providers such as Amazon, EBay, Facebook and different banks follow this model. Figure
3.4 illustrates the SILO model in which there are three SPs.
In this model, for some n ∈ N:
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Figure 3.4: SILO Model.
• IDPSILOi = {idpi} = {spi} = SPSILOi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
• DOMAIN SILOi = IDPSILOi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
• DOMAIN SILO =
⋃n
i=1 IDPSILOi .
The properties above signify that each single identity domain in the SILO Model, denoted
SILO i, consists of a singleton set of IdPs containing a single entity idp. The set of IdPs
can also be regarded as the set of SPs since they are analogous to each other. Additionally,
DOMAIN SILO represents the union of several single identity domains of the SILO Model.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the idea of the identity domain in the SILO Model when n = 4. Each
inner rounded rectangle represents a single SILO identity domain which consists of a sin-
gleton set of IdP (IDPSILO1 , . . . , IDPSILO4) containing only one IdP (IdP1, . . . , IdP4). The
vertical line in each inner rounded rectangle signifies the property that the singleton set of
IdP can also be regarded as the singleton set of SPs (SPSILO1 , . . . , SPSILO4) each containing
only one SP (SP1, . . . , SP4). The outer rounded rectangle represents the union of several
single identity domains. Moreover, for any 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n:
• |sharedBySILO i (idpi)| = 1 for all idpi ∈ IDPSILOi;
• sharedBySILO i (idpi) ∩ sharedBySILO j (idpj ) = ∅ for all idpi ∈ IDPSILOi and idpj ∈
IDPSILOj .
That is, each IdP is shared by only one SP and two IdPs belonging to different single identity
domains will not be shared by the same entity. Identity Management operations in one
single domain (inside one IdP or SP) is completely separate from the operations in other
domains. Lack of connection between any inner rounded rectangle signifies this fact and it
can be modelled in the following way, for any distinct DOMAIN SILOi ,DOMAIN SILOj ∈
DOMAIN SILO :
IDMOPDOMAIN SILOi ∩ IDMOPDOMAIN SILOj = ∅ .
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Figure 3.5: Representation of the SILO Model.
Federated User Identity (FED) Model
The Federated Identity Model may consist of one or more IdPs and one or more SPs [4]. Each
SP may or may not have its own IdP while each IdP has their own identity domain. Thus, this
model unifies different identity domains to create a unified larger identity domain. Such an
identity domain is commonly known as the Federated Domain, Identity Federation or simply
Federation and all entities (IdPs and SPs) are said to be a part of the so-called Circle of Trust
(CoT). The IdPs provide the identifier and the related credential to the users. To access a
service, the user authenticates herself to an IdP and once authenticated, she is redirected to a
service provider’s domain to access the service. Once a user is authenticated at the federated
domain she can access the service of all SPs that are part of the same federated domain
using a mechanism commonly known as Single Sign On (SSO). The Google Service is an
example of this model consisting of one Google IdP and many Google SPs such as Gmail,
Google Drive, Calender, Google Scholar, etc. Logging into the Google IdP allows a user to
access all Google services without any further logins using the SSO mechanism. Another
example of this model can be given in the setting of a university. A university may have one
federated domain consisting of one central IdP and a number of SPs such as Library, Email,
Printing Service, Result and Moodle. A user can access all these services by just one initial
login using the SSO mechanism. This model has gained considerable attention in the last
few years and is one of the most widely used models in the setting of the higher educational
establishments and Governmental services. SAML [5] is one of the most matured and widely
used protocols in such settings.
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The Federated Identity Management (FIM) is based on the concept of this model [81]. It
is also known as Federated Identities or Federation of Identities. In the ITU-T X.1250 rec-
ommendation, a federation is defined simply as “An association of users, service providers
and identity providers” [78]. In other words, a federation with respect to the Identity Man-
agement is a business model in which a group of two or more trusted parties legally bind
themselves with a business and technical contract [81, 91]. It allows a user to access re-
stricted resources seamlessly and securely from other partners in different Identity Domains
using the SSO mechanism.
A federated identity domain can be formed consisting of only one IdP in an identity domain
and more than one SP with each SP residing in a separate identity domain (Type 1 in Figure
3.6). Several identity domains can be combined to form a larger identity domain where
each smaller federated domain is of Type 1 (Type 2 in Figure 3.6). The dashed boundary
in each figure signifies the federated identity domain, that is a single CoT and each solid
circle represents a separate identity domain. That is, IdP, SP1, SP2 and SP3 in Figure 3.6(a)
and IdP1, IdP2 and all SPs in Figure 3.6(b) are part of a single CoT respectively. Federated
Identity Domain 1 and 2 in Figure 1(b) represent a combined Type 2 federated domain.
(a) Type 1. (b) Type 2.
Figure 3.6: Federated Identity Domain.
The FIM offers a number of advantages in different aspects to different stakeholders [81, 92]:
• The separation of duties among different organisations is the main advantage of FIM.
An IdP only concentrates on managing partial identities and providing identity infor-
mation to an SP while an SP concentrates only on providing services to authenticated
users based on the identity information. Such separation allows the SP to offload the
associated cost of managing and maintaining user identities to the trusted IdP.
• FIM provides scalability in the sense that it allows an SP to offer its services not only
to its own user-bases, but also to users from other SPs and thus maximising the number
of users using the same infrastructure.
• It is also attractive from an IdP’s perspective as it allows the IdP to maintain an asso-
ciation with end users and enables them to access an array of diversified services with
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the same identity.
• FIM utilises standardised approach to ensure the improved security and privacy of
users and make sure that the identity information is minimally propagated and thereby
reduces the risk of identity theft.
• The CoT can easily be expanded by integrating new applications and service partners
into the federation. It takes a minimal effort for any new partner to be a part of that
circle as they need not to worry about managing the user-base.
• It allows users to leverage the SSO facility to avail services from different providers
without any further logins. This also reduces the need to maintain partial identities
in different domains. Thus, SSO improves efficiency and enhances user experience
across different domains.
• FIM also alleviates users from remembering different identifiers and their related cre-
dentials as only one partial identity at an IdP is sufficient to access different services
from all SPs in a federation. In this sense, it also increases security imperatively as
only a very few accounts are managed by a user; a strong password can be chosen and
easily remembered.
The issue of trust is a fundamental concept in FIM as different participating organisations
need to trust each other inside the federation in a sufficient level to allow them to exchange
user information and trust those information. The issue of trust with respect to FIM in
different aspects will be explored in details in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
Mathematically, this model is: DOMAIN FED = {SILO ji | 1≤i≤n and 1≤j≤ni}, where
n ∈ N and ni ∈ N for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that:
• DOMAIN FEDi = COT i =
⋃ni
j=1 DOMAIN SILOji
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
• |sharedByFED i (idp)| = ni for all idp ∈ COT i and 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
• DOMAIN FED =
⋃n
i=1 COT i.
The first property signifies that each single federated domain or each single CoT (COT i), in
essence, consists of several SILO identity domains (denoted as SILOi). However, unlike the
SILO model, this model offers interoperability among different SILO domains, meaning that
identity management operations such as identification and authentication that take place in-
side an IdP are shared among several SPs inside the same CoT and is indicated by the second
property above. To ensure interoperability, an agreement is signed among participating or-
ganisations to create a single CoT. The combined federated identity domain (DOMAIN FED )
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Figure 3.7: Representation of the Federated Model.
consists of several single CoTs (the third property). Figure 3.7 illustrates the Federated Iden-
tity Domain. Now, there are three layers of identity domains. In the innermost layer, there
are several SILO identity domains represented by the innermost rounded rectangle. Each of
these SILO domain has the similar functionality as defined in SILO Model with one excep-
tion that they have been federated using a contract to share the identity information of their
users among each other. The dotted line between them signifies this fact. These federated
SILO domains are combined to create the CoT represented by the middle rounded rectan-
gles. The outer rounded rectangle represents the union of several CoTs.
In this model, Identity Management operations are totally different from one CoT to another
CoT. That is, for any 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n:
IDMOPCOTi ∩ IDMOPCOTj = ∅
Lack of any connection between two COTs in the figure also signifies this fact. Inside each
single CoT, Registration, Identification, Authentication and De-registration take place in-
side respective identity domain (IDPSILOi) and Authorisation and Service Provisioning take
place at any other SP that is inside the same CoT. That is, once the user is authenticated at
one identity domain in an IdP, she will be considered authenticated at all IdPs which belong
to the same CoT. So, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n and idpi, idp ′i ∈ COT i:
• IDFNidpi = IDFNidp′i ;
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• AUTHNidpi = AUTHNidp′i
Life-cycle of an Identity Federation. Once an entity (IdP or SP) joins in a federation,
it will remain there as long as the contract allows. During this time it might be required
to update corresponding information of that entity inside the federation. Finally, the entity
must be removed from the federation once the contract ends or the entity wants to leave the
federation. These tasks are carried out by the respective IT administrators at an IdP or an
SP and can be combined to introduce the notion of the Life-cycle for an identity federation.
The life-cycle of an identity federation implies the steps that are required to create, revoke,
maintain and to utilise a federation. The steps are:
• Association (Federation). The association is the process by which an IdP or SP is
added to a new or existing federation.
• Provisioning. This is the intermediary step in which the entities (an IdP or SP) utilise
the federation to offer services to the users.
• Maintenance. This intermediary step allows the administrator to update any informa-
tion regarding the respective entities.
• Revocation (Defederation). In this step, an entity (an IdP or SP) is removed from the
federation.
These four steps essentially define the way a federation can be managed.
Open Unfederated Identity (OUI) Model
Even though the Federated model is one of the most mature models, it has its own drawbacks.
The major drawback is the necessity to create federations beforehand and then to maintain
it. A federation becomes hard to manage as the number of IdPs and SPs increases. To avoid
the complication of creating and maintaining a federation, another model has gained much
attention and popularity in recent years with the proliferation of social networks. This model
consists of a number of IdPs and SPs, however, they do not need to be a part of a federation
to interact with each other. All entities can interact in run-time using the respective identity
protocol. Moreover, a user can use any IdP supporting the respective identity protocol to
access services from an SP of this model and thus is not restricted to a particular IdP like
the Federated Model. That is why I prefer to call it the Open Unfederated Identity Model.
Many popular social networks such as Facebook, Twitter and Linkedin store a number of
different user attributes and act as IdPs using this model to allow users to access services
from different online services. OpenID [6] and OAuth [7] are the two most popular identity
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protocols for this model. Figure 3.8 illustrates the idea of the identity domain in the OUI
Model. The absence of the dashed boundary in Figure 3.8 signifies the fact that this model
does not have any federation domain.
Figure 3.8: Open Unfederated Identity Model.
This model is based on the open trust paradigm in which every entity trusts another entity
and thus the issues of trust are not reliant on any factor such as being a part of a CoT. Such
characteristics of this model make it easier to deploy and maintain. However, this model
may not be suitable for scenarios when a minimum level of trust between different entities is
required.
In this model for some n ∈ N:
• IDPOUI =
⋃n
i=1 idpi ;
• SPOUI =
⋃n
i=1{sharedByOUI (idpi)} for all idpi ∈ IDPOUI ;
• DOMAINOUI = IDPOUI ∪ SPOUI for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
That is, the set of IdPs consists of IdPs supporting the protocol for this model. The set of
SPs consists of all the SPs that are related with each single IdP using the sharedBy function.
Note that, one single IdP in this model can be used to access services from all SPs of this
model or even more than one IdP can be used to access services from a single SP. Also,
the identity domain (DOMAINOUI ) consists of the set of IdPs (IDPOUI ) and the set of SPs
(SPOUI ) and represents one single identity domain for this model. The representation of this
model is illustrated in Figure 3.9. The dashed line in this figure represents that any IdP from
the set of IdPs (IDPOUI ) can be shared by any service provider from the set of SPs (SPOUI ).
The domain of this model is the union of the set of IdPs and the set of SPs.
Inside the identity domain, Registration, Identification, Authentication, De-registration take
place at one of the IdPs and Authorisation and Service Provisioning take place at one of
the SPs. However, once the user is authenticated at one of the IdPs, she will be considered
authenticated at all SPs since one IdP can be used to access services from all SPs. This is
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Figure 3.9: Representation of the OUI Model.
made possible by passing any authentication information between an IdP and an SP using an
Identity Protocol. So, for any idp ∈ IDPOUI and sp ∈ SPOUI :
• IDFNidp = IDFNsp;
• AUTHNidp = AUTHNsp .
This represents the fact that the identification and authentication operations are shared be-
tween the IdP and SP within the identity domain.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, a few preliminary concepts on Identity and Identity Management have been
provided. Different notions and semantics exist for the same topic related to Identity Man-
agement in different places. Therefore, it is required to build a common and consistent vo-
cabulary on related topics of Identity and Identity Management. The concepts provided here
will act as the consistent vocabulary and will be used as the point of reference throughout
the thesis.
In addition, the developed mathematical framework to formally model the central aspects
of IdM have been presented. Also, it has been explored how the framework can be used
to model several aspects of an IMS. Being based on formal mathematical foundations, the
framework can be used to build a deep understanding of the central issues of IdM. This is
the first model of its kind with the potential to be used for rigorous reasoning and formal
analysis of IdM. In addition, four application scenarios have been illustrated to show how
the model can be applied to analyse a few problems of the current setting of online services
and to mathematically model a few popular IdM Models. Among the analysed problems, the
focus in this thesis is on two problems: i) the effect of multiple partial identities and ii) the
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issue of data ownership and controllability and hence in the subsequent chapters, it will be
investigated how these two problems can be tackled.
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Chapter 4
Comparative Analysis of Identity
Management Systems
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a comparative analysis of three popular IMSs - SAML-based IMSs, OpenID
and OAuth - is presented. Each of these IMSs has been briefly discussed in Chapter 2. The
motivation for this comparative analysis is to identify the strength and weakness of each
system and lay out the foundation for the subsequent research. With this goal in mind, a
taxonomy of requirements for an ideal IMS has been compiled. Then, the taxonomy has
been used to compare the chosen systems.
This chapter starts by discussing different requirements from the taxonomy and then provides
a comparative analysis of the chosen systems using this taxonomy.
4.2 A Study of Requirements
Early IMSs were developed in isolated projects which had their own sets of requirements
to fulfil. These requirements were disparate in nature and lacked consistency. Efforts
to converge these requirements into a unified consistent set can be found in the literature
[4, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97]. Based on the existing work, especially the requirements given in
[97, 93], a list of core requirements has been compiled that any ideal Identity Management
System should satisfy. The list of requirements is presented in the form of a taxonomy in
Figure 4.1. The list is concise and more focused in the sense that it has excluded some
optional requirements (such as Interoperability, Gateways, Law Enforcement/Liability and
Affordability) given in [97, 93]. These optional requirements are not regarded as the core set
of requirements since they do not influence, in any way, the performance and the security of
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Figure 4.1: Taxonomy of core requirements for Identity Management Systems.
an IMS. Moreover, a few additional requirements (Storage, Context Detection and Attribute
Aggregation) have been added which have not been considered in any previous work. Such
requirements can play a crucial role for introducing innovative use-cases with the emergence
of social networks and the popularities of mobile devices. Next, each of these requirements
is explained.
4.2.1 Functional Requirements (FR)
The core set of requirements for a functional Identity Management System are as follows.
Identification and Representation (I-R). The main functionality of an IMS is to identify its
users correctly, and hence, represents the core requirement of an IMS. As mentioned earlier,
a user is identified with an identifier in a specific system. Different Identity Management
Systems use different types of identifiers and represent them in different ways.
Context Detection (CD). In the literature of Context-aware Services, the term Context has
different meanings. According to [98], contexts are described as locations, identities of
nearby people, objects and changes to those objects. The importance of detecting contexts
during the service provisioning phase in an IMS was initially ignored. This can result in the
release of unnecessary yet sensitive attributes to different parties. To be effective, secure and
privacy-friendly, the IMS should have the ability to detect the context and then inform the
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user about the context so that the user can choose the appropriate partial identity. This is still
an on going research area.
Logging (LOG). Each transaction (the action of releasing attributes to an SP) using an IMS
should be logged. The log then can be used to facilitate the History Management feature (see
below).
History Management (HM). History Management should be an important part of any mod-
ern IMS. A good history management facility should display all the logged transactions in
a user-friendly way. This will allow users to check their data trail, i.e. what attributes have
been released to what entity, when they have been released, if there is any privacy policy
attached to the released data, etc. In addition, users should be able to delete any existing
data trail. Such detailed history management facility will allow users to build trust in an
IMS, help them to fine-tune their privacy preferences and to make an informed choice for
any future correspondence.
Attribute Aggregation (AA). An Attribute Aggregation mechanism would allow the user
to aggregate attributes from multiple providers and pass them to an SP in a single service
session. With the proliferation of online IdPs, it is not realistic to assume that all attributes
of a single user will be stored in a single IdP. Essentially, the majority of users store a lot
of different attributes across multiple IdPs. Allowing users to aggregate their attributes in a
single session will enable novel service access scenarios. Therefore, it is timely to integrate
this feature in an IMS.
4.2.2 Security Requirements (SR)
An IMS can be used for accessing different services ranging from participating in social
network activities, blogging, emailing, accessing Government services, online banking and
e-commerce activities. There are different levels of security for each of these services yet
each service requires a minimum security guarantee to ensure that only an authenticated and
authorised user can access the requested service securely. Any lapse of security could not
only allow intruders to capture sensitive personal information, but also impersonate a valid
user and vandalise her reputation with illicit activities. Unlike the real world, it is diffi-
cult for the impersonated person to prove her innocence once an attacker impersonates her.
Therefore, a minimum level of security should be guaranteed in every Identity Management
System to ensure that user attributes are stored in an IdP securely and are released to service
providers in a secure manner. The following requirements are necessary and sufficient to
ensure a minimum level of security for an IMS.
Authentication (AUTH). A core security requirement for an IMS is to authenticate a user
in a secure manner. The identification process described previously identifies a user with the
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identifier and the authentication process verifies the association between the user and the sup-
plied identifier. As mentioned earlier, the verification process depends on a credential. There
are different levels of assurance or grades for satisfying the authenticity which generally de-
pends on the combination of the identifier and credential. For simple web services, a simple
identifier and an easy to use credential such as a user-id and password could be enough. For
more secured services such as financial or Government services, biometrics, OTP (One Time
Password), hardware tokens, etc. are more appropriate. Moreover, the authentication process
must be carried out securely to ensure that a malicious user cannot misrepresent herself by
authenticating as another user.
Storage (STO). Each attribute of a user must be stored securely in an IdP. This will ensure
that user attributes will not be readily exposed to an attacker even if the IdP where the at-
tributes are stored is compromised. With recent attacks on some major global companies
such as Sony [99], Linkedin [100] and Apple [101] where user data were stolen from their
databases, securely storing attributes is even more crucial. This requirement can be achieved
by encrypting user attributes before storing them and safeguarding the respective database
with different database security mechanisms.
Confidentiality (CON). Confidentiality is to ensure that the transmitted data between two
parties is not disclosed to any unauthorised entity. It guards against any eavesdrop attack by
which an attacker can retrieve data in transmission. Traditionally, confidentiality is satisfied
using cryptographic mechanisms. An IMS has to make sure that it uses latest cryptographic
mechanisms to ensure confidentiality.
Integrity (INT). Integrity is to ensure that the transmitted data is not altered during trans-
mission. It can also be satisfied using cryptographic mechanisms.
Non-repudiation (NR). Non-repudiation ensures that a user, once committed for a transac-
tion, cannot deny her commitment in the transaction. This is very important in e-commerce
scenarios where monetary transactions are involved. Once again, cryptographic mechanisms
can be used to ensure non-repudiation.
4.2.3 Privacy Requirements (PR)
The privacy of a user and the user’s identity is a very important issue. Each single piece
of datum, no matter how negligible it seems, needs to be privacy-protected since such data
could be used to build a profile of the user without her knowledge. Privacy Enhancing Tech-
nologies (PETs, in short) are the mechanisms by which privacy can be guaranteed. Quoting
the definition of PET from [102]: “A coherent system of ICT measures that protects privacy
by eliminating or reducing personal data or by preventing unnecessary and/or undesired pro-
cessing of personal data; all without losing the functionality of the data system”. Integrating
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an IMS with PET should protect the privacy of the user. The requirements discussed below
can be used to ensure the privacy of a user in the IdM setting.
Support for Anonym and Pseudonym (SAP) A Privacy-aware IdM System should have
strong support for Anonymity (denoted as ANON in the following section) and should be
used as the base rule for all underlying communication. Likewise, it should support the usage
of Pseudonym (denoted as PSD in the following table) to ensure that users are unlinkable at
different SPs as desired. Privacy protection techniques using various cryptographic methods
can be used to satisfy this requirement.
Data Minimisation (DM). The data minimisation requirement will ensure that only the
required data is transferred, stored and processed at an SP. This can improve the privacy of
a user as it guards against the release of unnecessary yet sensitive personal data to any party
which ultimately reduces the risk of privacy breach.
User Empowering (UE). All the above mentioned privacy requirements will be in vain if
users are not in control of their data and have no idea what data is released to what entity.
To enable such control, the user must be empowered. This can be achieved by satisfying
two requirements below that will allow them to disclose their data selectively and to provide
explicit consent before any data is being released to an SP.
• Selective Disclosure (SD). This requirement will allow a user to select specific at-
tributes before they are released to an SP. By this way, the user can choose specific
attributes for a specific SP.
• Explicit Consent (EC). This requirement will enable a user to provide explicit consent
before any data is released to an SP.
4.2.4 Trust Requirements (TR)
Based on the chosen systems, two different types of trust can be identified. One type, denoted
as Federated Trust, represents the trust requirements in the setting of the FIM Model. The
other trust, denoted as Open Trust, represents the trust requirements in the setting of the
Open Unfederated Identity Model. The Open Trust paradigm does not impose any specific
trust requirement as all entities in this paradigm trust each other. However, the Federated
Trust imposes several complex trust requirements. Such trust issues in the setting of FIM
will be further explored in later chapters.
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4.3 Comparative Analysis
Now, a comparative analysis of the three most popular Identity Management Systems -
SAML-based IMSs, OpenID and OAuth - is presented. Identifying what requirements are
satisfied by which systems and presenting them in a concise manner can be challenging since
the requirements satisfied by different IMSs are written in their respective specifications and
scattered among several documents. This section aims to aid in this regard by presenting
the finding in a concise way so that any reader can instantly deduce which requirements are
fulfilled by which systems. This will also help to identify the strength and weakness of each
system as well as to pinpoint any gaps in them.
Analysing existing Identity Management Systems according to a certain set of criteria is not
novel and two examples that this analysis has followed are [93, 94]. A few Identity Manage-
ment Systems, such as Microsoft .NET Passport, Liberty Alliance Architecture and Novell
DigitalMe, and applications, such as Mozilla 1.4 Navigator, Microsoft Outlook Express 6
SP1 and CookieCooker, have been analysed against a set of requirements in [93]. However,
this work can be considered out-dated in the sense that none of those systems is still func-
tional. A more recent attempt with the same objective can be found in [94] in which four
Identity Management Systems (Liberty Alliance Architecture, Shibboleth, PRIME Architec-
ture and Microsoft CardSpace) have been analysed against a set of requirements. However,
all systems except Shibboleth are either obsolete (Liberty Alliance and the CardSpace) or
have very limited acceptance (PRIME Architecture).
This analysis is similar to that of [94], however, it is more concise (327 pages in [93] and
76 pages in [94]), concentrates on two current systems (OpenID and OAuth) which have
never been analysed in this manner. Also, the analysis is more focused since it concentrates
only on the core set of requirements of an ideal IMS. Moreover, the findings in [94] were
published in a descriptive way and readers would need to read through different sections to
identify the missing features. The findings have been presented in tabular formats which is
more illustrative and will allow any reader to instantly identify which requirements are met
by which systems.
To compare the chosen systems against the set of requirements, it was needed to understand
their architectures and to familiarise with their protocols. Then, it has been checked if each
requirement is met by a system. For this, their protocol descriptions, specification documents
and corresponding wiki-pages have been consulted and sometimes development forums have
been visited. The findings of the analysis are presented in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. The tick
(X) mark, sometimes accompanied with an explanation in brackets (), has been used to
indicate that an IMS satisfies a respective requirement and the character ‘7’ has been used
to indicate that the system does not satisfy the respective requirement.
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Table 4.1: Functional and Security Requirements.
Functional Security
I-R CD LOG HM AA AUTH STO CON INT NR
SAML X X 7 7 7 X X X X X
(IdP Specific)
OpenID X X 7 7 7 X X X X X
(URI/XRI)
OAuth X X 7 7 7 X X X X X
(IdP Specific)
Table 4.2: Privacy and Trust Requirements.
Privacy
TRUSTSAP
DM
UE
ANON PSD SD EC
SAML 7 X X IdP Specific IdP Specific Federated
OpenID 7 7 X Provider Specific Provider Specific Open
OAuth X 7 7 7 Provider Specific Open
From Table 4.1, how the identifier is represented depends on the specific IdP for SAML
and OAuth. The most general example of the identifier is the username or email address.
However, there are other types of identifiers (e.g. URI/XRI for OpenID) as well. None of
the systems has any mechanism to detect the context of the user apart from the application
domain of the SP from where the user tries to access the service. There are other forms of
contexts which will be discussed in later Chapter 7. None of the systems has any specific re-
quirement in their specifications for transaction logging and history management. However,
implemented systems based on a specific IMS may include these features, and hence their
availability to the user is fully dependent on the specific implementation. Also, no system has
any facility for aggregating attributes from multiple IdPs. As for the security requirements
all IMSs have strong support to ensure that security requirements are properly satisfied.
OpenID does not have any support for anonymous or pseudonymous service accesses, SAML
only supports pseudonymous service accesses and OAuth only supports anonymous ac-
cesses. Data minimisation in SAML is achieved via an SP requesting specific attributes
from an IdP. Even though OpenID and OAuth also allow an SP to request specific attributes,
how it is achieved depends on a specific implementation. OAuth does not have any support
for selective disclosure of attributes. All other UE requirements are dependant on the spe-
cific provider. These issues will be analysed in greater detail in later chapters. As mentioned
earlier, SAML is based on the federated trust and the other two systems are based on the
open trust paradigm.
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4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, three popular Identity Management Systems have been compared using a
taxonomy of requirements. The comparative analysis of the three popular IMSs highlight
some major problems. In particular, no system has any facility for detecting the context apart
from the application domain. Moreover, what defines a context with respect to the identity
management is not properly clarified in the existing systems. None of the chosen systems
has any mechanism for attribute aggregation from multiple IdPs. How data minimisation,
selective disclosure and explicit consent requirements are met in these systems depends on a
specific implementation and deserves further attention as it can drastically affect the privacy
of a user. These issues will be further investigated in later chapters.
Among the analysed systems SAML is one of the most matured and widely used technolo-
gies. It already satisfies a good number of requirements as illustrated above. There is already
one implementation of SAML (SimpleSAMLphp [11]) that has limited support for selective
disclosure and explicit consent using its Consent module. The existing research on attribute
aggregation has been based on SAML. For these reasons that SAML is a good candidate
upon which this research can be built on. That is why SAML has been chosen as the basis
for the proposed IMS in following chapters.
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Chapter 5
Dynamic Identity Federation
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, a comparative analysis of three IMSs has been presented using a
taxonomy of requirements. Based on the analysis, SAML has been chosen for the subse-
quent research. It has been mentioned earlier that SAML is one of the most widely used
technologies for creating federations. Despite its several advantages, there is one major lim-
itation of SAML, the method by which trust is established and maintained, as mentioned in
Chapter 2. To enable federations using SAML, trust among participating organisations has
to be pre-configured by system administrators. Pre-configuring trust before any interaction
hinders the establishment of a federation between two prior unknown parties in a dynamic
fashion. This makes it hard to scale and maintain as the number of parties starts to increase in
the federation. As discussed in Chapter 2, the existing works allow a federation to be created
dynamically in a semi-automatic fashion and requires a major change in SAML. In addi-
tion, the focus of these works are on how an entity can join a federation and discussions on
other aspects (maintenance, provisioning and revocation) are rare. It is essential to address
all aspects covering the full life-cycle of a dynamic identity federation. In this chapter, the
proposal and implementation for managing federations in a dynamic fashion are presented.
5.2 Dynamic Federation
Creating a federation in a dynamic fashion is an ongoing and active research topic and there
are several works to address the issue as discussed in Chapter 2. However, all previously
mentioned works have used the term Dynamic Federation literally without defining it for-
mally. Without a formal definition, the term may be interpreted in multiple ways which can
cause confusion. This is why the term Dynamic Federation is defined at first.
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Definition 20 A Dynamic Federation with respect to Identity Management is a business
model which, in addition to entities of a traditional federation, consists of a group of two
or more previously unknown entities federated together dynamically without any prior busi-
ness and technical contract with the aim of allowing users to access services under certain
conditions.
This definition is a stark contrast with the traditional concept of the identity federation based
on SAML in which there must be a legally binding technical and business contract between
participating organisations before they can join any federation. The primary advantage here
is the ability to join a federation in real time. However, the lack of any legally binding con-
tract means that organisations must consider the possibility of negative consequences since
no party is contractually bound to behave as it should and therefore take proper precautions.
This leads to the topic of trust which will be explored below.
The life-cycle of a dynamic federation closely follows the steps in the life-cycle of a tradi-
tional identity federation: association, provisioning, maintenance and revocation. However,
now each steps is carried out in a dynamic fashion. Providing the capability to create fed-
erations dynamically in real time will enable users to carry out some of these steps. This
contrasts with traditional federations where all steps are carried out by the respective ad-
ministrator. However, the task of Provisioning and Maintenance must be carried out by the
respective administrator to ensure that a malicious user cannot update the metadata of an
entity in the federation. These issues have not been considered in previous works.
5.2.1 Trust Issues
According to the proposed definition of a dynamic federation (see Definition 20), participat-
ing organisations may not trust each other entirely since they are previously unknown and
there is no contract to make them accountable in case one acts maliciously. An IdP may not
want to release sensitive attributes to an SP that has been added dynamically and an SP may
not trust all attributes released by an IdP that has been added dynamically. This leads back
to the open trust paradigm of OpenID where every organisation (IdP/SP) is assumed to be
trusted even though it might behave maliciously.
Such trust issues have not been considered while drafting the Dynamic SAML [20] (see
Chapter 2). It is believed that this is a serious flaw and trust should be reinstated in dynamic
federations. Technically, joining a federation will require the parties to exchange and store
each other’s metadata. The SimpleSAMLphp implementation based on Dynamic SAML
only allows one to create a semi-automatic federation (as discussed in Chapter 2) where an
SP, to join with an IdP, requires that the IdP is pre-configured in the TAL (Trust Anchor
List, see Chapter 2) of the SP to allow any user to choose that IdP. However, to harness
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the true potential of dynamic federations, it must be ensured that both parties can be added
dynamically. Moreover, an IdP in SimpleSAMLphp does not distinguish between statically
and dynamically added SPs. This allows the IdP to release the same level of (sensitive)
attributes to both types of SPs. In summary, there are two requirements to fulfil:
1. fully automate the life-cycle in a federation for both parties, and
2. ensure that trust is established in a dynamic federation.
With these two goals in mind and based on how different entities are federated with each
other, the notion of fully trusted, semi-trusted and untrusted entities are introduced.
Definition 21 Fully trusted entities are IdPs and SPs in a traditional SAML federation which
have legal contracts between them.
They are so called since each IdP (or SP) inside a federation trusts any SP (or IdP) in the
same federation to behave as intended and can be made accountable in case the other party
behaves maliciously.
Definition 22 Semi-trusted entities are SPs in a dynamic federation that have been added
dynamically to an IdP inside the federation under some conditions without the presence of
any contract between them and to whom at least a user of the IdP has released a subset of
her attributes.
They are so called since the user wants to release a subset of their attributes to these SPs
inside the dynamic federation even though the IdP in the same federation may not fully trust
such an SP to behave as intended. Therefore, such an SP might not be made accountable by
an IdP in cases they behave maliciously with the absence of any contract between them.
Definition 23 Untrusted entities are IdPs and SPs in a dynamic federation which have been
added dynamically under some conditions without the presence of any contract.
They are so called since any IdP (or SP) inside a dynamic federation may not trust at all any
other dynamically added SPs (or IdPs) in the same federation to behave as intended.
It is important to understand that a dynamic federation may accommodate as many fully
trusted entities as possible. As such, a dynamic federation is an extension of the traditional
federation. Even though, different entities have been categorised based only on how they
federate, these three types of entities have their own effect on other parts of the life-cycle of
the federation which will be explored below.
The term “some conditions” in the definition of the semi-trusted and untrusted entities re-
quire further explanation. It can be the combination of several different conditions by which
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a federation between two entities can be created, updated or removed dynamically, the condi-
tions for establishing and removing individual trust with each other in such a federation, the
conditions by which attributes are released to a semi-trusted SP and the conditions by which
an SP treats attributes of a user from an untrusted IdP. Semi-trusted and untrusted entities
of different dynamic federations should have different sets of conditions suitable for their
business models and service provisioning scenarios. Here, a set of conditions is presented
that have been assumed for developing a proof of concept of managing a dynamic federation
using SAML.
• Only a valid user of an IdP is allowed to add an SP to that IdP dynamically. This is
to ensure that only those SPs that the users want to access for service provisioning
are added in a dynamic federation. This is missing in the current implementation of
SimpleSAMLphp.
• Once an SP is added to an IdP, the SP must add the IdP to its TAL to ensure that the
user can select the IdP from its WAYF service. This nullifies the need to pre-configure
the IdP in the SP.
• Only a valid user of an IdP who has added an SP to that IdP dynamically is allowed to
initiate the procedure to revoke the SP from the federation with that IdP. In this case,
the IdP will be removed from the TAL of the SP and the SP will be removed from the
TAL of the IdP.
• Only the administrator of each entity (an IdP or SP) is allowed to dynamically update
information in the metadata stored in the TAL of other entities. This is to ensure that
users with malicious intent cannot update or corrupt such information of the metadata.
• A dynamically added SP must be tagged as untrusted in an IdP at the initial stage.
Only after a user, after being authenticated at the IdP, has agreed to release a subset of
her attributes to the SP, the SP should be re-tagged as semi-trusted.
• A dynamically added IdP should always be tagged as an untrusted entity for every SP.
• An IdP should ensure that it does not release any attributes to any untrusted entity.
• An IdP should ensure that crucial and sensitive attributes are not released to any semi-
trusted entity since there is no guarantee that they will be handled as intended. There-
fore, it should allow their administrators to configure what attributes should be released
to a semi-trusted entity.
• It is up to the discretion of each SP as how they want to treat released attributes from an
untrusted IdP. They could use the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy) LoA (Level of Assurance or Level of Authentication) guidance of 1 to 4 where
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Level 1 conforms to the lowest assurance and 4 conforms to the highest assurance
[104]. Usually, the LoA level comes from an IdP and is embedded inside a SAML as-
sertion to provide the level of assurance for a certain authentication mechanism at the
IdP. However, an SP should consider implicitly that LoA 1 is the maximum that can
ever accompany a SAML assertion from any untrusted IdP. Since, how the released
attributes will be handled depends on the individual SP, it can vary from one SP to
another even inside the same federation.
To summarise, it is proposed that entities have to be federated/defederated in a fully auto-
matic fashion without any administrative intervention in order to harness the full potential
of dynamic federations and while doing so all entities must consider trust issues involved.
Moreover, the proposal also outlines the conditions for managing such federations in a fully
automated manner. It should be noted that the conditions above are some of the many ways
to fulfil the proposal; other implementations may require different sets of conditions suitable
for their use-case scenarios.
5.3 Proof of Concept: Dynamic Management
To illustrate the applicability of the proposal for managing a dynamic identity federation, a
the proof of concept has been implemented. For this, SimpleSAMLphp has been used and
modified to meet different requirements. In this section, the implementation is presented
using three different scenarios: i) dynamic federations, ii) dynamic defederations and iii)
dynamic update of federations.
5.3.1 Use-case: Dynamic Federation
The architectural setup for this scenario is that there is one IdP and one SP deployed with
the modified version of SimpleSAMLphp. At the beginning, the IdP and SP are not part of
a common federation (they individually may be part of separate federations) and they have
no prior knowledge of the other party. The IdP is configured to use a MySQL database to
store user attributes including identifiers (usernames) and credentials (passwords) in a table
called users. In addition, the IdP uses two tables called semitrusted and untrusted to store
the entity ID of the semi-trusted and untrusted SPs. Moreover, the IdP uses two additional
tables called idpadmin and spadmin.
• The idpadmin stores the entity ID of SPs and the IdP-generated admin codes that can
be used to update the metadata of the IdP stored at the TAL of the SP.
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• On the other hand, the spadmin stores the entity ID of SPs with the SP-generated admin
codes to update the metadata of the SP stored at the TAL of the IdP.
Similarly, the SP is also configured to use a MySQL database including a table called un-
trusted to store the entity ID of an IdP that has been federated dynamically. Likewise, the SP
uses two additional tables called idpadmin and spadmin.
• The idpadmin table at the SP stores the entity ID of an IdP along with an IdP-generated
admin code to update the metadata of the IdP stored at the TAL of the SP.
• The spadmin table at the SP stores the entity ID of an IdP along with an SP-generated
admin code to update the metadata of the SP stored at the TAL of the IdP.
Note that only administrators of the IdP or the SP have access to the spadmin and idpadmin
tables since general users are not allowed to make any changes to the metadata.
With this setup, the protocol flow, illustrated in Figure 5.1, for federating the IdP and the SP
dynamically while trying to access a service from the SP is given below.
1. A user visits the SP for the first time to access one of its services. Assuming that the
user is not authenticated, the user is redirected to the WAYF service to discover her
IdP and a list of federated IdPs with the SP is shown.
2. Since the IdP and SP are not part of a common federation, the IdP list at the SP does not
contain the IdP. However, since the SP supports (more precisely the SimpleSAMLphp
that has been used to deploy the SP supports) the proposal of dynamic federations, it
contains two additional text fields (Figure 5.2) which allow the user to enter the entity
ID of her IdP and a code to ensure that only the valid users of the IdP have the ability
of federating an SP with an IdP.
3. Since the user does not have the code, she logs in to her IdP and generates a code using
the Generate button at the Generate IdP Code page (Figure 5.3). This page also checks
the semitrusted table to see if there are any dynamically added SPs. Since there are
none, it says so (Figure 5.3). Once the Generate button is clicked, a 4 digit random
number is generated and displayed (Figure 5.4). This random number is also stored
temporarily in a database table called code along with the user identifier. The code is
used during metadata exchange for verification (see below). Here, a 4 digit code has
been opted, other implementations may opt for other type of codes according to their
own requirements.
4. After generating the code, the user inserts the entity ID of the IdP and the recently
generated code to the WAYF page of the SP (Figure 5.5) and clicks the Add button.
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Figure 5.1: Protocol flow for a dynamic federation.
5. Once the Add button is clicked, it is verified that the entity ID field or code is not null
and that the inserted entity ID is not already part of the federation (dynamically or
statically). If any part of the verification process fails, an appropriate error message is
displayed and the user is redirected to the WAYF page where she can start again.
6. Assuming there is no error during verification, the SP generates a 4 digit random code
which is then stored at the spadmin table along with the entity ID of the IdP. Then,
a request to retrieve the IdP metadata from that entity ID with some specific values
is posted. The request contains the entity ID and the code that the user has entered
and three hidden fields called MetaAdd, ReturnTo and AdminCode. The values of the
MetaAdd and ReturnTo fields contain the entity ID of the SP and the URL of the ser-
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Figure 5.2: Additional text fields at the WAYF.
Figure 5.3: Code generate page at the IdP.
Figure 5.4: Generated code at the IdP.
vices that the user requested in the first place which initiated the SAML flow, whereas
the AdminCode field contains the SP generated random admin code. Remember that
SimpleSAMLphp implementation of dynamic SAML requires that entity ID should be
an endpoint from where the metadata can be fetched.
7. Once the Appropriate end point of the IdP receives this request, it checks if there is a
field called MetaAdd. If found, it knows that this is a special request for exchanging
metadata with the requested SP. If not found, it assumes that it is a normal metadata
fetch request and returns its metadata. Since the request contains a MetaAdd field, it
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Figure 5.5: Entering values at the WAYF.
checks for a code field and retrieves its value and verifies if the same value can be
found in the code table of its MySQL database. If found, it indicates that this request
for exchanging metadata is valid. If not found, an error message is returned to the SP.
8. Assuming that the code field contains a valid code, the IdP retrieves the value of the
MetaAdd and AdminCode fields which contain the entity ID of the SP and the 4 digit
SP-generated admin code. The IdP stores this admin code in the spadmin table at
the IdP along with the entity ID of the SP and sends an HTTP GET request to that
location. GET has been used since there are no other parameters to pass during the
metadata fetch process from the SP.
9. When the SP receives this request, it returns its metadata.
10. Once the metadata is retrieved, the IdP goes through the specified verification process
for a dynamic SAML (verifying the embedded certificate and verifying the signature
on the metadata using that certificate). If the verification is correct, the metadata is
stored in its repository and the SP is added to its TAL. In addition, the user identifier
for the code is retrieved from the code table and the entity ID of the SP is added into
the untrusted table of the database along with the code and the user identifier. Next,
the used code is removed from the code table to ensure that it cannot be used again. If
the metadata verification is not correct, then the respective entry from the spadmin is
removed and an error message is returned to the SP.
11. If everything goes accordingly at the IdP, it generates a 4 digit random admin code
which is then stored in its idpadmin table along with the entity ID of the SP. Then, the
metadata of the IdP along with the ReturnTo field and its value, a code field contain-
ing the previously generated value and the AdminCode containing the recently IdP-
generated 4 digit admin code are returned to the requesting endpoint of the SP, where
the metadata, ReturnTo, code and AdminCode values are separated. As before, the SP
goes through the specified verification process for a dynamic SAML. If verification
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is correct, the metadata is stored in its repository and the IdP is added to its TAL. In
addition, the entity ID of the IdP along with the code is added into the untrusted table
of its database making the IdP to be tagged as untrusted. Moreover, the entity ID of
the IdP along with the value of the AdminCode parameter are stored in the idpadmin
table.
12. Finally, the user is redirected to the URL retrieved from the ReturnTo field (the URL
of the service requested initially) which in turn takes the user back to the IdP selection
page of the WAYF. However, as the IdP has already been added, the list contains the
list of the IdP and it is tagged as an untrusted IdP (Figure 5.6). Moreover, it is shown
to the user that the IdP has already been added as an untrusted IdP so that no other
users try to add it once again which will result in an error.
Figure 5.6: Added IdP at the WAYF.
In the traditional SAML scenario, it is assumed that both the IdP and SP are visible to each
other as they are expected to be online. This assumption does not hold for all SAML IdPs
which might be installed locally inside the user’s computer from where she is trying to ac-
cess a service. To accommodate this use-case, the implementation of the SP at the Simple-
SAMLphp has been modified so that the SP can communicate with the local IdP. This has
been done by embedding a JavaScript into an XHTML (Extensible Hypertext Markup Lan-
guage) form which is submitted automatically at the entity ID of the IdP. Since the JavaScript
runs inside the browser and the local IdP is visible to the browser, it can properly submit these
requests. The SP, on the other hand, is assumed to be online and is visible to the IdP. Hence,
no special treatment is required.
5.3.2 Use-case: Dynamic Defederation
The setup for this scenario is that an IdP and an SP have been federated dynamically using
the steps described above and a user wants to defederate them dynamically. A user is only
allowed to defederate those entities that she had federated previously.
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With this setup, the protocol flow, illustrated in Figure 5.7, for defederating the IdP and the
SP dynamically is given below.
Figure 5.7: Protocol flow for a dynamic defederation.
1. The user logs in to the IdP and then clicks the Remove SP link.
2. If the user did not federate the IdP to any SP dynamically, a message will be shown to
the user. Assuming, the user did already federate the IdP to some SPs, a list of SPs is
retrieved from the untrusted/semitrusted tables using the user identifier to ensure that
only the SP that has been federated dynamically by the user is retrieved. Then, a list of
check boxes containing the entity ID of these dynamically added SPs is shown (Figure
5.8).
Figure 5.8: Removing an SP at the IdP.
3. The user selects one of the SPs and clicks the Remove button.
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4. The IdP uses the entity ID of the selected SP to retrieve the code from the untrust-
ed/semitrusted table.
5. Once the code is retrieved, the corresponding entry is removed from the respective ta-
ble. The IdP also removes the corresponding SP entry from the idpadmin and spadmin
tables.
6. Then, a request to remove the IdP entry from the TAL of the SP is sent to the entity ID
of the SP. The request contains three parameters:
• the remove parameter containing the entity ID of the IdP,
• the code parameter containing the code retrieved in Step 4, and
• the ReturnTo parameter containing the link of the Remove page at the IdP where
the user will return later.
7. The SP checks if there exists the entity ID of an IdP along with the code containing the
respective value in its untrusted table. If such an entry is found, the entry is removed
from the table, otherwise an error message is shown. Moreover, the SP also removes
the respective entry from the idpadmin and spadmin tables.
8. Finally, the user is redirected to the location retrieved from the ReturnTo parameter
and the user is informed about the successful defederation.
As described in the previous use-case, the same approach has been adopted to defederate any
locally installed IdP using a JavaScript embedded into an XHTML form which is submitted
automatically to the entity ID of the IdP and like before the SP is assumed to be online.
Use-case: Dynamic Update
The setup for this scenario is that an IdP and an SP have been federated dynamically using
the steps described in the first use-case. The idpadmin table at the IdP contains the entity
ID of the SP along with the IdP-generated 4 digit AdminCode and the idpadmin table at the
SP contains the entity ID of the IdP with the same IdP-generated 4 digit AdminCode. Now,
the administrator of the IdP has made some changes. It is assumed that the changed entries
are the Binding Location entries of the SingleSignOnService entry of the IDPSSODescriptor
field of the metadata to the local metadata of the IdP and the administrator wants to propagate
these changes into the metadata stored at the SP in a dynamic fashion. It is assumed that the
IdP has provided an interface to allow the administrator to propagate these changes.
With this setup, the protocol flow, illustrated in Figure 5.9, for updating metadata dynami-
cally is given below.
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Figure 5.9: Protocol flow for dynamic update.
1. The administrator of the IdP visits the administrative interface of the IdP and logs in.
2. The administrator clicks the Update Metadata link at the interface and the update page
is shown (Figure 5.10).
3. The update page contains a dropdown list containing the entity ID of all (dynamically
or statically) SPs federated with the IdP (Figure 5.10).
4. The administrator selects the entity ID of the SP to which she wants to propagate these
changes.
5. The selected entity ID of the SP is used to retrieve the respective entries of the metadata
and those entries are displayed using check boxes to the administrator. The adminis-
trator selects the Binding and Location (SSO-Binding and SSO-Location entries in
Figure 5.10) entries and clicks the Submit button. The IdP restores the AdminCode
from the idpadmin table using the selected entity ID of the SP.
6. A request is sent to the entity ID of the SP. The request contains several parameters:
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Figure 5.10: Metadata update page.
• the update parameter containing the entity ID of the IdP,
• the AdminCode parameter containing the code, and
• the name of the entries of the metadata that need to be updated each containing
respective updated values and the ReturnTo parameter containing the location of
the update page at the IdP where the administrator will return.
7. Once the SP receives this request, all values of the parameters are retrieved. The update
parameter informs the SP that the IdP with the entity ID in that parameter wants to
update its metadata. The AdminCode parameter is used to authorise the request by
matching them with the values stored at the idpadmin table at the SP.
8. If they match, the metadata is updated with the requested values and an appropriate
message is returned to the location retrieved from the ReturnTo parameter. If no match
is found, an error message is returned to that IdP location.
A similar approach can be used to update the metadata of the SP stored at the TAL of the IdP.
As described in the previous use-case, the metadata of any locally installed IdP can be up-
dated using a JavaScript embedded into an XHTML form which is submitted automatically
to the entity ID of the IdP.
5.4 Proof of Concept: Service Provisioning
To illustrate how users can access services in a federation created dynamically, a proof of
concept has been implemented. In this section, the implementation is presented using two
different scenarios: an IdP-SP Scenario to illustrate the concept for a Type 1 Federation
(Figure 3.6(a)) and an IdP-IdP-SP Scenario to illustrate the concept for a Type 2 Federation
(Figure 3.6(b)).
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5.4.1 IdP-SP Scenario
The setup for this use-case is that an IdP and SP have been federated dynamically with the
IdP tagged as untrusted at the SP and the SP is tagged as untrusted at the IdP. Before the
protocol flow is discussed, underlying trust issues must be analysed.
A mechanism has been provided to ensure that an administrator of an IdP can configure
which attributes are released to a semi-trusted SP. For this, a configuration parameter called
semitrusted.sp has been added to the configuration file (called config.php) in SimpleSAMLphp.
It is assumed that an IdP has asked all its users to provide values for these attributes during
the registration process: username, name, telephone, age, position, org, salarygrade and
email. A sample configuration parameter could be ‘semitrusted.sp’=> array (‘username’,
‘name’, ‘telephone’, ‘age’, ‘position’, ‘org’) which will configure the IdP to release only
these attributes by excluding other attributes such as salarygrade and email, which the IdP
normally releases to trusted SPs. The administrator can add as many or as few attributes
as needed as per the requirements. This configuration parameter works like an attribute re-
lease policy. SimpleSAMLphp does not have the concept of an Attribute Release Policy like
in Shibboleth, however, it has something similar called an Authentication Processing Filter
(AuthProc) [105]. An AuthProc allows the system to do additional activities once user au-
thentication is complete. For example, it can be used for filtering out attributes. There are
several authentication processing filters bundled with the SimpleSAMLphp implementation.
One of them is the Consent module that is used to display the list of attributes to the user
just before they are released. This module has been modified to allow the IdP to show only
those attributes that can be found on the semitrusted.sp parameter. From the displayed list,
the user can choose which attributes she wants to release to the SP. Note that the illustrated
use-cases are applicable for any locally installed IdP as well as for any traditional IdP using
the mechanisms discussed previously.
With this setup, the protocol flow, illustrated in Figure 5.11, for the scenario is given below.
1. A user visits the SP for the first time to access one of its services. Assuming that the
user is not authenticated, the user is redirected to the WAYF service to discover a list
of IdPs federated with the SP. The list also contains the untrusted IdP federated in the
previous use-case.
2. Now, if the user selects the untrusted IdP, the usual SAML flow will take place. A
SAML authentication request will be sent to the selected IdP and if the user is not
already authenticated at the IdP, she will be prompted for login.
3. Once the user is logged in, the Consent module is called internally. It reads the
semitrusted.sp configuration parameter and displays the attributes automatically. Fig-
ure 5.12 shows the consent form. The consent page also states which attributes are
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Figure 5.11: Protocol flow for IdP-SP service provisioning.
filtered out from the full set and why. At this point, the user can choose which at-
tributes she wants to release to the SP.
4. If the user has chosen to release any attribute(s) by clicking the Yes, continue but-
ton, the entity ID of the SP is removed from the untrusted table and inserted into the
semitrusted table indicating that the SP will be tagged as a semi-trusted entity here-
after and the chosen attributes would be released to the SP using a SAML response. If
the user chooses not to release any attributes, the entity ID of the SP will remain in the
untrusted table.
5. Once the SP receives the response, the assertion is extracted and validated. Then,
attributes are retrieved from the assertion.
At this point, the SP knows from the untrusted table of its database that these attributes have
been released by an untrusted IdP. Therefore, the respective SP will treat these attributes
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Figure 5.12: Attributes to be released at the Consent page.
coming from an untrusted IdP having a LoA value of 1 and authorise the user accordingly.
Evidently, the notion of trust plays a crucial role in dynamic federations and goes through
different transformations while different entities interact during a use-case. The summary
of these transformations is as follows. When an IdP and an SP are added dynamically, they
initially consider each other as untrusted entities. When a user of the IdP, after being authen-
ticated, releases a few attributes to the SP, the SP is considered as semi-trusted. However,
a dynamically added SP is never considered as a fully trusted entity to an IdP. On the other
hand, a dynamically added IdP is never considered as a fully trusted or semi-trusted entity to
an SP.
5.4.2 IdP-IdP-SP Scenario
The protocol flows described above will allow the creation of federations in a fully dynamic
fashion and also consider the trust issues involved at both ends. However, the main problem
is that an SP may not trust all attributes coming from an untrusted IdP even though the IdP
is honest. The problem can be resolved if it is possible to link the untrusted IdP with an IdP
which is fully trusted by the SP. In such a case, the fully trusted IdP would act like a Proxy
IdP as described in [106]. A Proxy IdP can delegate the authentication task to another IdP
which is hidden from the SP. Thus, the SP will think that it is talking to the fully trusted IdP
while in fact it is another IdP performing the authentication. The untrusted IdP would release
the user attributes to the fully trusted IdP once the user is authenticated which will be then
retrieved and returned to the SP in such a way that the SP will think that the attributes have
been released by the fully trusted IdP. Another advantage is that the SP no longer needs to
support dynamic federations, since the Proxy IdP can, in a trustworthy manner, add new IdPs
indirectly. As before, SimpleSAMLphp has used and modified to demonstrate this scenario.
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SimpleSAMLphp allows multiple authentication sources (including another SAML IdP) for
authenticating a user. This can be enabled by the MultiAuth module of SimpleSAMLphp.
This feature has been used to add the untrusted IdP (from the perspective of an SP) as one
of the authentication sources in the fully trusted IdP. To the untrusted IdP, the fully trusted
IdP would be treated as a normal SAML SP, however, the fully trusted IdP would treat
the untrusted IdP as the SAML IdP. To enable this configuration, it needs the authentication
source to be pre-configured by exchanging metadata just like a federation. As in the previous
scenario, SimpleSAMLphp has been modified to automate this procedure so that two prior
unknown SAML IdPs can be linked (in other words federated) in a fully dynamic fashion.
However, this approach introduces an inconsistency which a malicious user may abuse for
elevation of privileges. Since the SP would think that the attributes from the linked IdP have
come from a trusted source (the Proxy IdP), they might be tricked in trusting them. To ensure
that it does not happen, the trusted IdP must add a LoA value of 1 into the assertion in cases
it has received any attributes from a dynamically linked IdP and return the assertion with that
lower LoA. This would help the SP to decide how much trust they can put in those attributes.
With this setup, the protocol flow, illustrated in Figure 5.13, for this scenario is given below.
1. A user logs in to the untrusted IdP and generates a code as described in Section 5.3.1 .
This code will be used to link the Proxy IdP.
2. Now, the user needs to log in to the Proxy IdP. Since the IdP has enabled the MultiAuth
module, the IdP shows all authentication sources (Figure 5.14). As there is no other
authentication sources, only the example-userpass source (an authentication source
based on locally stored username/password in a database) is shown, which allows the
user to log in to the IdP by using username/password. The user selects this source
and logs in using her username and password. After login, the user clicks the ‘Link
Another IdP’ option.
3. The user is presented with a page which has three fields:
• IdP ID field for entering the entity ID of the untrusted IdP,
• Code field to enter the generated code from step 1, and
• a Name field to enter a Nick Name for the untrusted IdP.
This Nick Name will help the user to remember the IdP once it is added as one of the
authentication sources. This field is not needed at the SP because each IdP is listed
using its entity ID, whereas at the Proxy IdP, IdPs are listed as authentication sources
using a user friendly name. After entering all this information, the user clicks the
Submit button.
5.4. Proof of Concept: Service Provisioning 101
Figure 5.13: Protocol flow for IdP-IdP-SP service provisioning.
4. Once the Submit button is clicked, it is checked to make sure that all information has
been entered in the three fields. If not, appropriate error messages are displayed. If
yes, a request to retrieve metadata from that entity ID is submitted with some specific
values just as discussed in the previous scenario.
5. At this point, the code is verified, metadata between the two IdPs are exchanged, veri-
fied and stored as discussed previously. At this point, the two IdPs are linked.
6. The user visits the SP to access one of the services. Assuming that the user is not
authenticated, she is redirected to the WAYF Service where the list of federated IdPs is
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Figure 5.14: Initially, one authentication
source Username/password at the IdP.
Figure 5.15: Linked untrusted IdP as the
authentication source in the Proxy IdP.
shown. The user selects the fully trusted IdP (Proxy IdP) and a SAML Authentication
request is submitted to that IdP.
7. The IdP displays the list of authentication sources. As the untrusted IdP is already
linked, the user can see the nick name (My IdP) of the untrusted IdP which was given
during the linking phase (Figure 5.15).
8. Once the user selects the untrusted IdP, she is redirected to the IdP where the user logs
in and the consent page with attributes is shown. As the Proxy IdP is not tagged as the
semi-trusted SP, all attributes that the user chooses will be released to the Proxy IdP.
9. Once the user clicks the Yes, continue button, a SAML assertion with all attributes is
sent back to the Proxy IdP. The Proxy IdP validates the assertion and then retrieves all
attributes. The Proxy IdP builds a SAML assertion with these attributes with a LoA
value of 1 and returns a SAML response with the assertion to the SP.
What the SP will do with all these attributes is not further explored here.
Now, the notion of trust among different entities is summarised. The Proxy IdP and the SP
consider each other fully trusted. Since, the Proxy IdP and the other IdP have been federated
dynamically, they initially consider each other as untrusted entities. In addition, the Proxy
IdP acts as an SP to the other IdP. Following the restrictions of dynamic federations, the
Proxy IdP will be considered as an semi-trusted entity to the other IdP once a user of the
other IdP releases her attributes to the Proxy IdP. On the other hand, the other IdP will
always be considered as an untrusted entity to the Proxy IdP.
5.5 Discussion
The approach for creating dynamic federations offers several advantages:
• Users can create federations dynamically and whenever required. Even though it was
not considered in the implementation, any IdP or SP can decide on how long it would
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allow the other party that has been added dynamically to remain in the federation by
using a time threshold. Once the threshold is reached, the respective entry can be
removed automatically from the TAL list, thus defederating the entity.
• By using separate trust domains inside the same federation for fully trusted, semi-
trusted and untrusted entities, a federation can host all types and leverage the advan-
tages of all in the same configuration. However, one must keep in mind that the types
of treatment semi-trusted entities may receive will fully depend on a particular imple-
mentation.
• The proposal illustrates how the life-cycle of any identity federation can be managed
dynamically in a fully automatic fashion. This approach can be extremely useful to
automate the task of federation management which is currently done manually.
Currently, the implementation only deals with one level of trust for linking IdPs: IdP-IdP. It
will be interesting to see if it can be extended for multi-levels so that the trust hierarchy looks
something like this: IdP-IdP-IdP-...-IdP. Technical challenges for exchanging metadata may
not be very difficult, however, establishing the transitive trust can be challenging. Also, the
current model is based only on the SimpleSAMLphp implementation of the SAML. It is nec-
essary to investigate how the proposals can be implemented in other SAML implementations
as well to ensure its widespread adoption. The best way to achieve this is by converting the
proposals into specifications and then integrating it with the official specifications to ensure
consistent implementations.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the proposal for managing dynamic federations in SAML has been explored:
how the life-cycle of such a federation can be fully managed in an automatic fashion and
how such federations can be used to provide services to a user. Managing an identity fed-
eration, especially when it is very large, can be a laborious job if it is done manually. The
proposed approach can be beneficial in such aspects as it can be used for creating, removing
and updating federations dynamically and in a fully automatic fashion. Furthermore, the
proposed approach requires no modification of the SAML Protocol, rather it depends on the
implementation and hence, can be easily adopted to any SAML implementation.
The proposal has been implemented using the SimpleSAMLphp SAML library. To outline
the applicability of the proposal, several use-cases with detailed protocol flows have been
illustrated using the implementation. In addition, the trust issues involved in such scenarios
have been examined. Finally, it should be noted that the issues of trust are very complex.
The way the trust issues have been outlined here may not be suitable for all scenarios. For
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example, an IdP may be reluctant to trust any SP which is not pre-configured in the traditional
way and thereby hesitant to release any attributes to it. In such cases, it will be difficult to
create federations in a dynamic way and the involved IdPs and SPs will need to relax the
trust requirements if they want to allow their users to take advantage of dynamic federations.
However, how much relaxation it will require will depend entirely on a specific use-case.
The implementation of dynamic federations has been extensively used to realise different
proof of concepts in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, and hence, becomes an integrated
part in realising the concept of the proposal of User-controlled Identity Management which
is explored in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
User-controlled Identity Management
Systems
6.1 Introduction
In previous chapters, a number of limitations of the current Identity Management Systems
have been identified. At first, the major limitations are highlighted below:
• The effect of multiple Partial Identities. The number of partial identities of a user
keeps growing and the user finds it increasingly difficult to manage her identities which
are spread across multiple IdPs.
• Data Ownership and Controllability. Users have limited control over their own data
and there is no way for users to know if their attributes are abused or shared with
third-parties.
• Privacy Issues. The support for the Selective Disclosure and the Explicit Consent
requirements is not universal and depends entirely on the specific provider.
In addition to these, there have been a number of incidents in which sensitive user attributes
were stolen from some major global companies (which also act as the IdPs for their respective
services) such as Sony (77 million user accounts were affected [99]), Linkedin (more than six
million passwords were stolen [100]), Apple (over 1 million Apple IDs fell into the wrong
hands [101]) and users are rightfully worried about storing crucial data at these IdPs.
In this chapter, the proposal for a User-controlled Identity Management System is introduced
to tackle these limitations. The main motivation for a User-controlled Identity Management
is to empower users by giving them more control over their own attributes. To allow the de-
sired control, a novel type of user-controlled IdP called Portable Personal Identity Provider
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(PPIdP) has been introduced. A PPIdP is a special type of IdP hosted in a mobile device of
a user and acts as the central component in User-controlled Identity Management. How the
proposal of PPIdP can tackle a few of the stated limitations has been investigated. Addition-
ally, the advantages and the current limitations of the proposal have been discussed. To show
the applicability of the approach, several use-cases have been illustrated. A PPIdP imposes
several functional, security, privacy and trust requirements. Therefore, it is also analysed
how these requirements have been satisfied while designing and developing a PPIdP.
6.2 Definitions and Requirement Analysis
User-controlled Identity Management can be considered as an extension of the traditional
concept of Identity Management. In essence, User-controlled Identity Management empow-
ers users with the authority and control over their data which have been missing in the current
setting of IdM. A few existing extensions of Identity Management may seem to offer a sim-
ilar level of authority and control. One such extension known as the User-centric Identity
Management [4, 107] will be investigated. The term User-centric Identity Management itself
has two interpretations. In one interpretation, it refers to the IdM technology that will ensure
that a user is placed at the centre of all protocol flows using that technology [107]. The argu-
ment is that putting a user at the centre of all protocol flows will enable the user to control the
data flow ensuring that the user knows what data is released to which entities. Modern IdM
technologies such as SAML and OpenID are based on this concept. Unfortunately, this does
not solve the problem of data ownership and the provider has the ultimate control over user
data. In addition, even though such technologies are supposed to provide more control (e.g.
the selective disclosure of attributes) during the data flow, it has been found that it entirely
depends on a specific implementation and many implementations simply do not offer such a
facility. The findings regarding this will be presented in Chapter 8. The second interpretation
of User-centric Identity Management refers to the theoretical use-case of utilising a personal
device to collect and store data from different IdPs. Then, the personal device can be used
to authenticate and access different services [4]. Since this is only a theoretical model, this
is not clear how such a model can be realised and how such a model can be used to tackle
the stated problems. Also, this interpretation does not deal with the issue of data ownership
since all data is stored at an IdP. In summary, the User-centric Identity Management moves
toward the right direction to ensure users have more control over their data, unfortunately,
does not handle all issues regarding data ownership and controllability. User-controlled Iden-
tity Management builds upon the concept of User-centric Identity Management while adding
the additional functionalities. In that sense, the User-controlled Identity Management can be
thought of as an evolution of the User-centric Identity Management.
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6.2.1 Definitions
At first, a definition of User-controlled Identity Management is provided.
Definition 24 User-controlled Identity Management consists of all the functions and capa-
bilities of the traditional Identity Management as defined in Definition 15 while allowing
users the following additional functionalities:
• full ownership of their data so that no other entities can impose ownership of it;
• ultimate controllability over their data including the selective disclosure of attributes,
and thus ensuring no entity can get hold of any subset of it without her consent;
• availability of their data so that it can be used for online services and applications in
a secure manner.
A system that can be used for User-controlled Identity Management is regarded as the User-
controlled Identity Management System. Like any traditional IMS, such a system consists of
three classes of entities - IdPs, SPs and Users - and respective protocols to enable interactions
among entities of these classes. To equip the proposed system with capabilities of a tradi-
tional IMS, any existing model (e.g. the Federated or Open Unfederated Identity model) can
be used. Unfortunately, the IdPs and the SPs in these models fall short of realising the addi-
tional functionalities. The two ways by which the additional functionalities can be realised
are discussed next.
• The first way is to allow users to encrypt their data at source (e.g. at the device from
where the data is being uploaded) before storing it at a provider. Then a third party
(including a provider itself) will only be able to access the data when the user allows
it by decrypting the data before sharing. In this manner, the provider will have no way
to know which value for any attribute is being stored at their end. Ultimately, this will
also undermine the possibility of abusing user data or sharing user data with any third
party and thus solving a few of the existing problems (the second issue in Definition
24) and allowing users to have the ultimate controllability over their data. Unfortu-
nately, this does not tackle the problem that arises due to the effect of multiple partial
identities since users will still need to manage those partial identities across different
providers as described previously. Moreover, this does not ensure data ownership. For
example, a provider has the ultimate control on how and when the data is available to
a user, even though the data is unusable by it. Also, if a provider is unavailable (it may
go through a maintenance phase or may be forced out of business), users will not be
able to access any data stored at the provider when required. In essence, this approach
is promising, unfortunately, it does not solve all issues.
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• The second way is to introduce a novel type of IdP that will be under the full control
of a user. One way to achieve this is to ensure that users are the owners of this type of
IdP. This enables a user to own any data stored in the IdP. However, the IdP must be
equipped with appropriate technologies to allow users the full controllability of their
data and to make these data available whenever required. In addition, such an IdP can
be used to replace a significant number of IdPs where a user’s data is currently stored.
This will reduce the difficulty that arises from the effect of multiple partial identities.
Clearly, the second approach is more advantageous for a user and that is why this approach
has been adopted. With this goal in mind, a novel type of IdP called the Portable Personal
Identity Provider is introduced and defined below.
Definition 25 A Portable Personal Identity Provider (PPIdP) is an Identity Provider that
is under the full control of a single user and resides in a mobile device owned by the user.
It is the user who must decide what attributes should be stored in such an IdP and which
attributes should be released to which SP by this IdP.
Since a PPIdP is hosted inside a mobile device of a user, all attributes stored in it will be
owned by the user. Hence there is no chance of any abuse by an IdP. However, it must
be ensured that a PPIdP is equipped with appropriate technologies to allow a user to fully
control the stored attributes. Apart from this, the IdP must provide an interface to allow
users to add, update and remove attributes into this IdP as well as to set a Attribute Release
Policy (ARP) that dictates which attributes will be released to which SP. Moreover, it is the
responsibility of the IdP to ensure that all user attributes are stored safely and securely.
Interestingly, such an IdP adds the feature of portability allowing a user to use it while on
the move. Windows CardSpace, a former initiative from Microsoft, could act as a type of
personal IdP [108] and was included with several versions of the Windows operating system
such as Windows 7 and Windows Vista. However, it was not portable since it was only
available for desktop computers. Currently, there is no such personal yet portable IdP and
the implementation described here aims to fill this gap.
In short, additional functionalities of the User-controlled IMS will be realised using a PPIdP.
Other entities (such as an SP and user) must be equipped with capabilities so that they can
interact with the PPIdP using a protocol. Thus, the PPIdP takes the central stage for realising
the concept of the User-controlled IMS.
6.2.2 Requirement Analysis
To ensure that additional functionalities are properly met and different key issues are effec-
tively addressed, the following set of requirements, in addition to those given in the taxonomy
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of Chapter 4), have been formulated.
Functional Requirements.
• Online Service Integration. All IdM protocols are based on standard web technolo-
gies. Therefore, it needs to be ensured that a PPIdP is compatible with such web
technologies and is integrable with online services.
• Visibility. The existing API of different IdM protocols (e.g. SAML and OpenID) have
not been developed with a locally hosted IdP in mind. The general assumption is that
both an IdP and SP are online and visible to each other. Since a PPIdP will be hosted
inside a mobile device, this assumption does not hold. Therefore, there must be a
mechanism to make a PPIdP and SP visible to each other.
• Federation. As discussed previously, SAML requires every entity to be a part of a
federation before they can interact with each other and such a federation is established
by exchanging metadata. Since a PPIdP is hosted inside a user’s mobile device and is
maintained by the user herself, the traditional approach of exchanging metadata cannot
be used to create federations. A mechanism needs to be provided to federate a PPIdP
with other entities.
• Attribute Storage and Update. A PPIdP must store and handle attributes of a user
locally and must provide an interface to allow the user to provide new attributes and
update existing ones.
• Attribute Release Policy. There should be an interface to set up any attribute release
policy which will dictate what attributes can be released to which SPs.
• Attribute Synchronisation. Nowadays, many users have more than one mobile de-
vice. Some have a smart phone as well as a tablet and some have more than one smart
phone and tablet. To enable a user to access the same set of online services using a
PPIdP across multiple devices, a PPIdP must be installed on each of these devices.
While using a PPIdP across multiple devices, a user may add, remove or update dif-
ferent attributes in different PPIdPs in different devices during different interactions.
Thus, she may end up with inconsistent sets of attributes in different PPIdPs. To en-
sure consistency, there must be a mechanism to allow a user to synchronise attributes
in these PPIdPs across multiple devices.
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Security Requirements.
• Secure User Authentication. A user should be securely authenticated at a PPIdP.
• Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity. Attributes released by a user using a
PPIdP should be transmitted between different entities maintaining their confidential-
ity, integrity and authenticity.
• Secure Storage and Data Theft. A PPIdP should ensure that a user’s attributes are
stored safely and securely having mechanisms to guard against any data theft possibil-
ities.
• Intentional or Accidental Corruption of Data. A PPIdP must guard against the
intentional or accidental corruption of data.
• Name Qualification and Impersonation Issues. A PPIdP is a locally hosted IdP and
a user can have her own IdP hosted on her mobile devices. Therefore, a mechanism
is required to ensure that each PPIdP is name-qualified with respect to an SP so that
the SP can uniquely differentiate between different PPIdPs. Similarly, many users may
end up using the same identifier (a username) in their PPIdP. Hence, it must be ensured
that one user cannot impersonate others.
Privacy Requirements. The privacy of a user in an IMS can be affected if the privacy
requirements of the taxonomy presented in Chapter 4 are not fulfilled. Even though the
introduction of a new IMS introduces novel functional, security and trust requirements, the
privacy requirements remain unchanged. This is because the proposed system will not affect
the privacy of a user in any way. Hence, it needs to be ensured that the existing requirements
- Support of Pseudonym, Data Minimisation, Selective Disclosure and Explicit Consent - are
satisfied.
Trust Requirements. Implicit in every Identity Management is the issue of trust. Hence, it
is crucial to closely examine the trust requirements that may arise while using the proposed
system. The trust requirements essentially outline the level of trust each entity may have over
another. A trust metric can be used to indicate the level of trust of each entity over another
entity. For the proposed system, the NIST proposed LoA (Level of Assurance) value of 1 to
4 will be used as a trust metric.
6.3 Architecture
To realise the proposal, a model of PPIdP has been designed. The architecture of the model
is illustrated in Figure 6.1. A PPIdP has two major components called the Personal Attribute
Store (PAS) and the IdP Component. Each component is discussed in turn.
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Figure 6.1: Architecture of the PPIdP.
As the name suggests, the Personal Attribute Store (PAS) is where a user’s attributes are
stored in encrypted format and is a necessary companion of PPIdP. It consists of a back-
end database to store the attributes and an interface for users to update attributes. It also has
interfaces to communicate with internal sensors (such as the GPS receiver) of mobile devices
in order to collect contextual information and store them as dynamic attributes.
The IdP component is responsible for providing IdP services using different protocols (SAML,
OpenID, etc.). It has two sub-components: the IdP Context and the Control Panel. The IdP
context may consist of several endpoints where each endpoint serves a specific protocol. De-
pending on the requirements for a particular implementation, as many or as less endpoints
can be added to the IdP context component. The IdP component can access the same back-
end database of the PAS allowing it to retrieve user attributes while engaging in an interaction
of a protocol The control panel acts as the controller allowing a user to start or stop the IdP
Component whenever required.
6.4 Prototype Implementation
To show how the proposed architecture can be realised, a proof of concept prototype has
been implemented. The current implementation of the prototype is based on SAML with
an experimental support of OpenID. There are several popular platforms for mobile devices,
namely Android, iOS, Windows and Blackberry. Since both SAML and OpenID have a
Java API, Android has been chosen due to its strong support for Java. In addition, SAML
SPs have been deployed with the capabilities to interact with the PPIdP. There are different
implementations of SAML SPs such as Shibboleth [109], SimpleSAMLphp [11] and ZXID
[110]. However, SimpleSAMLphp has been chosen because of its strong support for the se-
lective disclosure of attributes using the Consent module. Next, it is discussed how different
components of PPIdP have been developed in Android. Then, the challenges faced while
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developing these components are explored.
6.4.1 Personal Attribute Store
The PAS has been developed as an Android application. Android is bundled with the sup-
port for the SQLite Database [111] which is used to store user’s attributes. To ensure the
security of stored attributes, they are encrypted before storage. An open source library called
SQLCipher [112] has bee used to encrypt attributes before storage and decrypt during us-
age. SQLCipher provides fast and secure 256-bit AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
encryption of SQLite database files and thus alleviating the need for manual encryption and
decryption of attributes.
The first-time user of a PPIdP must create an account by providing an identifier (username)
and a credential (password). The user must use that identifier (and credential) to add or
manipulate other attributes and also to start the IdP. Once the user is logged in, a session is
created and she is presented with the main control panel of PAS which has several options
(Figure 6.2). The user can choose the Add option to add a new attribute, the Edit and Delete
options to edit and delete existing attributes respectively, the Exit option to exit the PAS and
the Sign Out option to sign out by deleting the existing session. If the user exits the PAS
without signing out, the session will be kept for an hour. When the user launches the PAS
next time and the session has not expired, the user will be automatically taken to the main
control panel of the PAS. This saves the user having to log in every time the PAS is launched.
The panel also shows the already added attributes, if any, in the bottom part of the screen.
In addition, a secret key is generated as a configuration parameter by hashing the identifier
and the credential of the user. The secret key is used for encryption/decryption of the user’s
attributes.
6.4.2 Identity Provider Component
The IdP component also has been developed as an Android app. The IdP context hosts
several servlets which actually act as the endpoints. The SAML servlet is responsible for
handling SAML requests and responding to them. The OpenID servlet is to handle OpenID
requests. To develop the SAML servlet, the OpenSAML library [113] was considered at
first. OpenSAML is a set of open source Java and C++ libraries that can be used for SAML
development. However, it has quite a large number of external dependencies (more than 20
external jar files) which would increase the size of the app considerably and many of these jar
files could not be compiled with the Dalvik VM (Virtual Machine) of the Android platform.
To overcome this problem, a subset of the SAML protocol based on the Web Browser SSO
Profile and HTTP Post binding has been developed. In this way, it has been possible to
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Figure 6.2: Main control panel of the
PAS.
Figure 6.3: Main control panel of the
IdP.
reduce the size of the app considerably. The OpenID servlet has been developed using the
OpenID4Java Libraries [114].
The user can use the username/password pair of the PAS to log in to the IdP component
and access the control panel. The control panel provides the option to Start/Stop the IdP
component using the Start/Stop button (Figure 6.3). When the Start button is touched, the
IdP component starts running in the background. Then, the user can use their preferred
browser of the mobile device to access federated services. When an authentication request
arrives at one of the servlets, it accesses the same back-end database (see Section 6.3.1)
to retrieve the user’s attributes which are then used to create responses. SimpleSAMLphp
[11] and the JanRain PHP OpenID libraries [115] have been used for deploying SAML and
OpenID service providers respectively.
6.4.3 Implementation Challenges
While developing the PPIdP, a number of key challenges has been handled. The challenges
are discussed below.
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Web Server
The first challenge was to find a suitable web container for the Android platform. After a
thorough search, Jetty Web Server, an open source HTTP Server and Java Servlet Container
[116], seems to be the only candidate that meets the requirements.
Visibility Issues
The second challenge was to solve the problem of visibility between a PPIdP and an SP.
In the traditional setting, both IdPs and SPs are online and visible to each other. In this
case, the PPIdP is installed in the device as a local web server and therefore is not visible
to an SP. This problem has been solved by embedding an XHTML (EXtensible HyperText
Markup Language) form submitted to the IdP using JavaScript. Since JavaScript runs on
the browser, it is possible to contact the respective IdP component using the localhost URL.
This is a standard technique used in the SAML SSO Browser profile. The same behaviour
has been adopted by modifying the code of SimpleSAMLphp and JanRain PHP libraries for
the implementation. Note that a PPIdP has no problem interacting with an SP since the SP
has to be online to offer services.
SAML Trust Issues and Dynamic Federation
As discussed in Chapter 2, trust between an IdP and an SP in SAML needs to be established
through exchanging metadata before they can interact with each other. This is accomplished
by the system administrators. This imposes a problem with respect to a PPIdP since a PPIdP
will be used by a user who does not have the provision to exchange metadata as an admin-
istrator. This means that a mechanism needs to be provided for federating a PPIdP with an
SP by exchanging metadata, and thus establishing the required notion of trust. In addition,
the mechanism must be accomplished in an automated fashion so that users are not burdened
with the task of manual metadata exchange. Both of these issues are addressed by allowing
users to create federations in a dynamic fashion as discussed in Chapter 5.
Essentially, the proposed approach for creating and maintaining a dynamic federation can
be used to federate a PPIdP with an SP. Once an SP is federated with a PPIdP, it creates a
novel type of federation which is called the Personal Identity Federation (PIF). In a way,
this is an extension of the traditional Identity Federation and also can be of two types (Type
1 and Type 2 PIF). Figures 6.4 and 6.5 illustrate two types of PIF. In the first type (Type
1), a traditional IdP is replaced by a PPIdP. On the other hand, the second type allows a
user to federate two IdPs (a PPIdP and a traditional IdP) in such a way that the user can
import dynamic attributes from the PPIdP to the IdP. Then those attributes can subsequently
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be passed as attributes to an SP. The middle IdP (IdP1 in Figure 6.5) in this setting is known
as the Proxy IdP and is assumed to be fully trusted by the SP with a mutual trust agreement.
On the other hand, the PPIdP will be considered as untrusted by both the Proxy IdP and SP
following the condition of the dynamic federation as explained in Chapter 5.
Figure 6.4: PIF Type 1.
Figure 6.5: PIF Type 2.
6.4.4 SAML Protocol Flow
For accessing federated services from a SAML SP using a PPIdP, the PPIdP needs to be fed-
erated with the SP by utilising the previously described mechanisms for creating a dynamic
federation. The protocol flow for creating such a federation and accessing services from the
PPIdP is illustrated in Figure 6.6 and is discussed below:
1. First, a PPIdP needs to create a Type 1 PIF with an SP. For this, the user visits the PAS
of the PPIdP and generates a temporary code.
2. The user visits the SP and she is forwarded to the WAYF page of the SP. Therefore,
the user is presented with a form to allow her to create a dynamic federation.
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Figure 6.6: Protocol flow in SAML.
6.4. Prototype Implementation 117
3. The user inputs the entity ID of the PPIdP along with the temporary code.
4. The previously described mechanism for exchanging metadata takes place and in the
end, the PPIdP and the SP becomes a part of the PIF.
5. The user visits the SP using her preferred mobile browser.
6. The SP forwards the user to the WAYF Page where she chooses the PPIdP.
7. The SP creates a SAML authentication request and forwards the request to the PPIdP.
As discussed before, the request is submitted automatically to the locally hosted PPIdP
using an embedded XHTML form and JavaScript.
8. The respective end point of the PPIdP receives the request and presents a login form
to the user.
9. The user logs in using her username/password.
10. Once the authentication is successful, a form with all user attributes is presented to
the user. The PAS has the option to create a pre-configured Attribute Release Policy
(ARP) for any specific SP using the Set/Reset/View/Edit Authorisation option of the
PAS main control panel (Figure 6.2). The PPIdP will use the ARP to filter out any
attributes before they are shown to the user. The user selects the attributes that she
wants to release to the SP and clicks the Submit button.
11. A SAML assertion including the selected attributes is created and returned to the SP.
12. The SP validates the assertion, retrieves the user attributes and makes an authorisation
decision with respect to the user accessing the requested service (Figure 6.7).
Since the PPIdP has been federated with the SP using the mechanism of a dynamic feder-
ation, the SP must treat it as an untrusted entity even if the IdP acts honestly. In this way,
the SAML implementation of the IdP will essentially act equivalently to OpenID. Thus, this
technique will be suitable for general SPs which do not require user attributes coming from
a highly trusted IdP. Interestingly, some attributes (such as credit card information) are self-
certifiable. It does not matter if they are coming from a highly trusted IdP or an untrusted
IdP since the SP can verify the authenticity of those attributes, and hence use them to decide
whether to allow users to access sensitive services.
Another scenario has been deployed in which the PPIdP can be federated with a trusted IdP
to create a Type 2 PIF. Here, the fully trusted IdP would act like a Proxy IdP as described in
[106] and would delegate the authentication task to the PPIdP which is hidden from the SP.
The PPIdP will essentially act as an authentication source for the trusted IdP (Figure 6.8). A
SAML IdP and a SAML SP have been deployed using simpleSAMLphp. Their metadata has
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Figure 6.7: Released attributes in
Type 1 Federation.
Figure 6.8: Two authentication
sources at the trusted IdP.
been exchanged beforehand to ensure they are considered fully trusted to each other. The
PPIdP has been added to the trusted IdP as an authentication source using the mechanism of
dynamic federations. With this setting, the protocol flow for this deployment is illustrated in
Figure 6.9 and discussed below:
1. The user visits the SP using her preferred mobile browser to access its services.
2. The user is forwarded to the WAYF page where the user selects the trusted IdP.
3. A SAML authentication request is sent to the trusted IdP and the user is presented
with a selection of authentication sources: The PPIdP (Mobile IdP in Figure 6.8) or
the trusted IdP itself (example-sql in Figure 6.8).
4. Assuming the user selects the PPIdP, a SAML authentication request is forwarded to
the PPIdP and the usual SAML protocol flow takes place.
5. A SAML assertion with the selected attributes is sent back to the trusted IdP.
6. The trusted IdP validates the assertion, retrieves the attributes and creates a SAML
assertion with those attributes. To reflect the fact that these attributes have come from
the PPIdP, it also inserts a LoA value of 1 for this assertion.
7. A response with the assertion is sent back from the trusted IdP to the SP.
8. The SP validates the assertion, retrieves the attributes and determines if the user is
authorised to access the requested service using the released attributes with a LoA
value of 1 (Figure 6.10). If the user had chosen the trusted IdP, the assertion would
contain a LoA value of 2 to indicate a higher trust on the trusted IdP. This could have
allowed users to access more restricted services (Figure 6.11).
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Figure 6.9: PIF Type 2 Protocol flow in SAML.
Figure 6.10: LoA 1 for attributes from the
PPIdP.
Figure 6.11: LoA 2 for attributes from the
trusted IdP.
6.4.5 OpenID Protocol Flow
Compared to SAML, OpenID is a simple protocol. There are no complex trust assumptions
to consider as every OpenID provider is considered trusted. The only problem that needs to
be considered is the visibility issue between a PPIdP and an SP (RP in OpenID) as discussed
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earlier. To handle this problem, a specific implementation of OpenID has been modified so
that the SP can communicate with the IdP in much the same way that the metadata exchange
is accomplished in SAML. The Janrain OpenID Libraries for PHP [115] has been used to
implement the OpenID SP. For this, the code has modified so that IdP discovery, authentica-
tion requests and verification requests are submitted to the IdP using JavaScript. Note that
the responses from the IdP do not require any special treatment since the SP is visible to the
IdP and hence the responses can be returned in the normal way.
The servlet of the OpenID context of a PPIdP has been developed using the OpenID4Java
Libraries which is a set of Java libraries to develop an OpenID Provider and SP. The flow
for accessing OpenID services using a PPIdP is similar to what was illustrated in Chapter 2
(Figure 2.2) and is as follows:
1. The user visits the SP using her preferred mobile browser to access one of its services
and she is given the option to enter her OpenID.
2. The SP needs to authenticate the user. As it has support for OpenID, it allows the user
to enter her OpenID and it has a special button tagged as Sign in with OpenID. Once
clicked, it will allow the user to enter her OpenID.
3. The user enters her OpenID (https://localhost:8443/OpenIDTest/Server) and touches
the Verify button (Figure 6.12(a)).
4. The PPIdP is discovered using the mechanism described above (via JavaScript). Dur-
ing the discovery process, the optional key exchange step has been skipped.
5. The SP creates an authentication request which is submitted to the IdP using the same
approach.
6. The PPIdP receives the request and forwards it to the appropriate servlet.
7. The authentication of the user takes place using a username and password.
8. Once authenticated, an authentication response is generated and returned to the SP.
9. The SP then sends a signature verification request to the PPIdP where the signature is
verified as per the OpenID specification.
10. A verification response is generated and is sent back to the SP.
11. At this point, the user is considered as authenticated (Figure 6.12(b)). What the SP
will do with the authenticated user is not explored further.
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(a) Entering the OpenID. (b) OpenID Verified.
Figure 6.12: OpenID service access.
6.5 Analysis
This section investigates whether PPIdP satisfies the requirements of Section 6.2.2.
6.5.1 Functional Requirements
Since the PPIdP is based on SAML, it automatically satisfies the functional requirements (of
the taxonomy given in Chapter 4) that SAML satisfies. Each user in the PPIdP is identified
and represented using a username and a context is identified as an application domain. A
PPIdP also satisfies two other requirements - Transaction Logging and History Management
- which are not satisfied by SAML. How these two requirements as well as other additional
functional requirements outlined in this chapter are satisfied by the PPIdP is discussed below.
• Transaction Logging and History Management. Each transaction using a PPIdP is
logged into the database. Whenever any attributes are released by a PPIdP to an SP, the
name of the SP and the list of attributes along with the time are stored in the database by
the IdP component. The user can view each transaction by clicking (touching) the Re-
leased Attributes button from the control panel of the PAS. The log shows which attributes
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have been released to which SP at what time. Figure 6.13 illustrates an example of the
logged transactions at the PAS. The user also has the option of deleting any of the stored
transactions whenever she wishes to.
Figure 6.13: Logged transactions at
the PAS.
Figure 6.14: Attribute synchronisa-
tion at PAS.
• Online Service Integration. Using the proposed approach for dynamic federations and
the modified SimpleSAMLphp implementation, a PPIdP can be federated with any SP that
provides online services. This enables a user of a PPIdP to access online services provided
by any SP using the PPIdP.
• Visibility. As explained previously, the visibility issues between a PPIdP and an SP have
been tackled using the automatic submission of the XHTML form with JavaScript.
• Federation. A PPIdP is federated with any SP using the proposed approach of Dynamic
SAML as discussed previously.
• Attribute Storage and Update. A PAS is used to provide an interface for a user to add,
update and remove any user attributes which are then stored in a database hosted in the
mobile device.
• Attribute Release Policy. A PAS provides an interface for a user to set up attribute release
policies which can be accessed by touching the Set/Reset/View/Edit Authorisation button
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from the control panel of the PAS (Figure 6.2).
• Attribute Synchronisation. To enable attribute synchronisation across multiple devices,
a contactless smartcard has been utilised. A contactless smartcard is a pocket-sized card
with an embedded micro-chip allowing the secure storage of data and has the capability
to communicate with a reader via radio waves using Near Field Communication (NFC)
technology [117]. The NFC is a standard technology for wireless communication between
NFC-enabled devices which are a few centimetres apart and is used by contactless smart-
cards for communication [118]. The technologies for such smartcards have been defined
in the ISO/IEC 14443 standard [119, 120, 121, 122]. The wireless smartcard itself can be
of two types: Type A and Type B. The main differences between the two types are the
variation in modulation techniques, protocol initialisation methods and coding schemes.
Many modern smart devices are NFC-enabled allowing them to communicate with wire-
less smartcards and other NFC-enabled devices. In particular, since 2011 Android OS has
had extensive support for NFC and has been the primary platform for popularising NFC.
It allows any app to leverage the NFC capability of a device and supports both Type A and
Type B smartcards. Apple made the NFC-enabled iPhone 6 in 2014, however, the NFC
chip is only accessible for a specialised application scenario called Apple Pay which allows
a user to use her iPhone to make payments wirelessly. The extensive support for NFC on
Android makes it an ideal platform to explore the possibility of attribute synchronisation
in different PPIdPs across multiple devices.
Since a PAS is the central place from where attributes are managed, the support for attribute
synchronisation with NFC has been added to the PAS. A user can access this feature by
touching the Sync button from the control panel of the PAS (Figure 6.2). Once touched, a
new view is shown to the user (Figure 6.14) from where the user can touch their smartcards
to the back of their mobile devices to initiate the synchronisation step. During synchro-
nisation, attributes (and their values) are encrypted using the 256-bit AES algorithm and
the same secret key that is used for storing encrypted attributes at the database. Then, the
encrypted attributes are transferred to the smartcard. This ensures that the attributes in the
smartcard remain secure even if the card gets stolen or falls into the wrong hands. To en-
able synchronisation, an additional table, called timestamp, is maintained in the database
of the PAS which stores the timestamp of the last action regarding the addition, removal or
updating of attributes in the database. With this setup, the synchronisation step is discussed
below using several use-cases.
Use-case 1: Non-empty database – Empty smartcard. This depicts the scenario when
the smartcard is used for the first time and hence it is empty; meaning that it does not
contain any user attributes. Once the card is touched to the back of the device from the
Attribute Synchronisation view (Figure 6.14), user attributes are concatenated along with
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the timestamp (retrieved from the timestamp table), then encrypted and finally transferred
to the card. Once completed, a message is shown to the user.
Use-case 2: Empty database – Non-empty smartcard. This depicts the scenario when
all data from the database of the PAS has been accidentally deleted or when the user wants
to synchronise attributes to a new mobile device where the PPIdP and the PAS have just
been installed and hence the database is empty. For the first scenario, it is assumed that a
user account and a secret key have already been created and the user has already synchro-
nised attributes from the database to the smartcard using the first use-case. Once the at-
tributes have been synced to the card, all attributes in the database were mistakenly deleted.
Now, the user wants to synchronise the data back to the database. To achieve this, the card
is touched to the back of the device from the Attribute Synchronisation view (Figure 6.14)
and encrypted user attributes and the timestamp are transferred from the card to the PAS
where they are decrypted. Then, the timestamp and user attributes are retrieved from the
decrypted text. The timestamp is used to update the timestamp table and attributes stored
in encrypted format in the database using mechanisms discussed before. For the second
scenario, the user must use the same username and password for the second PAS to ensure
that the secret key generated for attribute synchronisation is same as that of the PAS of the
first device. This can be achieved without problems since two devices essentially emulate
two different application domains where the same user can have the same username; just
like a user can have multiple accounts in different web domains using the same identifier.
With this assumption, the attribute synchronisation process from the card to the PAS is
exactly same as the first scenario. An appropriate message is shown at the end of each
synchronisation step.
Use-case 3: Non-empty database – Non-empty smartcard. This depicts two scenarios:
1. when a user has accidentally deleted an attribute (or multiple attributes) from the
database of the PAS of one of her devices and wants to restore the attribute (or at-
tributes).
2. when a user has added, updated or removed attributes from the database of the PAS
of one of her devices and hence the card or the PAS of another device needs to be
updated accordingly.
This is not a trivial step like the first two use-cases as there must be an indicator that can
be used to determine the latest state between the card and the database of the PAS. The
value of the timestamp is used as the indicator. Once the card is touched to the back of the
device from the Attribute Synchronisation view (Figure 6.14), a dialog appears with the
question: “Would you like to restore attributes in PAS?”. If a user touches Yes, then the
first scenario is assumed. Encrypted user attributes and the timestamp are transferred from
the card to the PAS where they are decrypted. Then, the timestamp and user attributes are
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Table 6.1: Different properties of the used NFC card.
Property Value
Type ISO/IEC 14443 Type A
Chipset Topaz NFC IC
Size 512 Byte
retrieved from the decrypted text. Also, user attributes are retrieved from the database.
These two sets of attributes are compared side by side to determine which attributes in
the database need to be restored and based on the comparison, the respective attributes are
restored. Also the timestamp table of the database is updated with the timestamp value
retrieved from the card.
If a user touches No, then the second scenario is assumed. Encrypted user attributes and the
timestamp (denoted tc) are transferred from the card to the PAS where they are decrypted
and retrieved as before. Also, the timestamp value (denoted tm) is retrieved from the
timestamp table of the PAS. With these two timestamps, there are three possible use-cases.
– If tm > tc, it depicts the scenario that the card needs to be synchronised with at-
tributes from the database, user attributes are concatenated along with the timestamp
(retrieved from the timestamp table), encrypted using the approach discussed previ-
ously and finally stored on the card.
– If tm < tc, it depicts the scenario that the user is trying to synchronise the database
of another device with the value from the first device using the card, encrypted user
attributes and the timestamp are transferred from the card to the PAS where they are
decrypted. Then, the timestamp and user attributes are retrieved from the decrypted
text. Also, user attributes are retrieved from the database. These two sets of attributes
are compared side by side to determine which attributes in the database need to be
added, updated or removed. Based on the comparison, the respective attributes are
added, removed or updated. Also the timestamp table of the database is updated with
the timestamp value retrieved from the card.
– If tm = tc, it depicts the scenario that both databases are synchronised, no further
step is taken. An appropriate message is shown at the end of each synchronisation
step.
The current implementation of the PAS is functional for both Type A and Type B cards.
The functionalities have been tested by installing the PPIdP in two Nexus 4 (NFC-enabled
Android) devices and by emulating the outlined use-cases with a Type A NFC card. The
different properties of the used NFC card are given in Table 6.1.
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6.5.2 Security Requirements
Next, it is analysed how the security requirements for PPIdP are satisfied.
• Secure User Authentication. A PPIdP is installed in a mobile device of a user, mean-
ing that the user is authenticated locally inside the device and the identifier and the
related credential of the user for the PPIdP are never transmitted over the network.
This ensures the secure authentication of a user at a PPIdP.
• Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity. PPIdP uses encrypted communication
channels (HTTPS) during different protocol flows as per the specification of SAML
and OpenID. The encrypted channel guarantees the confidentiality, integrity and au-
thenticity of information passed between involved entities.
• Secure Storage and Data Theft. As mentioned previously, all user attributes are
stored in encrypted formats using the SQLCipher library in the database as well as in
the NFC card. As all user attributes are stored centrally in a database, it needs to be
ensured that user attributes are stored safely and securely. This is ensured with the
help of the SQLCipher library which encrypts every attribute stored in the database.
The database is saved in the external storage of the android phone to allow both the
PAS and PPIdP to access the database. Because of the use of the SQLCipher Library
with a secret key (as described in Section 6.4.1) that only the PAS and PPIdP know, the
whole database will be inaccessible by other applications. This removes any threats
involving other applications or third parties accessing the database. Similarly, user
attributes are stored on the smartcard in encrypted formats. The security of the system
can be increased furthermore by storing attributes in a hardware/software based TPM
(Trusted Processing Module). However, the availability of such TPMs for the Android
platform is currently limited. Therefore, it will take some time for any wide-spread
adoption of this mechanism.
• Intentional or Accidental Corruption of Data. Since the database acts as the central
repository, it is essential to guard against any intentional or accidental corruption of
the database. To ensure redundancy, a backup database is always maintained in the
internal storage of the PPIdP and PAS which are private to the applications and are
inaccessible to other applications or attackers. The data in the backup database are
stored in encrypted format just like the main database. Every single operation (addi-
tion/updating of attributes) is synchronised across both databases. In case the main
database gets corrupted, the PAS provides the option of allowing the user to restore
attributes from the backup database using the Restore Data option of the PAS con-
trol panel (Figure 6.2). Furthermore, users also can create a secondary backup of the
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database to allow them to copy the database onto some other places (e.g. PC or Laptop)
using the Backup Data option of the PAS control panel (Figure 6.2). Moreover, stor-
ing data onto smartcards provides another layer of protection against the intentional or
accidental corruption of data. Once the data is stored onto a smartcard and even if the
mobile device (along with the database) gets stolen, all data can be easily recovered
by installing a new PPIdP and the PAS in the device and then synchronising the device
using the NFC smartcard as discussed previously.
• Name Qualification and Impersonation Issues. The most difficult problem in terms
of security for implementing a PPIdP is how to name-qualify different PPIdPs installed
on different users’ phones. In the general setting of SAML and OpenID, the entity
ID of an IdP and OpenID are name-qualified based on the Domain Naming System
(DNS). This ensures that no two IdPs have the same entity ID and no two users have
the same OpenID in OpenID. Since the PPIdP installed on different phones will have
the same entity ID (https://localhost:8443/saml/idp) and the same OpenID IdP name
(https://localhost:8443/OpenIDTest) and different users in different phones might have
the same username, malicious users might use this technique to impersonate users from
other phones. The problem has been solved by devising a request/response mechanism
to name-qualify each IdP installed on different phones from the viewpoint of each SP.
The mechanism is described below for a PIF Type 1 federation.
1. When a user provides the entity ID (https://localhost:8443/saml/idp) of a PPIdP
and the respective code while creating a dynamic federation, the SP generates a
random hash and a password. The random hash is used as an SP-specific iden-
tifier for the PPIdP and is included in the provided entity ID so that it takes the
form of: https://localhost:8443/saml/idp/random_hash. The modified entity ID
and the password are also exchanged during the metadata exchange period. The
metadata of the PPIdP is based on the modified entity ID which will be used
for any subsequent SAML protocol flow. Once the metadata is successfully ex-
changed and a dynamic federation is created, both the PPIdP and the SP store
four pieces of information: the modified entity ID, the password, the entity ID of
the SP and the code used for the dynamic federation.
2. When the user wishes to access one of the restricted resources, just before the
WAYF Page is shown to the user, the SP sends a message to the PPIdP provid-
ing the entity ID of the SP and the code, and ask for the PPIdP’s entity ID and
corresponding password.
3. The PPIdP retrieves the saved entity ID along with the password using the SP’s
entity ID and the provided code and send them back to the SP.
4. The SP matches the supplied entity ID and password with its database entry.
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Then, the supplied entity ID is used to filter out other PPIdP entity IDs (e.g. the
entity ID that belongs to the https://localhost:8443/ domain) when the TAL is
presented. Note that other entity IDs belonging to other trusted or untrusted IdPs
are not filtered out.
5. When the user chooses one of the IdPs, the usual SAML protocol flow resumes.
This mutual authentication between an IdP and SP serves two purposes:
– it helps the SP to name-qualify each PPIdP using the SP-specific random hash,
and
– a malicious user of one PPIdP will not be able to impersonate other users of other
PPIdPs (in different phones) using the entity ID.
An SP has very little to gain by acting maliciously since a malicious act by an SP
will expose its services to unauthorised users. However, a malicious PPIdP may gain
considerably if it can impersonate another PPIdP. Using the stated mechanism, a mali-
cious PPIdP would be required to know both the modified entity ID and the respective
password. Since all communications take place on encrypted channels using HTTPS,
the only option for a malicious PPIdP is to guess both the modified entity ID and
password. As both the hash of the entity ID and password consist of 12 randomly
generated alphanumeric characters, they will be difficult to guess. A similar technique
can be used to create a PIF Type 2 federation using a PPIdP.
The whole mechanism is invisible to users which alleviates them from any associated
complexities. Interested users, however, have the option to view the modified entity ID
and OpenID provided by each SP using the View EntityID/OpenID option of the PAS
control panel (Figure 6.2). In cases where a user is accessing the federated SP from
another devices where the PPIdP is not installed, the intermediate request/response
mechanism will time out and the user cannot view any PPIdP in the WAYF page. The
presented TAL will contain only other trusted or untrusted IdPs. The proposed mech-
anism has been successfully tested with PPIdPs installed in three different Android
phones.
In SAML, an IdP has the option to generate an unique identifier (known as the Tran-
sient Identifier) for each SP. This transient identifier is passed on to the SP as the
unique identifier for a user. The PPIdP uses the same approach. However, to ensure
that different users from different PPIdPs do not generate the same transient identifier,
the generated entity ID (in the format of https://localhost:8443/saml/idp/random_hash)
for the requested SP as well as the entity ID for the SP are used to generate the tran-
sient identifier. This guards against the possibility of a user maliciously impersonating
another user.
6.6. Discussion 129
6.5.3 Privacy Requirements
The core privacy requirements for any Identity Management System is to ensure that it sup-
ports pseudonymity (or anonymity) and empowers users by giving them full control over
their own data as discussed in Chapter 4. SAML supports pseudonymity with the concept
of transient identifiers. A PPIdP adopts the same technique that generates different transient
identifiers for different SPs as discussed above. This enables each SP to maintain a session
with a specific user and prevents the possibility of linking the same user across different SPs.
How the Selective Disclosure and the Explicit Consent requirements are satisfied depend on
the particular IdP, developing a system based on SAML does not automatically satisfy these
requirements. Therefore, it is analysed how these requirements are satisfied by a PPIdP.
Firstly, the PAS allows one to set a general ARP that will dictate which attributes to release
to any SP. Users can also set a policy for each SP. Secondly, a user is presented with a form,
called the Consent form, containing the attributes (excluding the attributes that have been
filtered out based on the ARP) just before they are released. This allows the user to select
the attributes that she wants to release to that SP. Moreover, the PAS also provides an in-
terface that the user can use to examine the history of what attributes have been released to
which entities by using the Released Attributes option of the PAS control panel (Figure 6.2).
All these features enable the PPIdP to meet the Selective Disclosure and Explicit Consent
requirements of an IMS. Data minimisation can be achieved by releasing only the required
attributes to an SP. For this, users must be informed which attributes are required for ac-
cessing a service. SAML does not have any mechanism to inform users regarding required
attributes. In next two chapters, it will be explored how data minimisation with a PPIdP can
be achieved.
6.5.4 Trust Requirements
Since a PPIdP is federated with an SP using the mechanism of dynamic federations, the
PPIdP, once federated with a SAML SP, must be treated as untrusted by the SP and the SP
will be treated as semitrusted by the PPIdP. Therefore, all attributes released by the PPIdP
have a LoA value of 1 at the SP.
6.6 Discussion
The PPIdP offers a number of advantages that can overcome many of the limitations of the
current IMSs. Here, these advantages are outlined and analysed:
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• As stated before, this approach empowers users to have full control over an IdP and
the attributes stored. Users have ultimate control over their attributes and they dictate
which attributes are released to which SP. This essentially solves problems related to
Data Ownership and Controllability.
• A PAS acts as the central repository for storing a user’s attributes. Since the attributes
are not scattered over many IdPs, their management becomes easier. Furthermore, a
PPIdP can replace all low trusted and untrusted IdPs as the LoA values provided by
those IdPs will be the same as that provided by the PPIdP. By replacing all low trusted
and untrusted IdPs with a PPIdP, the problem that arises from the effect of multiple
partial identities can be effectively counteracted. This will allow the identity space to
look like Figure 6.15. By comparing this figure with Figure 3.3, this reduced identity
space with the PPIdP is easier to maintain and offers complete control of attributes that
none of the previous low trusted and untrusted IdPs would offer.
Figure 6.15: Identity space with the PPIdP.
• Users can use as many mobile devices as they want and keep attributes in all of them
synchronised using a NFC smartcard. This alleviates the need for a user to manually
update attributes across multiple devices and also provides the protection against any
corruption of data or database.
• Usually attributes stored in traditional IdPs are static in nature. Mobile devices can be
used to generate dynamic attributes such as spatial values that can be used to provide
context-aware services in a secure way using SAML.
• By accommodating other IdM protocols, the PPIdP can provide a single interface to
interact with all types of SPs.
Unfortunately, this approach also has some limitations. It currently supports only the SAML
Web Browser SSO Profile and HTTP Post binding and is incompatible with other SAML
profiles and bindings. Currently, the implemented PPIdP does not support other advanced
OpenID extensions such as Provider Authentication Policy Extension (PAPE) [123] and
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OpenID Attribute Exchange [124]. These limitations can easily be tackled by adding these
required functionalities.
Another problem of the current implementation is the limited memory size of the NFC cards.
With only 512 bytes of memory size, the card cannot store a large number of attributes. One
way to tackle this problem is to zip the concatenated attributes and timestamp before they
are encrypted. Even so, the number of attributes that can be stored will be limited. Another
option is to use a dual interface smartcard. A dual interface card is based on the ISO/IEC
14443 and ISO/IEC 7816 standards [117]. The ISO/IEC 7816 is the standard for contact
smartcards, e.g. debit/credit cards, that require to be in contact with a reader for commu-
nication. The standard defines technologies and mechanisms to establish communication
between the reader and the smartcard. Since a dual interface card has the ability to commu-
nicate wirelessly using NFC and the memory capacity for most of them is in the range of
144K byte, they can be a better choice for the scenario. Unfortunately, there is a cost differ-
ence between contactless and dual interface cards. A contactless smart card costs less than a
pound whereas a dual interface card costs approximately £10 depending on the memory size
(the price quotation has been retrieved from http://www.smartcardfocus.com/).
However, it should be noted that, as the technology grows, the memory size of the contact-
less card will grow and at certain point of time, they might offer enough memory to offer a
viable option for storing attributes for the scenario.
6.7 Conclusion
The User-controlled Identity Management is all about empowering users and establishing a
firm control over their attributes. A PPIdP takes the central stage in realising this concept.
Since it is under the full control of its user, the user has the ultimate authority to dictate which
attributes will be stored in it and which attributes will be released to different SPs. Moreover,
a PPIdP can replace different low trusted IdPs, allowing a user to minimise the number of
partial identities that need to be managed. Hence, some major issues in the current setting of
Identity Management can be tackled effectively using a PPIdP as evident from the discussion
of this chapter.
In addition, a PPIdP provides a solid foundation to explore new ideas that can improve the
ways online services can be provided by an SP and accessed by a user. Especially, it will be
explored how a PPIdP can be leveraged to provide context-aware federate services and how
it can help to realise privacy-preserving attribute aggregation in federated services. The next
two chapters will investigate these two issues.
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Chapter 7
Context-aware Federated Services
using PPIdP
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, the User-controlled Identity Management System has been pro-
posed. It also has been discussed how the system is realised using a novel type of IdP called
Portable Personal Identity Provider (PPIdP). How the proposed system can be used to over-
come many limitations of the existing Identity Management Systems has been analysed. In
this chapter, it will be explored how PPIdPs can be used to offer context-aware federated
services.
In the last decade or so, an incredible number of mobile devices equipped with an array
of sensors have been proliferated. These devices have been the driving force behind the
ever-increasing popularities of context-aware services, mainly in the form of location-based
services. A study by MarketsandMarkets predicted US$120 billion worth of market share for
context-aware computing by 2018 [125]. There are numerous works that have explored how
context can be used to provide online services. However, there are a few major problems that
are yet to be addressed.
• Firstly, most of these works focus on the authentication or the authorisation of users
neglecting other aspects of identity management. In that sense, the issue of Context-
aware Identity Management has not been explored in detail, as discussed in Chapter
2.
• Secondly, the existing works are mostly based on the SILO Model where the users
need to authenticate themselves, if needed, separately to access each service which
could be inconvenient for the user. The usability of such services could be improved
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by introducing the capability of federated services allowing users to access services
with just a single authentication using the Singe Sign On (SSO) feature [81].
• Thirdly, the security and privacy issues in the existing context-aware frameworks have
not been addressed properly. As such, unresolved security and privacy issues need to
be addressed to harness the full potential of context-aware services [126].
In this chapter, the proposal of a novel framework called Context-aware Federated Service
(CAFS) is introduced which can tackle the stated problems. In this regard, a concrete defini-
tion of Context-aware Identity Management is provided. Next, the definition has been used
to develop a framework for Context-aware Federated Services. The framework has been de-
veloped by utilising the PPIdP of Chapter 6. To show the applicability of the approach, a
number of use-cases has been illustrated. The framework imposes several functional, secu-
rity, privacy and trust requirements. Therefore, how the framework meets these requirements
are investigated as well as the advantages of the framework over existing works are discussed.
7.2 Context-aware Identity Management
In the literature of Context-aware Services, the meaning of the term Context is highly debated
and has been defined in numerous ways. Schilit and Theimer [98] used the term context-
aware for the first time describing contexts as locations, identities of nearby people, objects
and changes to those objects. Similarly, Ryan et al. [127] regarded context as the user’s
location, environment, identity and time. Hull et al. [128] represent contexts as different
aspects of the current situation. One of the most accurate and widely-used definition is given
by Abowd et al. [129]: “any information that can be used to characterize the situation of
entities (i.e. whether a person, place or object) that are considered relevant to the interaction
between a user and an application, including the user and the application themselves”. This
definition is preferred since it considers the application itself as a context which is related
to Identity Management. Interestingly, the term Context has a specific meaning in Identity
Management. A context in identity management is the application domain or namespace
under which an entity exists, operates and is identified with a specific identifier. The identity
of an entity within that application domain is defined as the partial identity of that entity for
that domain (see Chapter 3). Combining these, the context for Identity Management can be
defined in the following way.
Definition 26 Context in Identity Management is any information that represents the user’s
partial identity (using an identifier), the physical location from where the user tries to access
any service, the time and date of the service request and the application domain in which
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the partial identity of the user is valid (the IdP) or where the user is requesting access to a
service (the SP).
Such information can also be regarded as the Contextual Information or Dynamic Attributes.
The terms Context, Contextual Information and Dynamic Attributes will be used interchange-
ably throughout this chapter.
Using the above definition, the term Context-aware Identity Management is defined in the
following way:
Definition 27 Context-aware Identity Management is a specific type of Identity Management
that can use contexts for at least one of the following:
1. registering and de-registering the partial identity of a user containing identifiers, partial
identifiers, credentials, etc. to an IdP;
2. to aid users in selecting appropriate attributes to release to a specific SP;
3. to aid users in selecting appropriate contexts to be used as dynamic attributes;
4. for utilising dynamic attributes during the authorisation and service provisioning step;
and
5. for supporting business and security applications in providing innovative services.
7.3 Requirement Analysis
The goal is to design and develop a framework for context-aware federated services. At
first, a list of requirements is formulated that the framework should satisfy. Based on the
taxonomy of the requirements in Chapter 4, the following set of requirements are identified.
Functional Requirements.
F1 Online Services. The framework should be integrable with online services.
F2 Single Sign On Capability. The framework should provide the SSO capability which
allows users to access services from different SPs of the same federation.
F3 Indoor/Outdoor Location Tracking. The framework should have the capability to lo-
cate users both indoors and outdoors.
F4 Showing Required Attributes. The framework should inform users what attributes are
required to access a particular service so that they can make informed choices.
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F5 Advanced Authorisation Capabilities. The framework should provide advanced policy-
based authorisation capabilities which will allow administrators of SPs to write advanced
yet flexible authorisation policies to enable complex use-cases.
Security Requirements.
S1 Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity. Contextual data and other user attributes
transmitted between different entities should maintain their confidentiality and integrity.
The authenticity of contextual data should be verifiable when required.
S2 Secure User Authentication and Authorisation. The framework should ensure that
services can be offered only to authenticated and authorised entities.
S3 Preventing Relay Attacks. The framework should be able to prevent any relay attack
involving contextual data.
S4 LoA Calculation. The LoA value for a specific IdP is properly determined.
Privacy Requirements. There is no additional privacy requirements other than the ones out-
lined in the taxonomy of Chapter 4. Hence, it must be ensured that the existing requirements
- Support of Pseudonym (denoted as P1), Selective Disclosure (denoted as P2), Explicit
Consent (denoted as P3) and Data Minimisation (denoted as P4) - are satisfied.
Trust Requirements. The federated services are bound by implicit trust requirements.
Therefore, the trust requirements that may arise while using the proposed system must be
closely examined. As these trust issues are dependent upon the way a framework is designed
and implemented, they will be discussed after the implementation is introduced.
7.4 CAFS Framework
Designing a context-aware framework that allows federated services should be based on the
concept of context-aware identity management and satisfy all requirements given in Section
7.3. At first, an IdP with the capability to provide fine-grained contextual information is
required. This is because the traditional IdP cannot provide such information.
A novel framework to utilise contexts for federated services, called CAFS or Context-aware
Federated Services, has been designed and developed. The basic idea is very similar to
the existing federated architecture where there are three classes of entities: users, IdPs and
SPs. SPs are considered to have the capabilities of providing context-aware services where
contextual information is received from IdPs. However, the main difference of CAFS and
the existing framework is the inclusion of PPIdPs, as introduced in Chapter 6. PPIdPs can
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be integrated with SPs to create Personal Identity Federations (PIFs) in a dynamic fashion,
as described in Chapter 6.
The authorisation of users in CAFS is handled by the eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML). XACML is an OASIS standard that defines a general-purpose access
control and authorisation system [50]. It consists of a policy language based on XML and a
processing system that knows how to interpret the policy with respect to the relevant appli-
cation. The policy language is used to create policies where each policy enlists the require-
ments to access a resource in a protected environment. The major components of XACML
are (Figure 7.1):
• Policy Administration Point (PAP) which is responsible for creating and managing all
policies,
• Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) which is responsible for intercepting users’ requests
and enforcing XACML decisions received from the Policy Decision Point (PDP, see
below),
• Policy Decision Point (PDP) which is responsible for evaluating users’ requests based
on existing policies and returning XACML decisions to the PEP, and
• Policy Information Point (PIP) which gathers additional attributes of a user.
Figure 7.1: A simpler architecture of XACML.
XACML is an example of a request/response language where a user submits a request to the
PEP to access a protected resource. The PEP generates an XACML request based on the user
attributes, the resource the user wants to access and the action (read/write) the user wants to
perform on that resource; it then forwards that request to the PDP. At this point, additional
user attributes may be retrieved from the PIP to aid the PDP in making a decision. Using
these attributes, the PDP evaluates the existing policies to determine if the user can perform
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that particular action on that resource. Then, the PDP creates an XACML response and
returns it to the PEP. Based on the response, the PEP approves or rejects the user’s request.
The existing XACML standard cannot handle location data. Geospatial XACML or GeoX-
ACML is an Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) standard that has been introduced as an
extension to the XACML Version 2.0 standard to enforce access restrictions based on geo-
graphic information [130]. The geographic information is encoded in Geography Markup
Language (GML) [131] and can be used inside a policy as a condition. Based on the user’s
location information, the PDP will evaluate the existing policies considering user attributes
and user’s location and determine if the user is allowed to access the resource. The GeoX-
ACML architecture has been incorporated with the PIF to complete the architecture for the
CAFS Framework. The architecture for CAFS using Type 1 PIF is given in Figure 7.2. The
PIF consists of a PPIdP and a number of SPs federated with the PPIdP. The CAFS consists of
such SPs where each SP incorporates the GeoXACML architecture. The protocol flow using
CAFS is as follows. When a user, following the SAML authentication phase at the PPIdP,
returns to the SP with a SAML assertion, she is forwarded to the PEP. Essentially, the PEP
acts as the entry point for the GeoXACML architecture. The PEP retrieves attributes from
the assertion, creates an XACML request with those attributes and forwards the request to
the PDP. There is no PIP in this architecture since the GeoXACML architecture of CAFS
relies only on the user attributes retrieved from the PPIdP (or the Proxy IdP for Type 2 PIF,
see below). The PDP evaluates the user’s request using the existing policies and returns an
XACML response to the PEP. Based on the XACML response, the user is granted or rejected
by the PEP. This architecture can be easily extended for the Type 2 PIF using a Proxy IdP as
shown in Figure 7.3.
7.5 Implementations
The existing open source XACML APIs for Java such as SunXACML [132], HERASAF
XACML Core [133] and enterprise-java-xacml [134] do not provide any support for the
GeoXACML. There does however exist a commercial proprietary implementation of the
GeoXACML in [135]. An incomplete implementation of GeoXACML has been located in
the GeoServer SVN Repository [136]. That project has been exported and integrated it with
the SunXACML API by going through some major modifications to a number of its classes.
The combined API has been bundled with the Jetty Web Server [116] that runs on a local
web server.
Next, a number of use-cases is illustrated to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed
approach.
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Figure 7.2: CAFS Type 1 Architecture.
Figure 7.3: CAFS Type 2 Architecture.
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7.5.1 Configurations
The SimpleSAMLphp library has been used for deploying a SAML SP. The PEP has been
developed in PHP. There are two service providers (hereafter denoted as SP1 and SP2) in the
deployment. Each SP has a few web pages that have been protected using the PEP. Each page
has different requirements that need to be fulfilled to access that page. These requirements
have been used as conditions inside the policies in the GeoXACML environment. Table 7.1
specifies the list of attributes required for each page in each SP. In the table, the value val
refers to the rectangular bounding box of these geographic values: (55.865318, -4.267437),
(55.865185, -4.2660857), (55.864722, -4.266203), (55.864806, -4.268220). The gte condi-
tion signifies that the user attribute should be greater than or equal to the stated value, equals
signifies that the user attribute should match the stated value, within signifies that the loca-
tion of the user should be within the specified value and the between signifies that the request
should be made during the specified duration. The value ST or HT signifies that the IdP has
to be semitrusted or highly trusted respectively. The value a for the org attribute signifies a
specific organisation.
The location attribute will be provided by the PPIdP and can locate a user outdoor within
a certain geographical location, as in the case to access the Page1.php of SP1. However,
some services or resources (as in the cases to access the Page2.php and Page3.php of SP1)
require the system to locate a user inside a building (e.g. in a room of a particular floor).
Verbally, the requirements for accessing the Page2.php can be expressed as: “a user can
access Page2.php only if she is within a geographic location and has a loa value greater
than or equal to 1 and has submitted the request from Building 1, Floor 3, Room 5 in be-
tween 14:00 to 14:30 on 4 May 2013”. There have been a few works to locate a user inside
a building, however, the technology is not precise yet. That is why an alternative approach
using Dynamic QR codes introduced in [40, 56] has been adopted. Their work has been used
as a basis for the proposed deployment with one major difference: they did not consider the
usage of federated services meaning if the user needs to access more than one service, they
will need to authenticate again whereas the deployment alleviates the user from any further
authentication by leveraging the SSO capability of the federation.
A QR (Quick Response) code is a type of two dimensional bar code. It can display informa-
tion in a pictorially encoded format which can be read by a device having a digital camera
and a specific piece of software to decode the information [137]. It has gained considerable
popularity with the rise of smart mobile devices as most of these are capable to decode QR
codes. Traditional QR codes are static in nature meaning that once one is generated its con-
tents cannot be altered. In fact, it is not normally required that the contents of the QR code
change after they are generated since they are used for marketing purposes via printed or
digital media. With a computer system running in the background, it is possible to easily
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Table 7.1: Attributes required for each page
Name Resource Attributes Conditions Values
SP1
Page1.php
loa gte 1
location within val
Page2.php
loa gte 1
location within val
building equals 1
floor equals 3
room equals 5
time between 14:00 - 14:30
date equals 2013-05-04
Page3.php
idp equals HT/ST
location within val
building equals 4
floor equals 5
room equals 2
time between 14:00 - 15:30
date equals 2013-05-04
loa gte 1
idp equals HT
pos equals student
org equals a
loa equals 2
SP2
Page1.php
loa gte 2
salarygrade gte 6
age gte 33
Page2.php
loa gte 2
salarygrade gte 6
age gte 33
position equals admin
generate and display dynamic QR codes which can be refreshed dynamically. This approach
has been adopted in the implementation where different information such as the Building
Number, Floor Number, Room Number, Date and Time are encoded into QR codes. In this
implementation, this scenario has been emulated by developing an Android app. The as-
sumed administrator provides the required information (Building no., Floor no., etc.). The
information is combined and then encrypted. The secret key is shared between the app and
the PEP. The user scans a QR code using the PAS (Figure 7.4) upon entering the specific
room from where she has to access the specified resource. The encrypted information re-
trieved from the QR code is saved as an attribute on the PAS that the user must release to
access that resource. This means that users must know beforehand which attributes they need
to release to different SPs; otherwise they might not release the required attributes to access
a particular resource. This is also one of the requirements of CAFS. That is why when a user
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Figure 7.4: Scanning a QR code.
visits the homepage of a service provider, she is informed which IdP they will need to use
and which attributes they will need to release. Figure 7.5(a) and 7.5(b) show homepages of
the service providers.
(a) SP 1. (b) SP 2.
Figure 7.5: Homepages of Service Providers.
For accessing Page3.php, the user, in addition to attributes similar to Page2.php, will need
to release the pos and org attributes from a highly trusted IdP to testify that she belongs to
an organisation. This means that the user will need to combine attributes from two SAML
IdPs: the location, building, floor, room, time and date attributes from the PPIdP and the
pos and org attributes from a highly trusted IdP. Here, it has been assumed that the pos
and org attributes are stored at the highly-trusted IdP and thus will have a LoA value of 2.
This interaction can be accomplished using the use-case 2 illustrated in Chapter 6 where the
highly-trusted IdP acts as the Proxy IdP. It needs to be federated with the SP in the traditional
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way so that it is considered as highly trusted by the SP. The PPIdP needs to be federated with
the Proxy IdP as an authentication source as discussed in Chapter 6.
With these settings, a number of protocol flows is discussed. It is assumed that users have
already federated the PPIdP with the respective SP and with the trusted (proxy) IdP to create
a Type 1 and Type 2 PIF respectively.
7.5.2 Use-Case: SP1
The requirements for accessing different pages have been given in Section 7.5.1. Now dif-
ferent protocol flows are outlined in turn.
Accessing Page1.php
The protocol flow for accessing Page1.php is illustrated in Figure 7.6 and is discussed below:
1. The user visits the homepage of SP1 using a browser on her mobile device where a
PPIdP is installed. She notes that she will need to release the location attribute to
access Page1.php.
2. The user clicks the Page 1 button in order to access Page1.php.
3. She is redirected to the WAYF Page of SP1 and she selects the PPIdP.
4. A SAML Authentication Request is sent to the PPIdP.
5. The user is authenticated there with her username and password.
6. At this point, the user is provided with the consent form containing the list of attributes
and she selects the location attributes and clicks the Submit button.
7. A SAML response with a SAML assertion is sent back to the SP where the PEP re-
ceives the response.
8. The PEP validates the assertion and retrieves the attributes from the SAML response.
Since the response is from an untrusted IdP, the PEP assigns a LoA value of 1 to this
response.
9. An XACML request with the location and loa attributes are sent to the PDP.
10. The PDP uses existing policies to evaluate the user’s request. Depending on the loca-
tion of the user, an XACML response with the Permit/Deny value is sent back to the
PEP.
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Figure 7.6: Protocol flow for accessing the Page1.php.
11. The user is granted or denied accordingly to access the Page1.php.
Accessing Page2.php and Page3.php
At this point, if the user tries to access Page2.php, there is no need for the user to authenticate
again due to the Single Sign On (SSO) capability offered by the PPIdP or the Proxy IdP.
However, the user will not be authorised to access the service since the user does not have
the required additional attributes. To access either Page2.php or Page3.php, the user must
logout. Then, she needs to be in that specific room of the floor in the building from where she
can access the service. Assuming that the user is in that specific room (e.g. Building 1, Floor
3 and Room 5) and there is a Dynamic QR code displayed inside the room, the user uses the
PAS to scan the QR code and saves the information as an attribute, called IntPosition, into
the PAS. With this setting, the protocol flow is very similar to what is illustrated in Figure
7.6 and is discussed below.
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1. The user visits the homepage of SP1 with a browser of her mobile device and notes
that she needs to release the location and IntPosition attributes to access Page2.php.
The user clicks the Page2.php button.
2. The user is forwarded to the WAYF page. She chooses the PPIdP from the WAYF page
and is forwarded to the PPIdP with an authentication request.
3. The user is authenticated there with her username and password.
4. The user is presented with the consent form in which she chooses to release the loca-
tion and IntPosition attributes (Figure 7.7).
5. A response containing a SAML assertion with the selected attributes are sent back to
the SP where the PEP receives the response.
6. Since the assertion contains the IntPosition attributes, the PEP decrypts its value and
retrieves the building, floor, room, date and time attributes.
7. These attributes are used to create an XACML request to send to the PDP.
8. The PDP uses the existing policies to evaluate the user’s request using the provided
attributes.
9. If the user scans the QR code while being inside the room, an XACML response with
the Permit value is sent back to the PEP.
10. The user is granted to access the Page2.php.
Figure 7.7: Releasing location attributes at the PPIdP.
To access Page3.php, the user needs to release attributes from two IdPs as discussed above,
meaning that she needs to combine attributes from two IdPs. The protocol flow is illustrated
in Figure 7.8 and is outlined below.
1. The user visits the homepage of SP1 using a browser on her mobile device and notes
that she needs to release the pos and org attributes from the Proxy IdP and the location
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Figure 7.8: Protocol flow for accessing the Page3.php.
and IntPosition attributes from the PPIdP to access Page3.php. The user clicks the
Page3.php button.
2. The user is forwarded to the WAYF page. She chooses the Proxy IdP from the WAYF
page and is forwarded to the Proxy IdP with an authentication request.
3. The user authenticates herself at the Proxy IdP.
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4. The user is presented with a consent form that contains the attributes stored at the
Proxy IdP.
5. The consent form also contains a button called Aggregate More Attributes (Figure 7.9).
The user clicks the button.
6. A session is created and the user is forwarded to the IdP selection page where other
SAML IdP (including the PPIdP) linked to the Proxy IdP are listed.
7. The user chooses the PPIdP and she is forwarded to the PPIdP with a SAML authenti-
cation request.
8. The user authenticates herself at the PPIdP.
9. The user is presented with the consent form at the PPIdP (Figure 7.7). The user selects
the required attributes and clicks the Submit button.
10. A response with a SAML assertion with the attributes are returned to the Proxy IdP.
The Proxy IdP validates the assertion and retrieves the attributes.
11. The Proxy IdP retrieves attributes stored at its end and combines both sets and presents
them in the consent form (Figure 7.10). Note that the Proxy IdP also inserts the IdP
and LoA value for each corresponding set of attributes from a single IdP.
12. Assuming the user chooses the required attributes for accessing the Page3.php, a re-
sponse with a SAML assertion containing the attributes will be sent back to the PEP
and the same XACML protocol flow takes places to determine if the user can access
the Page3.php.
Figure 7.9: The consent form at the Proxy IdP allowing the user to combine attributes.
Note that, the user can access (Page1.php and Page3.php) or (Page1.php and Page2.php)
when she can access Page3.php or Page2.php respectively, since the entities in both pairs
require the same value for the common location attribute.
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Figure 7.10: Combined attributes from the Proxy IdP and the PPIdP.
7.5.3 Use-Case: SP2
Since the pages of the SP2 requires an LoA value of 2, the user cannot use the PPIdP (either
directly or indirectly via the Proxy IdP). The protocol flow is similar to what is illustrated in
Figure 7.6 and is described below.
1. The user visits the homepage of SP2 and notes the list of attributes that she needs to
release to access Page1.php and Page2.php (Table 7.1). The user clicks the Page 1
button.
2. She is redirected to the WAYF Page of SP2 and she selects the Proxy IdP.
3. A SAML Authentication Request is sent to the Proxy IdP.
4. The user is authenticated at the Proxy IdP.
5. The user is provided with the consent form containing a list of attributes.
6. The user selects the required attributes and clicks the Submit button.
7. A response with a SAML assertion containing the selected attributes is sent back to
the PEP.
8. The SP validates the assertion and retrieves the attributes.
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9. These attributes are used to create an XACML request to send to the PDP.
10. The usual XACML flow takes place. If the XACML response contains a Permit value,
the user is allowed to access the resource otherwise, she is denied access.
7.6 Analysis
This section investigates whether the CAFS framework has satisfied different requirements
outlined in Section 7.3.
7.6.1 Functional Requirements
The current implementation of the PPIdP does not use any contexts for registering and de-
registering the partial identity of a user. However, a trusted IdP can impose the requirement
that the user must visit a particular place physically to register for different services and
thus utilising the contexts for registration. The whole framework has been designed and
developed with online services in mind and provides a seamless Single Sign On capability
across different service providers in the same federation. Therefore, it meets requirements
F1 and F2.
As illustrated in previous use-cases, the framework has the ability to locate users indoors as
well as outdoors and thus meets requirement F3. To meet F4, a mechanism will be needed
to allow an SP to request attributes from an IdP. For the use-cases, an option has been chosen
where the deployed SPs publish on their homepages what attributes are needed to access
each service. This is not a very user-friendly option as the user must keep note of what
attributes are required for which service. In the next chapter, a more user-friendly way of
accomplishing this is presented. As evident from the use-cases, CAFS supports an advanced
policy-based authorisation infrastructure XACML and thus also meets the requirement F5.
7.6.2 Security Requirements
The whole framework has been developed using standardised SAML and XACML protocols.
The communication channel in SAML is fully encrypted. CAFS also uses the encrypted
channel (HTTPS) to communicate with the GeoXACML environment. The encrypted chan-
nel guarantees the confidentiality and integrity of information, including contextual informa-
tion, passed between involved entities. The discussion regarding the authenticity of contex-
tual data, e.g. location, deserves further discussion since location information can be falsi-
fied in mobile devices using available application. For example, Fake GPS location [138]
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and Location Spoofer [139] are two popular Android apps for spoofing location data for the
Android platform. Therefore, it is advisable to provide location-based services in such a way
that users need to be physically present to avail the service thereby undermining the motive
of spoofing location data. An alternative approach is to deploy external sensors that can be
used to prove that a user is in vicinity of the sensor at a certain time. This approach has been
adopted by using dynamic QR codes as external sensors. To ensure that the information re-
trieved from the QR code cannot be spoofed, the information is encrypted and then the QR
code is generated. Here, it is assumed that the dynamic QR codes are deployed by the SP,
and thus the SP can decrypt the encrypted QR code to retrieve the location data. This ensures
the authenticity of location data and thus meets S1. The CAFS also authenticates users se-
curely over the HTTPS channel and provides the services only to the authorised users which
is determined by the respective XACML policy and thus meets S2. To limit relay attacks,
the date and time of the day are also embedded inside the information in the QR code. This
ensures that the QR code cannot be used after that date and time, thereby ensuring S3. The
Proxy IdP determines the LoA value of the PPIdP for the second use-case, thereby satisfying
S4.
7.6.3 Privacy Requirements
During the authentication phase, the PPIdP and the Proxy IdP generate a pseudonymous
identifier (similar to what was discussed in Chapter 6) which is unique to each SP. In this
way, users can maintain a session with an SP, however, several SPs cannot collude to build
a profile of a user. The Proxy IdP can also provide such a unique identifier. The user can
release such unique identifiers if it is required. This satisfies P1.
A user can set up a pre-configured ARP to decide which attributes she wants to release to a
particular SP. Once a user is authenticated, she can choose, using the consent form, which
attributes she wants to release to an SP. All these features help users to select attributes and
contextual information, control data flow and to provide her consent during a service access
scenario and hence P2 and P3 are satisfied. As mentioned in Chapter 6, data minimisation
can be achieved if a user knows which attributes are required for accessing a service and then
releasing only those attributes. The F4 requirement enables users to know which attributes
are required for a service and this implicitly satisfies P4.
7.6.4 Trust Requirements
Discussion of any federated system will be incomplete without analysing the trust issues
involved. As the Proxy IdP and the SP have been in the traditional way, they trust each other,
whereas the PPIdP is considered as untrusted to the IdP and the SP. If the authentication is
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delegated by the Proxy IdP to another IdP (as in the case of CAFS Type 2), an SP depends
on the judgement of the Proxy IdP following the rule of the transitive trust property. That
is, if the Proxy IdP considers other IdPs as trusted then they will be trusted by the SP and
if other IdPs are considered as semitrusted (or untrusted), then, they will be considered as
semitrusted (or untrusted) as well. As mentioned earlier, the LoA value is used as a trust
metric. For the CAFS Type 1 architecture, any attributes released by the PPIdP will be
implicitly considered by an SP as attributes having a LoA value of 1. For the CAFS Type 2
architecture, the Proxy IdP holds the responsibility to assign the LoA value of 1 for attributes
retrieved from the PPIdP and a LoA value of 2 for attributes retrieved from another trusted
IdP.
7.7 Discussion
The CAFS provides several key advantages which are highlighted below.
• CAFS is the first framework to consider context-aware identity management in a compre-
hensive way focusing all aspects of identity management and satisfying all requirements
as outlined in Section 7.3.
• CAFS is the first framework to demonstrate how location data can be used to provide fed-
erated services. This has been possible by creating Type 1 and Type 2 PIFs. This brings
benefits to both users and SPs. A user can utilise the SSO capability of the IdP, thereby
reducing the need for further logins for each separate location-based service hosted on dif-
ferent identity domains. SPs can offload the associated cost of managing and maintaining
user identities to IdPs and instead can concentrate on providing services.
• CAFS illustrates how geographical location data can be utilised by integrating the GeoX-
ACML API with the SAML and the existing XACML libraries. In addition, the deploy-
ment shows how the user can be located precisely inside a building and how the authentic-
ity of the location can be verified using external sensors and the readily available sensing
technologies of smart mobile devices.
• CAFS framework empowers users by informing them which attributes they will need to
release. This enables users to create fine-grained ARPs and control the flow of their at-
tributes.
• This is the first work to explore the possibility of combining attributes from two different
IdPs to provide context-aware services. The discussed use-cases illustrate how this can be
achieved using the CAFS framework to formulate innovative and advanced other use-case
scenarios.
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Table 7.2: Comparison of CAFS with existing works.
Name
FR SR PR
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 S1 S2 S3 S4 P1 P2 P3 P4
Bardram et al. [39] 7 7 X 7 7 X X 7 7 7 7 7 7
Jansen et al. [40] 7 7 X 7 7 X X 7 7 7 7 7 7
Malek et al. [41] 7 7 X 7 7 X X 7 7 7 7 7 7
Hsieh et al. [42] 7 7 X 7 7 X X X 7 7 7 7 7
Hayashi et al. [43] 7 7 X 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 7
Covington et al. [46] 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zhang et al. [47] 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Hulsebosch et al. [48] X 7 X 7 7 X 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
Jean-Yves et al. [49] X 7 X 7 7 X X 7 7 7 7 7 7
Covington et al. [51] 7 7 X 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Hu et al. [52] 7 7 X 7 X 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 7
Nishiki et al. [54] X X X 7 7 X X 7 7 7 7 7 7
Covington et al. [55] X 7 X 7 7 X X 7 7 7 7 7 7
Goel et al. [56] X 7 X 7 X 7 X X 7 7 7 7 7
CAFS X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Table 7.2 provides a comparative analysis of the framework with existing works on context-
aware services against the set of requirements compiled in Section 7.3. The table provides
a side-by-side comparison between this work and other existing works. The “X” symbol
has been used in the table to signify that the particular work has considered the respective
requirement. The “7” symbol has been used to signify that either the system has failed to
meet that respective requirement. As evident from the table, the proposed framework satisfies
more requirements than the existing works for accessing access context-aware services.
Many services will not require any identifying information, providing the location informa-
tion would be enough to access such services as in the case of Page1.php and Page2.php. To
offer secure services only to an authorised subset of users (based on the Role Based Access
Control (RBAC) or Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC)) that might require any iden-
tifying information (e.g. the user’s identity or the user’s group membership) from a trusted
source as well as location information (as in the case of Page3.php), the user will need to
combine attributes from two IdPs as illustrated in the use case. The Page3.php access control
in the use-cases has only illustrated the RBAC scenarios (e.g. if the role of a user is student).
Even though the Page3.php use-case required to know the role of the user (e.g. a student), it
can be easily adopted for scenarios requiring the user’s identity. Moreover, the LoA values
provided by the Proxy IdP is a key mechanism for the SP to ensure that the level of assurance
for attributes are properly calculated; in turn this could be used to undermine any privilege
escalation.
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7.8 Conclusion
As current trends suggest, the popularity of federated services and context-aware services
will only increase. An architecture that can provide context-aware federated services will
be advantageous for users due to the SSO capability, and thus reduce the number of online
accounts they need to manage and use to access different services. Such services can also
be advantageous for SPs as well, since it allow them to offload the burden of managing user
information to IdPs. In this chapter, a novel framework, based on the concept of Portable
Personal Identity Provider and Personal Identity Federation, has been presented for context-
aware federated services using the SAML, XACML and GeoXACML standards. It also
has been shown how combining attributes from different sources can play a crucial role
in providing innovative use-case scenarios. The mechanism of combining attributes from
different providers is commonly known as Attribute Aggregation. There are different such
mechanisms. The discussed approach in this chapter is based on the Identity Proxying model
[58]. The topic of Attribute Aggregation has potential to stand out as a research topic in its
own. In the next chapter, the issue of attribute aggregation is treated thoroughly.
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Chapter 8
Attribute Aggregation in Federated
Identity Management
8.1 Introduction
It is evident from the discussions in previous chapters that federated services have improved
the usability and experience of online services. It also has been shown how the proposed
User-controlled Identity Management Systems using PPIdPs can offer context-aware feder-
ated services while allowing users to have ultimate control over their attributes. Unfortu-
nately, there exists a serious limitation in the current setting of federated services: users can
use only a single IdP in a single service session [61]. This is an unrealistic restriction that
assumes that one IdP would be able to provide all the required attributes to an SP where,
in reality, users have different attributes stored in different providers. To illustrate the re-
striction, a real-life scenario in the setting of FIM (Federated Identity Management) can be
considered. Imagine a user, named Alice, wants to buy an age-restricted product from her
favourite online shop. She might need to use her Governmental IdP (e.g. her passport or
driving licence from passport or driving authorities) to prove her age, her bank details to pay
for the product and her loyalty card information to collect loyalty points during this purchase.
This information is stored at different IdPs. Even if it is assumed that the online seller has
a federated agreement with all these IdPs, the current setting of federated services does not
allow Alice to provide all this information in a single session (e.g. during her purchase).
Allowing users to aggregate attributes from different providers will enable them to release
these attributes to an SP in a single service session which can be used to provide innovative
services.
The concept of attribute aggregation has been introduced to tackle this very problem. A
number of novel approaches exist for aggregating attributes targeted for federated services.
Even though each model has its own strength, most of them suffer from serious limitations.
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For example, many are based on either complex user interactions, unrealistic assumptions
or have not been implemented in practice. In addition, all models have been exclusively
designed to allow users aggregating attributes only from SAML IdPs. With the proliferation
of social networks, many users store different attributes across different non-SAML social
IdPs (e.g. Facebook, Google and OpenID Providers) and different non-SAML technologies
(such as OpenID and OAuth) are increasingly being used for accessing such IdPs. Allowing
users to combine attributes from such providers would enable novel service access scenarios.
In this chapter, a Hybrid model of attribute aggregation for federated services is presented.
The model is based on two existing models and has been designed to specifically address
these limitations. This model does not require complex user interactions and is the first
to allow users to aggregate attributes from both SAML and non-SAML IdPs. The model
imposes several functional, security, privacy and trust requirements. An in-depth analysis
has been provided regarding the design choices to ensure that every requirement is met. The
current SAML specification does not have any mechanism that will allow an SP to pass
any information regarding requested attributes to an IdP during the authentication process.
To rectify this problem, a mechanism is proposed. A proof of concept prototype has been
implemented based on the proposal. Then, several use-cases using the prototype have been
illustrated to demonstrate the applicability of the model. Finally, the advantages of the model
along with its limitations are discussed.
8.2 Attribute Aggregation
Attribute Aggregation is the mechanism of aggregating or combining attributes of a user
retrieved from multiple identity providers in a single session. As mentioned earlier, the
profile of a user in an IdP contains the subset of attributes of that user retrieved from that
IdP. Therefore, this means that attribute aggregation, in reality, is actually an aggregation of
profiles of a user from different IdPs and the terms “profile” and “attribute” will be used
interchangeably. Formally, the set of aggregated attributes can be defined in the following
way:
Definition 28 For any entity e ∈ E, the set of aggregated attributes of e, denoted by
Att−Agge is given by:
Att−Agge = ∪{PROFILE ed | d ∈ DOMAIN } .
Here, DOMAIN represents the set of domains and PROFILE ed represents the profile of
entity e in domain d.
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Figure 8.1: A single assertion con-
taining all profiles (attributes).
Figure 8.2: A single assertion containing all
assertions.
In practice, profiles of a specific user from several IdPs can be aggregated only if the user has
authenticated at each IdP and released the profile from each IdP. In SAML, each such profile
is embedded inside a separate assertion. Therefore, from the perspective of an implementa-
tion, there are two interpretations of attribute aggregation: it either means the aggregation of
attributes where all attributes are embedded inside a single assertion (Figure 8.1) or it means
the aggregation of assertions where other assertions are embedded inside a single assertion
(Figure 8.2). These two possible interpretations will be discussed later in the chapter.
8.2.1 Taxonomy of Attribute Aggregation Models
While aggregating, it is necessary to determine the entity which will aggregate the attributes
and the entity that mediates the process. Here, the term mediation means initiating the ag-
gregation mechanism. During attribute aggregation a user may need to access several IdPs
from where she wants to aggregate her attributes and it is crucial that the user has a starting
point and an end point during the process. The two entities, that initiate the process and that
combine the released attributes, act as the starting and finishing points for the process. These
points can be utilised as the criteria to create a taxonomy of existing attribute aggregation
models. Based on where the attribute aggregation takes place, the existing attribute aggre-
gation mechanisms can be classified in three categories: Aggregation at an SP, Aggregation
at an IdP and Aggregation at a Client (e.g. a User-Agent/Browser). Each category can then
further be classified based on who mediates the aggregation process: an IdP or an SP. Based
on these categories, a taxonomy has been created which is illustrated in Figure 8.3. Next, a
brief description of each mechanism is provided.
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Figure 8.3: Taxonomy of Attribute Aggregation Models.
8.2.2 Aggregation at an SP
The models discussed in this section enable a user to aggregate attributes at an SP. As men-
tioned earlier, the models can be further classified based on the entity that initiates the pro-
cess: an SP or an IdP.
Mediated by an SP
The models which allow an SP to initiate the aggregation mechanism are placed into this
category.
Application Database (AD) Model. This is the simplest form of attribute aggregation model
(Figure 8.4) [58, 59]. In this model, an SP can store additional attributes of a user such as a
local identifier, user-preferences for that particular service or group membership, in addition
to the attributes supplied by an IdP. The SP creates a mapping of the SP-created identifier to
the IdP-supplied identifier to store these additional attributes at a local repository. Such local
attributes can be retrieved later on using this mapping to determine if the user is authorised
to access its service(s).
SP-Mediated (SPM) Model. In this model, an SP allows a user to aggregate attributes from
multiple IdPs in a single session (Figure 8.5) [58, 59]. A user is forwarded to different IdPs,
one after another, where she is authenticated separately and finally returns to the SP with the
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Figure 8.4: Appli-
cation Database
Model.
Figure 8.5: SP-Mediated
Model.
Figure 8.6: Linking Ser-
vice Model.
IdP-supplied attributes. The SP combines the sets of attributes at its end to determine if the
user can access its service(s).
Linking Service (LS) Model. Linking Service model is a combination of the linking and
identity relay model (see below). It consists of a special type of SP called the Linking
Service (LS, Figure 8.6) [61, 59] which is used by a user using a LS-supplied identifier. This
identifier is used to link different IdPs using an IdP-supplied LS-specific persistent identifier
in a table called the Linking Table. To access any service of an SP, the user visits the SP and
is forwarded at the first IdP (IdP1 in Figure 8.6). The user authenticates at IdP1 and then
an assertion containing user-attributes, the persistent identifier for the LS and a reference to
the LS is returned to the SP. The SP forwards the persistent identifier to the LS to aggregate
attributes. At this point, two options are available: either the LS can retrieve the list of linked
IdPs for this persistent identifier using the Linking Table and retrieve attributes from each of
them which are then combined at the LS and returned to the SP. Alternatively, the LS can
send back the list of linked IdPs to the SP. The SP then retrieves attributes from each IdP.
Based on the aggregated attributes, the SP determines if the user can access its service(s).
Mediated by an IdP
This category consists of the model which allows an IdP to initiate the aggregation mecha-
nism.
Identity Federation/Linking (IFL) Model. This model, introduced by the Liberty Alliance
framework, is one of the first models to address the problem of attribute aggregation (Figure
8.7) [58, 59]. In this model, an IdP allows a user to create a pair-wise link between two IdPs.
To create the link, the user needs to visit and authenticate to the first IdP. The first IdP will ask
the user if she wants to federate this IdP with another IdP. If chosen, the user will be asked
to federate the second IdP with the first one. At this point, both IdPs will interact with each
other to create a random alias. During accessing services from an SP, one IdP will provide
that random alias to the SP along with the assertion containing attributes. The SP can use
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that alias to retrieve another assertion containing attributes from the other IdP. Combining
attributes from both IdPs, the SP can determine if the user can access its service(s).
Figure 8.7: Identity Fed-
eration/Linking Model.
Figure 8.8: Identity
Proxying Model.
Figure 8.9: Identity Re-
lay Model.
8.2.3 Aggregation at an IdP
This category includes the model where an IdP aggregates attributes.
Mediated by an IdP
The models in which an IdP initiates the aggregation mechanism are placed in this category.
Identity Proxying (IP) Model. In this model, an SP allows a user to aggregate attributes
from multiple IdPs using a highly trusted IdP (Figure 8.8) [58, 59]. A user is forwarded
to the highly trusted IdP (IdP1 in Figure 8.8) and then the trusted IdP forwards the user to
other multiple IdPs. Such an IdP is known as the Proxy IdP. After the user is authenticated
separately at each IdP, the user returns back to the trusted IdP with an assertion including
attributes. At this point, the trusted IdP validates each assertion, retrieves attributes from
them and combines the attributes. The trusted IdP might supplement the combined set with
the attributes of the user stored at its end and then reasserts all attributes to the SP as its
own attributes using a single assertion. The SP validates the assertion, retrieves all attributes
from the assertion and, not being aware of other IdPs, assumes that all attributes have been
released by the trusted IdP. Based on the combined attributes, the SP determines if the user
can access its service(s).
Identity Relay (IR) Model. The Identity Relay model is a generalised case of the Identity
Proxying model (Figure 8.9) [58, 59]. Since the IP model requires an SP to have a strong
trust in the trusted IdP, it cannot function properly in situations when the Proxy IdP cannot
be fully trusted. The Identity Relay model fits in such scenarios where an intermediary IdP
(or Relay IdP), (IdP1 in Figure 8.9) is used instead of a trusted IdP. A user is forwarded to
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the relay IdP and then the relay IdP forwards the user to other multiple IdPs. The user is
authenticated separately at each IdP and is returned back to the Relay IdP with assertions
including user-attributes. The relay IdP combines all assertions into a single assertion and
forwards it to the SP. The SP extracts embedded assertions from this assertion and validates
each assertion to retrieve attributes from other IdPs. Based on the combined attributes, the
SP determines if the user can access its service(s).
8.2.4 Aggregation at a Client
In this model, a client (e.g. a browser) aggregates attributes on behalf of a user.
Client-Mediated (CM) Model. This model is similar to the Identity Relay Model. Here,
the functionality of a relay IdP has been replaced by an intelligent user-agent or application
(known as the client) that has the capability to aggregate attributes from different IdPs [58,
59]. An SP informs the client about the IdPs that it trusts. The client forwards the user to
each of these IdPs. After respective authentication at each IdP, the client receives assertions
from all IdPs and present the combined set of assertions to the SP. The SP validates each
assertion, retrieves all attributes and then determines if the user can access its service(s).
8.2.5 Comparative Analysis
Each model discussed above has their own strengths and weaknesses. A side-by-side com-
parison of strengths and weaknesses of each model is presented in Table 8.1. Unfortunately,
it is evident from the table that no one model is superior to other models. Extensive research
is needed to come up with a model that offers a good number of advantages. According to
the analysis, it has been found that the Identity Proxying and the Identity Relay models are
good research candidates since both are easy to deploy for an SP, offer a good number of ad-
vantages and have relatively fewer disadvantages. Therefore, the implementation is based on
these two models. Before the implementation is discussed, it is investigated how attributes
are released in the existing online (federated and non-federated) services and whether any of
them has any support for attribute aggregation.
8.3 The State of the Art
It has been mentioned earlier that SAML is one of the most widely-used technologies for au-
thenticating a user, releasing user attributes to an SP and for accessing federated services. In
addition, many popular social networks utilise OpenID and OAuth protocols to authenticate
users and release their attributes to third party service providers. Frameworks are available
8.3. The State of the Art 160
Table 8.1: Aggregation Models: Strengths and Weaknesses.
Models Advantages Disadvantages
AD Easy to implement and maintain.
Small number of requirements.
Aggregation from only one IdP in a
session. Changing identifiers causes
the system to fail.
SPM Aggregation from a number of IdPs
in a session.
Hard to maintain. Potentially privacy
invasive. Extensive changes are re-
quired at the SP. No implementation
exists.
LS Secure and Privacy-preserving.
Proof of concept implementation
available. Attribute aggregation
from multiple IdPs in a single ses-
sion. SSO capability during service
access.
Hard to deploy and difficult to main-
tain. The LS represents a single point
of failure.
IFL Secure and Privacy-preserving.
Proof of concept implementation
available. SSO capability during
service access.
Difficult to maintain and scale. At-
tribute aggregation from only two
IdPs in a single session.
IP Attribute aggregation from multiple
IdPs in a single session. An SP util-
ising this model is easy to maintain.
Relatively small number of require-
ments.
Strong trust is required on the Proxy
IdP. The Proxy IdP is the single
point of failure. No implementa-
tion based on Shibboleth and Sim-
pleSAMLphp.
IR Attribute aggregation from multiple
IdPs in a single session. An SP util-
ising this model is easy to maintain.
Relatively small number of require-
ments. Less trust on the relay IdP.
The relay IdP is the single point of
failure. Hard to maintain. No imple-
mentation based on Shibboleth and
SimpleSAMLphp.
CM No need to rely on external IdP.
Attribute aggregation from multiple
IdPs in a single session. Relatively
small number of requirements.
No implementation exists currently.
Extensive changes are required to en-
sure that IdPs, SPs and clients can in-
teract.
that allow the integration of such social networks within SAML federations to offer feder-
ated services [106]. However, how attributes are released using these protocols or if such
protocols can be used to aggregate attributes in a federated setting have not been considered.
These issues are now examined next.
8.3.1 SAML
How and what attributes are requested and released in SAML depend on a specific imple-
mentation. There are many different implementations of SAML including Shibboleth [109],
SimpleSAMLphp [11] and ZXID [110]. One approach to request attributes as adopted by
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Shibboleth is using an AttributeQuery request which is initiated once the user is authenti-
cated by an IdP and the IdP has returned an assertion to an SP. Then, the SP requests a
few attributes using the AttributeQuery request and the IdP replies back with an assertion
containing the requested attributes. On the other hand, SimpleSAMLphp has adopted a dif-
ferent approach in which, without using a separate AttributeQuery request, the attributes are
embedded inside the same assertion which is returned in response to the SAML authenti-
cation request. This is a reasonable approach as it reduces protocol flows. However, there
are drawbacks: an IdP has no way of knowing what attributes an SP is requesting and hence
the user does not know which attributes are required by an SP to access a particular service.
One adhoc approach has been used in Chapter 7 where an SP enlists, at its homepage, the
attributes required for accessing any of its services. This is not very efficient as users need
to remember the list of attributes needed to release to an SP.
Also, the way in which attributes are selected is not standardised in SAML and depends
entirely on the specific implementation. Shibboleth uses the Attribute Release Policy (ARP)
[140], known as the Attribute Filter Policy (AFP) in Shibboleth V 2.0 [141]. An ARP/AFP
allows an administrator to setup a policy that determines which attributes can be released to
an SP. However, there are third-party extensions such as ShARPE [142] that allows a user to
set up an ARP. An alternative approach has been used by SimpleSAMLphp using a module,
called the Consent module, that allows a user to select attributes in real time once the user is
authenticated at an IdP with no need to setup the policy beforehand. The SAML specification
has no mechanism to aggregate attributes, nor does any SAML implementation provides this
facility. However, the implementations of existing models of attribute aggregation are mainly
based on SAML.
8.3.2 OpenID
The original OpenID protocol was intended for authentication only and hence, the aspect of
exchanging attributes was not initially considered. However, two extensions, the OpenID
Simple Registration Extension (SREG) [143] and the OpenID Attribute Exchange (AX)
[124] allow an SP to request and fetch attributes from a provider. The provider might ask a
user to release the requested attributes which are then sent back to the SP embedded inside
the response.
At this point, it is investigated how a few popular OpenID providers act when they receive a
request to return attributes. Especially, the focus is to investigate how each provider allows a
user to selectively choose their attributes individually (the selective disclosure of attributes).
With these in mind, five popular OpenID providers - Yahoo [144], Google [145], LiveJournal
[146], myopenid [147] and VeriSign [148] - have been selected. Then, a SAML SP and IdP
using the SimpleSAMLphp implementation has been deployed. Even though the IdP and SP
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are based on SAML, the SimpleSAMLphp allows different types of (e.g. OpenID or OAuth
enabled) IdPs to be configured as authentication sources at an IdP. These authentication
sources can be used by a user to be authenticated at another IdP. Once authenticated, the user
returns back to the SimpleSAMLphp IdP with attributes. This approach has been used for
two reasons:
1. the support of such IdPs are built in SimpleSAMLphp and hence, it is not needed to
deploy a separate OpenID or OAuth SP, and
2. a very similar setup will be used for implementing the proof of concept.
The SimpleSAMLphp OpenID module had been configured to request openid, email, full-
name and age attributes among which only the age attribute was optional. A typical flow
using this approach is as follows: a user visits the deployed SP and then chooses the SAML
IdP. When the user is forwarded to the SAML IdP, she chooses OpenID as the authentication
source and then the user provides her OpenID and the usual OpenID protocol flows take
place.
Dummy user accounts have been created in the chosen providers to use during the exper-
iments. It has been noted how the provider allows a user to authorise it to release her at-
tributes, after the user is authenticated or during the user authentication process. The screen-
shots while accessing different providers are captured and presented in Figures 8.10 to 8.14.
Two problems are noticed: the login screen does not inform the user which individual at-
tributes have been requested; therefore, the user has no way of knowing what information
will be released. Also, none of the providers except VeriSign has any support of selective
disclosure. This practice not only violates the principle of data minimisation but also forces
the user to release attributes based on obscure information. This may have serious effect on
the privacy of the user. Also, note that the OpenID Specification does not have any mech-
anism to aggregate attributes from other providers and hence, none of the implementations
has any such facility.
8.3.3 OAuth
Unlike OpenID, OAuth does not require any separate mechanism to exchange attributes since
all user attributes are considered as resources which can be accessed using OAuth upon
approval from the user. With the same intention as OpenID, it it observed how a user can
grant authorisation to a client - an entity that wants to access some attributes of the user.
Three popular IdPs based on OAuth - Facebook [149], Linkedin [150] and Twitter [151] -
have been chosen. The same SimpleSAMLphp setup to initiate the OAuth protocol flow has
been used. A typical flow takes the following form: a user visits an SP and then chooses
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Figure 8.10: Yahoo Login screen. Figure 8.11: Google Login screen.
Figure 8.12: LiveJournal Login screen.
Figure 8.13: myopenid Login screen.
the SAML IdP. When the user is forwarded to the SAML IdP, she chooses one of the OAuth
providers (Facebook, Twitter and Linkedin) as the authentication source and then the usual
OAuth protocol flow takes place.
To initiate this protocol flow, a respective application needs to be registered at each provider.
Once the application is registered, an application key and a corresponding secret are gen-
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Figure 8.14: VeriSign Login screen.
Figure 8.15: Facebook Authorisation
screen.
erated. These two pieces of information are then used at the SimpleSAMLphp to initiate
the protocol flow at the respective IdP. In addition, the way in which user attributes can
be requested using a registered application depends entirely on the respective provider. For
Facebook, the application can be configured to request different user attributes or information
regarding requested attributes can be passed as configuration parameters during initiating the
protocol. The second approach has been adopted for the investigation. For Linkedin, the ap-
plication needs to be configured to request attributes. The application has been configured
to request the full public profile and the email address attributes. For Twitter, the public
user attributes have been requested from the SimpleSAMLphp. As before, the process by
which the user allows the application to access the requested attributes have been noted and
screenshots have been captured. The screenshots are presented in Figures 8.15, 8.16 and
8.17. It has been found that, like OpenID providers, the same two problems exist: the login
screen does not inform a user which individual attributes have been requested (for example,
in Figure 8.15 it is not clear which information from the public profile will be released) and
none of the providers has any support for the selective disclosure of attributes. The user
needs to release either all attributes or none. This approach also violates the principle of data
minimisation and forces the user to release attributes based on obscure information and thus
can have negative effect on the privacy of the user. OAuth also does not have any support of
attribute aggregation.
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Figure 8.16: Linkedin Authorisation
screen. Figure 8.17: Twitter Authorisation screen.
8.4 The Hybrid Model
Now, a model for attribute aggregation is introduced for overcoming the issues discussed
above. The model is called the Hybrid Model and is based on the combination the IP and the
IR models. In this model, the trusted IdP will be called the Hybrid IdP.
8.4.1 Requirement Analysis
Before designing such a model, a list of requirements that the model should fulfil are iden-
tified using the taxonomy of requirements of an ideal IMS as presented in Chapter 4. The
requirements have been formulated assuming that there is an SP offering different services.
To access these services, users need to aggregate attributes from multiple SAML and/or non-
SAML IdPs using the Hybrid IdP.
Functional Requirements (FR). The functional requirements ensure that a system behaves
as desired. The requirements are:
F1 Federation Requirement. The Hybrid IdP and the SP must be a part of the same
federation. All SAML IdPs as well as the Hybrid IdP must be a part of a SAML fed-
eration. For enabling the capability of the IR model so that IdPs can return encrypted
assertions to the SP, such SAML IdPs also need to be a part of a SAML federation
with the same SP.
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F2 Session Retention. A session is maintained at the Hybrid IdP so that it can correlate
the attributes from an IdP with attributes retrieved previously from other IdPs.
F3 Dual Capabilities. The Hybrid IdP must have the dual capabilities of an IdP and an
SP. The Hybrid IdP has to act as an IdP to the SP and as an SP to other IdPs.
F4 Assertion Target. For the IP model, the assertions returned by other IdPs should be
targeted for the Hybrid IdP so that it can validate each assertion, extracts attributes
from them and then aggregates all of them, possibly also with its own attributes. For
the IR model, the encrypted assertions returned by other SAML IdPs should be tar-
geted for the SP. The Hybrid IdP will just aggregate all assertions and embed them
inside another assertion and send it back to the SP. The SP will validate the outer as-
sertion and retrieve all embedded assertions. Then, it must validate each assertion in
turn to extract attributes from them.
F5 Heterogeneous IdP. The Hybrid IdP should allow a user to aggregate attributes from
SAML as well as non-SAML IdPs.
F6 Source of Aggregated Attributes. The existing proxy model assumes that the aggre-
gated attributes, from SAML IdPs, are combined to build a single assertion to pass over
to the SP. The effect of this assumption is that the original sources of the attributes are
lost, leaving the SP with the notion that the attributes have originated from the trusted
Proxy IdP (Hybrid IdP in this model). This is a risky assumption to make which might
escalate privileges since some (or even all) attributes might originate from the SAML
IdP which the SP might not trust at all. To prevent the SP from making such risky
assumptions, the Proxy IdP must indicate the source of all attributes. The SP should
have the capabilities to interpret such groupings to ensure that it can easily identify the
source of each attribute and the associated LoA value.
F7 IP/IR Model Switching. A user should have the ability to choose between the IP and
IR models. If the user chooses the IR model, it means that she wants the other IdPs to
release encrypted assertions, instead of regular unencrypted assertions, to the SP via
the Hybrid IdP. In such cases, the Hybrid IdP should forward the information regarding
the SP to the other IdPs to enable them to generate the encrypted assertions properly.
Security Requirements (SR).
S1 Secure User Authentication. Every user should be securely authenticated at all IdPs
from where attributes are aggregated.
S2 Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity. Aggregated attributes should be trans-
mitted between different entities, maintaining their confidentiality, integrity and au-
thenticity.
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S3 Transient Storage. To ensure the security of attributes, the Hybrid IdP must not store
the aggregated attributes (assertions for the IR model) once the session with the Hybrid
IdP is terminated.
S4 LoA Calculation. The LoA values for each group of attributes from a specific IdP are
properly determined.
Privacy Requirements (TR). There is no additional privacy requirements other than the
ones outlined in the taxonomy of Chapter 4. Hence, it must be ensured that the existing
requirements - Support of Pseudonym (denoted as P1), Selective Disclosure (denoted as
P2), Explicit Consent (denoted as P3) and Data Minimisation (denoted as P4) - are satisfied.
Trust Requirements (TR). Like the implementation discussed in Chapter 6 and 7, the trust
requirement while using the system is expressed using a trust metric: the NIST LoA value
from 1 to 4. The responsibility lies on the Hybrid IdP to calculate the respective trust metric
for each group of attributes from a specific IdP and embed that metric in the assertion. The
SP then can use the trust metric to determine the level of trust over a set of attributes from
each IdP.
8.4.2 Architecture
The architecture of the Hybrid Model is illustrated in Figure 8.18. The dotted area in the
figure represents the Circle of Trust (i.e. the federation) between entities. The Hybrid IdP
Figure 8.18: Architecture of Hybrid Model.
takes the central stage in the model. Any number of SAML and non-SAML IdPs can be
added with the Hybrid IdP. These IdPs will act as third party IdPs and a user can aggregate
attributes from these IdPs using the Hybrid IdP. Any such third-party SAML IdP (SAML
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IdP1 and SAML IdP2 in Figure 8.18) must be federated with the Hybrid IdP, while there is
no need for any non-SAML IdP (IdP1, IdP2, ... , IdPn in Figure 8.18) to be federated with
the Hybrid IdP since they can be accessed using their respective protocols. In addition, the
SP needs to be federated with the Hybrid IdP (as illustrated in Figure 8.18) and any other
third-party SAML IdP to enable users to release encrypted assertions for the SP. The absence
of any federation between the SP and any third-party SAML IdP will prohibit the user from
releasing any encrypted assertions from those IdPs. For example, in Figure 8.18, the SAML
IdP1 can release encrypted assertions to the SP whereas the SAML IdP2 cannot release any
encrypted assertions to the SP. The whole architecture has been designed in such a way that
it satisfies all the requirements listed above. In the subsequent section, it will be explored
how the design choices have achieved this.
8.4.3 Implementation
SimpleSAMLphp has been used for the implementation. This is for two reasons:
1. SimpleSAMLphp has built-in support for the selective disclosure of attributes based
on their Consent module, and
2. SimpleSAMLphp also has another built-in module called the Multiauth module that
allows a SAML IdP to delegate the authentication task to an external SAML or non-
SAML IdP (e.g. OpenID or Facebook). Once the user has authenticated at the external
IdP and returned back to the SAML IdP with attributes, it releases the attributes to the
SP via a SAML assertion.
The second module allows an IdP to act as a Hybrid IdP with the Identity Proxying capabil-
ity. However, it does not allow a user to choose more than one IdP for a particular session
and hence, attribute aggregation from multiple IdPs is not possible. In addition, it cannot
return an encrypted assertion to an SP; this means that it cannot act as a Relay IdP. Even
with these limitations, these two modules would give a solid platform on which to base the
implementation, with the main focus to confine most of the changes to the Consent and the
Multiauth modules. The idea is to modify the core code-base of SimpleSAMLphp only when
this is absolute necessary.
In SimpleSAMLphp, the Consent module is loaded to show a consent form once a user is
authenticated at an IdP. The consent form displays the list of attributes of the user stored at
the IdP and allows the user to choose the attributes that she wishes to release to an SP. A
sample consent form is shown in Figure 8.19. The Consent module has been modified by
adding two new inputs - a check box and a button - so that the consent form acts as the entry
point for allowing users to aggregate attributes. The modified consent form is illustrated
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Figure 8.19: The usual consent form.
in Figure 8.20. The check box with the text Return Encrypted Assertion is used to toggle
between the IP and IR mode and the Aggregate More Attributes button is used to initiate the
process of attribute aggregation.
Figure 8.20: The modified consent form.
The original Multiauth module enables an IdP to act as a Proxy IdP to delegate the authen-
tication to another IdP. A list of different IdPs is shown to a user at an IdP. Once the user
selects an IdP, she is forwarded to the chosen IdP where the user authentication takes place.
The user is then redirected back to the Proxy IdP where a session is created. Once the session
is created, the user cannot choose another IdP without logging out from the Proxy IdP. This
behaviour needs to be changed to allow users to choose other IdPs even if there is already a
session at the Proxy IdP. For this, two amendments have been made:
1. the Multiauth module has been modified so that it shows the list of external IdPs,
excluding those IdPs where a user has already been authenticated at, when the user
clicks the Aggregate More Attributes button at the consent page, and
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2. The SimpleSAMLphp IdP code-base has been modified to allow a user to initiate an
authentication process even if the user has a session at the IdP and to retain that session
when the user is redirected back from the chosen external IdP. This allows the IdP to
collate attributes from the recently authenticated IdP with the attributes aggregated
previously.
Note that the IP model is based on the first interpretation of attribute aggregation where dif-
ferent attributes are combined in a single assertion. As such, when attributes are aggregated
from multiple sources at the Hybrid IdP and passed to an SP inside a single assertion, it will
be impossible for the SP to identify the source of each single attribute. Without identifying
the source of each attribute, it might be difficult for the SP to take access control decisions.
None of the previous implementations considered this crucial issue. One way to retain the
source of attributes is to group them according to their sources and the only place this can
be done properly is at the Hybrid IdP. This is because only the Hybrid IdP has access to
all aggregated attributes. In addition, the Hybrid IdP can also determine the LoA value for
each IdP and add this information to each group. A data structure is needed to hold all this
information. One option for such a data structure is a list of lists where each entry of the list
is a list holding the attributes from a particular IdP along with its LoA value. The structure
is illustrated in Figure 8.21.
Figure 8.21: The data structure for the attribute list.
In the current SAML specification, each attribute with its value, is inserted inside an At-
tributeStatement element [5]. The schema for the AttributeStatement is given in Listing
8.1. If the grouped attributes following the proposed data structure are inserted in the At-
tributeStatement element in this manner, there are chances that each group may get mixed
up with each other. To mitigate this problem, the inclusion of a new SAML element called
AttributeStatements is proposed. The schema of the proposed element is given in Listing
8.2. The AttributeStatements element will essentially accommodate one or more AttributeS-
tatement element(s). In this way, the Hybrid IdP can include the IdP and LoA information
for each group of attributes inside each AttributeStatement element. The IdP and the SP
code-bases of the SimpleSAMLphp have been modified to reflect this mechanism.
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The next amendment made is to handle the IR mode which is based on the second interpreta-
tion of the attribute aggregation where multiple assertions containing different attributes are
combined into a single assertion. As such, the relay mode will enable external SAML IdPs
to release encrypted assertions to the Hybrid IdP. To do so, two things are required:
1. a mechanism to signal to the external IdP that the Hybrid IdP is requesting an encrypted
assertion, and
2. the Entity ID of the SP so that the external IdP can encrypt an assertion that is only
decryptable by the SP.
Since the SP is only communicating with the Hybrid IdP, not with the external IdP, the Hybrid
IdP has the responsibility of passing on these two pieces of information. As stated earlier, a
check box in the consent form is used to toggle between the IP and the IR mode to indicate
if a user wants to receive an encrypted assertion. Once the checkbox is ticked and the user
clicks the Aggregate More Attributes button, an attribute called EmbedAssertion is added to
the SAML authentication request which contains the Entity ID of the SP.
Listing 8.1: Schema for AttributeStatement Element
<element name="AttributeStatement" type="saml:AttributeStatementType"/>
<complexType name="AttributeStatementType">
<complexContent>
<extension base="saml:StatementAbstractType">
<choice maxOccurs="unbounded">
<element ref="saml:Attribute"/>
<element ref="saml:EncryptedAttribute"/>
</choice>
</extension>
</complexContent>
</complexType>
Listing 8.2: Proposed Schema for AttributeStatements Element
<element name="AttributeStatements" type="saml:AttributeStatementsType"/>
<complexType name="AttributeStatementsType">
<complexContent>
<extension base="saml:StatementAbstractType">
<choice minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded">
<element ref="saml:AttributeStatement"/>
</choice>
</extension>
</complexContent>
</complexType>
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When an external IdP receives a SAML authentication request, it checks for an attribute
called EmbedAssertion in the request. If this attribute is not found, the IdP behaves as
usual. However, if the attribute is found, the external IdP knows that it has to release an
encrypted assertion. Then, the Entity ID of the SP that sent the request is retrieved from
that attribute which is then used to create an encrypted assertion. To transmit the encrypted
assertion, it is Base64 encoded and added as the value of a special type of attribute called
encryptedAssertion into an AttributeStatement element which is then embedded inside a
regular unencrypted SAML assertion. This regular assertion is then passed to the Hybrid
IdP. After receiving an assertion from an external IdP, the Hybrid IdP validates it and if it
finds that there is an attribute called encryptedAssertion, it is treated differently (see below).
Otherwise, the attributes retrieved from the external IdP are aggregated with the previously
aggregated attributes and are presented in the consent form. Necessary amendments to the
SimpleSAMLphp code-base have been added to reflect this behaviour.
To achieve data minimisation and selective disclosure of attributes and to provide an optimal
way of aggregating attributes, a user must know beforehand the attributes required by an
SP to access its services. As mentioned earlier, one way to achieve this is to show the list of
attributes for each specific service at the home page of an SP as explained in Chapter 7. How-
ever, it is unrealistic to assume that a user will remember such a list for each service. A draft
to extend the SAML AuthnRequest element has been proposed in [152] to include a SAML
AttributeQuery statement within the authentication request. This approach has been adopted
in the implementation. The SimpleSAMLphp SP code-base has been modified to include the
AttributeQuery statement, containing the list of required attributes, with the SAML Authn-
Request statement at the SP side. Furthermore, the IdP code-base has been modified as to
parse the list of attributes from the AttributeQuery statement of the authentication request at
the IdP side and then to show them at the top of the consent form (Figure 8.22). It is believed
Figure 8.22: The requested attributes at the consent form.
that the consent form is the best place to show the required attributes as it will allow a user
to choose the IdP from where she can aggregate attributes as well as to decide the minimum
number of attributes she needs to release to an SP. In addition, when a user chooses another
external SAML IdP for attribute aggregation, the requested attributes will also be included
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within the AttributeQuery element of the SAML AuthnRequest that will be sent to an exter-
nal IdP. This will enable any external SAML IdP to parse and show the requested attributes
at any appropriate place. Moreover, the capability has been added to the SP code-base to al-
low an administrator to set the required attributes for each SP in the configuration file (called
config.php in SimpleSAMLphp). Then this file can be used to configure the AttributeQuery
element with the requested attributes to be embedded inside the AuthnRequest statement as
described before. In this manner, the administrator can set different attribute requirements
for different services for each SP.
The current implementation equipped with all these features can aggregate attributes from
SAML IdPs, IdPs based on OpenID including Google and IdPs based on OAuth such as
Facebook, Twitter and Linkedin. The implementation supports two types of SAML IdPs:
trusted and semi-trusted. A trusted SAML IdP is the one which has been federated in the
traditional way by exchanging metadata at the administrative level whereas a semi-trusted
SAML IdP is the one that has been federated using the concept of dynamic federation as
discussed in Chapter 5.
8.5 Use-cases
To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed model in different usage scenarios, three
use-cases are described below.
8.5.1 Use-case 1
The first use-case illustrates the simplest form of attribute aggregation using the Hybrid
model. The initial setup is that a user wants to access a service from an SP. The SP requires
a set of user attributes from different IdPs. The SP is deployed using the modified Sim-
pleSAMLphp and is federated with the Hybrid IdP. Another SAML IdP is also implemented
using SimpleSAMLphp. Moreover, the administrator of the SP has set the required attributes
for each service in the configuration file as discussed above. With this setup, the protocol
flow for the first use-case is illustrated in Figure 8.23 and is described below:
1. A user visits the SP to access one of its services. The user clicks the respective service
and is forwarded to the WAYF Page of the SP to choose an IdP. The user chooses the
Hybrid IdP.
2. The required attribute(s) for the requested service are read from the configuration file
and are used to create a SAML authentication request. The user is redirected to the
Hybrid IdP with a SAML authentication request.
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Figure 8.23: Protocol flow for Use-case 1.
3. The user is authenticated at the Hybrid IdP and the consent form is shown. The consent
form displays the requested attributes from the SP (Figure 8.22). In addition, the con-
sent form allows the user to aggregate more attributes from other IdPs (Figure 8.20).
The user compares the requested attributes and the attributes shown in the consent
form to decide if she needs to aggregate attributes.
4. Assuming that the user decides to aggregate attributes, she clicks the Aggregate More
Attributes button. A session is created to keep track of the previous attributes and then
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the user is forwarded to the IdP selection page of the Hybrid IdP. This page contains
the list of those IdPs from where the user has not aggregated attributes in the current
session.
5. The user chooses one IdP and based on the user’s selection, the respective protocol is
initiated. For example, if the user chooses another SAML IdP, a SAML authentication
request is created and the user is forwarded to the respective IdP. If the user chooses
OpenID, a HTML form is shown to the user to input the user’s OpenID. Once the
OpenID is provided and the Login button is clicked, the usual OpenID protocol starts
and the user is forwarded to the OpenID provider. If the user chooses an OAuth-based
IdP she is forwarded to the respective IdP following the OAuth protocol.
6. The user authenticates at the respective IdP and releases the attributes to the Hybrid
IdP using their respective protocols and implementations. For example, if the user
chooses the SAML IdP, the user is shown a basic consent form (cf. Figure 8.19) where
she chooses the attributes. Based on her selection, a SAML response is returned to
the Hybrid IdP. For other OpenID or OAuth IdPs the attributes are released using the
methods described previously.
7. Once the user returns to the Hybrid IdP, it validates the assertion (in case of SAML) or
the security token/information (for other protocols) using their corresponding mecha-
nisms. Then, the attributes are retrieved from the assertion or the security token and
the previously aggregated attributes are retrieved. The two sets of attributes are then
merged and are shown to the user by grouping them based on the IdP in the consent
form (Figure 8.24). The Hybrid IdP determines the LoA for each IdP. Note that the
IdP attribute and the LoA attribute for each attribute group are disabled so that the
user cannot deselect them. If the user chooses to release at least one attribute from an
attribute group, the respective IdP and the LoA value will be attached along with the
chosen attribute(s).
8. The requested attributes from the SP are listed on the consent form. The user can
always consult that list to determine if she needs to aggregate more attributes. If so,
the steps 4-7 can be repeated.
9. Once the user has aggregated the required attributes, she selects those attributes. Based
on her selection, the attributes from each IdP are wrapped inside a SAML AttributeS-
tatement element. These are then are wrapped inside a SAML AttributeStatements el-
ement. A SAML assertion is then created with the AttributeStatements element which
is embedded inside a SAML response and is sent back to the SP.
10. Upon receiving the response, the SP validates the assertion and retrieves the SAML
AttributeStatements element. From there each attribute group is retrieved and from
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Figure 8.24: Aggregated attributes from two IdP at the consent form.
each group, all attributes are retrieved. A sample of such attributes is illustrated in
Figure 8.25. The SP then can take authorisation decisions based on those attributes.
8.5.2 Use-case 2
The first use-case allows a user to aggregate attributes from multiple IdPs in a single session.
However, the main drawback is the extreme level of trust on the Hybrid IdP as it obtains all
the released attributes. Even if it is highly trusted, there is no guarantee that it will not abuse
the attributes. One way to mask attributes released by a SAML IdP from the Hybrid IdP is to
wrap them inside an encrypted assertion and present the encrypted assertion as an attribute.
The second use-case illustrates this scenario. The setup is very similar to the first use-case
except that the SAML IdP has to be federated with the SP to allow it to create an encrypted
assertion that the SP can decrypt. It is also assumed that the user has already gone through
the steps from 1 - 7 from the previous use-case. With this setup, the protocol flow for the
use-case is illustrated in Figure 8.26 and is described below:
1. The user needs to aggregate attributes from a SAML IdP and she does not want to
reveal the attributes to the Hybrid IdP. Therefore, the user selects the Return Encrypted
Assertion checkbox and clicks the Aggregate More Attributes button (Figure 8.20).
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Figure 8.25: Released attributes from multiple IdPs in a single SP session.
2. A session is created to keep track of aggregated attributes and then, the user is for-
warded to the IdP selection page of the Hybrid IdP as discussed in the previous use-
case. However, this time the page enlists only SAML IdPs. Since non-SAML IdPs
cannot provide an encrypted assertion, they are filtered out. When the user chooses
a SAML IdP, a SAML authentication request is created. An attribute called Embe-
dAssertion is inserted within the request containing the Entity ID of the SP. Then, the
user is forwarded to the SAML IdP with the request.
3. The IdP notes the EmbedAssertion attribute in the request and the entity ID of the SP
is stored in a session variable.
4. The user is authenticated at the IdP and the consent form containing attributes stored
at this IdP is shown. The user chooses the attributes and clicks the Release attributes
to SP button.
5. The IdP uses the entity ID from the session variable to create an encrypted assertion
targeted for the SP using the chosen attributes. The encrypted assertion is then Base64
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Figure 8.26: Protocol flow for Use-case 2.
encoded and added as the value of the encryptedAssertion attribute and is used to create
a regular unencrypted SAML assertion.
6. The regular assertion is then sent back to the Hybrid IdP.
7. Upon receiving this assertion, the Hybrid IdP validates the assertion and retrieves the
encryptedAssertion attribute. Since this encrypted assertion is not decryptable by the
Hybrid IdP, the IdP treats it as it is.
8. The Hybrid IdP merges the encrypted assertion with the previously aggregated at-
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tributes using the approach described before and displays all of them in different at-
tribute groups in the consent page. Since, the Base64-encoded encrypted assertion can
be quite a large value, it is not shown in the consent page. Instead, the text Encrypted
Assertion from the Other IdP is shown (Figure 8.27). Note that the Hybrid IdP assigns
a LoA value of 2 for the encrypted assertion as the other SAML IdP is assumed to be
trusted in this instance.
Figure 8.27: Encrypted assertion as the attribute in the consent page.
9. When the user chooses the encrypted assertion (along with other attributes from the
other IdP) and clicks the Release attributes to SP button, an assertion containing these
attributes is created (as described previously) and is sent back to the SP.
10. The SP validates the assertion and retrieves attributes as discussed previously. How-
ever, when the SP finds the encryptedAssertion attribute, it is treated in a special way.
The attribute is, at first, Base64-decoded. Then, the SP decrypts the assertion, vali-
dates it and retrieves the attributes. Finally, the SP can take an authorisation decision
as described above.
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8.5.3 Use-case 3
Even though the second use-case can tackle the problem of revealing attributes to the Hybrid
IdP from a SAML IdP, it fails when attributes are released from non-SAML IdPs. However,
the issue can be tackled effectively by combining the IR model with a PPIdP. By using a
PPIdP, the user can aggregate attributes from non-SAML IdPs at the PPIdP, rather than at
the Hybrid IdP. The aggregated attributes then can be released using an encrypted assertion
targeted for the SP, just like the second use-case. This will allow a user to release attributes to
the SP, however, such attributes will not be known to the Hybrid IdP and thus the mentioned
problem can be tackled effectively. Before the use-case is initiated, it is assumed that a PPIdP
has been federated with the SP as an IdP and has been added as an authentication source (an
IdP) at the Hybrid IdP following the mechanism of dynamic federations. It is also assumed
that the user has already gone through steps 1 - 7 from the first use-case. Moreover, as the
current implementation of the PPIdP requires the user to access the SP in a mobile browser,
the following interaction is assumed to take place from a browser of the mobile phone where
the PPIdP is installed. With this setup, the protocol flow for the use-case is illustrated in
Figure 8.28 and is described below:
1. The user needs to aggregate attributes from non-SAML IdPs and she does not want to
reveal the attributes to the Hybrid IdP. Therefore, the user selects the Return Encrypted
Assertion checkbox and clicks the Aggregate More Attributes button.
2. A session is created to keep track of the previous attributes and then the user is for-
warded to the IdP selection page of the Hybrid IdP, as before. However, this time the
page enlists only SAML IdPs. Since other non-SAML IdPs cannot fulfil the require-
ment, they are filtered out (Figure 8.29).
3. When the user chooses the PPIdP (tagged as Mobile-IdP in Figure 8.29), a SAML
authentication request with the EmbedAssertion attribute is forwarded to the PPIdP.
4. The PPIdP notes the EmbedAssertion attribute in the request and the entity ID of the
SP is retrieved and stored in a session variable.
5. The user is authenticated at the PPIdP and then the consent form containing attributes
stored at this IdP are shown (Figure 8.30). The form has a Aggregate Attributes button
which the user can click to initiate the attribute aggregation process.
6. Assuming the user clicks the Aggregate Attributes button, a new page with a list of
non-SAML IdPs is shown to the user (Figure 8.31). The current implementation of the
PPIdP allows the user to aggregate attributes from Twitter, Google, OpenID, Linkedin
and Facebook.
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Figure 8.28: Protocol flow for Use-case 3.
7. The user chooses one of the IdPs and she is forwarded to the corresponding IdP where
she is authenticated. Then, she comes back to the PPIdP with attributes as discussed
in the first use-case.
8. The user can repeat steps 3-7 to aggregate more attributes from other IdPs. After
aggregating attributes from multiple IdPs, the screenshot of the consent form at the
PPIdP is given in Figure 8.32.
9. The user chooses the attributes that she wants to release and clicks the Submit button.
The PPIdP uses the SP entity ID from the session variable to create an encrypted
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Figure 8.29: Filtered out non-SAML IdPs.
Figure 8.30: Consent form at the PPIdP.
Figure 8.31: Available IdP at the PPIdP.
assertion targeted for the SP using the chosen attributes. Then steps 8-10 of the second
use-case are repeated and ultimately the SP receives all these attributes and takes an
authorisation decision based on these attributes.
While preparing the encrypted assertion, the PPIdP groups the attributes based on their
sources and inserts them in different AttributeStatement elements which are then wrapped
inside an AttributeStatements element and inserted into the encrypted assertion as previously
discussed. The PPIdP also inserts the name of the IdP in each group, however, it does not
provide a LoA value. This is because the SP trusts a LoA value only provided by the Hybrid
IdP and thus there is no advantage to provide a LoA value by the PPIdP. Instead, the Hybrid
IdP assigns a LoA value of 1 for the encrypted assertion received from the PPIdP. This will
enable the SP to assume all attributes contained in this particular encrypted assertion have a
LoA value of 1. Note that this does not downgrade the level of assurance whatsoever for any
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Figure 8.32: Aggregated attributes at the PPIdP.
IdP involved in this manner since the Hybrid IdP considers that attributes from the PPIdP
and other non-SAML IdPs have a LoA value of 1. The advantage is that the Hybrid IdP has
no way of knowing what attributes from other non-SAML attributes the user has consented
to release to the SP.
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8.6 Discussion
In this section, the proposed model is analysed against the required functional, security and
privacy requirements (see Section 8.4.1). The advantages and limitations of the proposed
model are also discussed.
8.6.1 Analysis
The three use-cases require that the Hybrid IdP and SP are part of the same federation as well
as any other SAML IdPs and the PPIdP, thereby satisfying F1. The Hybrid IdP and the PPIdP
also retain the sessions while the user is forwarded to aggregate attributes from other IdPs
and performs the dual role of an IdP to the SP and an SP to other IdPs, thereby satisfying F2
and F3. Based on the IP/IR mode, assertions are targeted for the appropriate party and thus
enabling only the targeted entity to validate the assertion and retrieve embedded attributes.
This satisfies F4. From the three use-cases, it is evident that the Hybrid model also satisfies
F5, F6 and F7.
The security requirement S1 is mostly dependant on the respective IdP. The current imple-
mentation uses encrypted communication channels (HTTPS) during different protocol flows
as per the specification of SAML, OpenID and OAuth. The encrypted channel guarantees the
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of aggregated attributes passed from different IdPs
to a Hybrid IdP and from a Hybrid IdP to an SP. This satisfies S2. The Hybrid IdP itself does
not store any released attributes and it determines and assigns the LoA in a correct manner
and thus satisfies S3 and S4.
The implementation of the Hybrid model is based on SAML and utilises the SimpleSAMLphp
implementation and the PPIdP. Since both the SimpleSAMLphp implementation and the
PPIdP satisfy privacy requirements P1-P3, these requirements are also met by the system.
The Data Minimisation requirement is satisfied by allowing an SP to pass on the list of re-
quired attributes to the IdP and then by showing that list of user attributes at the Consent
page.
As the Hybrid IdP and SP have been federated in the traditional way, they trust each other
whereas all non-SAML IdPs and the PPIdP are considered untrusted to the Hybrid IdP and
SP. The other SAML IdPs to which the authentication is delegated by the Hybrid IdP will
be considered as trusted by the Hybrid IdP and following the rule of transitive trust prop-
erty, those IdPs will also be considered trusted by the SP. The LoA value is used as a trust
metric. Any attributes released by an untrusted entity, the Hybrid IdP will implicitly assign
a LoA value of 1. On the other hand, for any trusted entity, a LoA value of 2-4 can be used
depending on the authentication mechanism. In such cases, the Hybrid IdP may depend on
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the LoA value received by the respective IdP since the respective IdP knows which authen-
tication mechanism has been used. For example, the other SAML IdP may release attributes
with a LoA value of 2 when the respective user is authenticated using a username/password
and a LoA value of 3 or 4 when the user is authenticated using a more secure mechanism
such as OTP (One Time Password). The Hybrid IdP will just retrieve the embedded LoA
value and assign it into the respective group of attributes. If no LoA value is present in the
assertion by the other trusted IdP, the Hybrid IdP will provide a LoA value of 2 for that group
of attributes.
8.6.2 Advantages
The Hybrid model offers a number of advantages which are described below:
1. By combining the features of the IP and IR model, it has been possible to leverage the
advantages of both models allowing a user to aggregate attributes almost seamlessly.
2. The model allows a user to switch between the IP and IR mode in the most convenient
way - just by selecting a checkbox. Then, all the mechanisms are handled internally
without burdening the user.
3. This is the first model to allow a user to aggregate attributes from non-SAML IdPs in
a SAML setting. With the proliferation of social networks, lots of user attributes are
stored in such IdPs. Allowing users to aggregate attributes from such IdPs in the FIM
setting is novel yet timely.
4. Another added advantage that comes from the SSO feature of SAML is that once the
Hybrid IdP releases the attributes to an SP, a user does not need to log in and choose
attributes for the same SP until the session is lost. However, when the user accesses
services from another SP and chooses the Hybrid IdP, the SSO feature directly takes
the user to the consent form containing the aggregated attributes from the first instance
with the first SP. At this point, the user can aggregate more attributes if she wishes or
chooses a separate set of attributes. In this way, a user can release completely different
sets of attributes to different SPs using either the same or extended sets of aggregated
attributes.
5. When a user logs in to a non-SAML IdP for the first time, she can take advantage of
the cookie based session maintenance feature of non-SAML IdPs. She will just need
to select the appropriate OAuth IdP or select the OpenID option and write down the
name of the OpenID provider; the user will retrieve attributes automatically without
any further login. This allows the user to achieve a form of SSO at these IdPs.
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6. As discussed above, OAuth and most OpenID providers do not support the selective
disclosure of attributes. A user needs to release either the full basic or extended set
of attributes to an SP. In this regard, the model provides another layer for the user
to choose individual attribute from any OAuth and OpenID provider either using the
Hybrid IdP or PPIdP. As there is no way for the Hybrid or a PPIdP to know which
attributes it should ask the OpenID provider to release, the best option is to ask for an
extended set of attributes from the OpenID/OAuth provider and to allow the user to
choose from that extended list.
7. None of the current SAML implementations allows an SP to pass on information re-
garding requested attributes along with the authentication request. The adopted ap-
proach to pass such request via the SAML authentication request is the first of its kind
and could be widely adopted not only for the attribute aggregation mechanism but also
for any general SAML implementation.
8.6.3 Limitations
There are still a few limitations to the approach, many of which are due to the way the Hybrid
IdP and the other non-SAML IdPs interact with each other. The limitations are discussed
below:
1. One major problem that still exists in almost every SAML system is the lack of control
over the attributes once they are released to the SP. Being mostly based on SAML, the
architecture also suffers from this limitation.
2. Instead of requesting an extended set of attributes from an OpenID provider, the im-
plementation could provide an option, preferably at a page where the user provides her
OpenID, which would allow the user to choose the attributes that she wants to request
from an OpenID provider. However, it should be noted that it does not guarantee that
only the requested attributes will be returned, as evident from the previous discussions
or even the OpenID Provider has the requested attributes.
3. The LoAs of different IdPs are currently hard-coded. The way LoAs have been as-
signed might not suit every scenario. The best approach would be to allow an admin-
istrator to assign the LoA value in the configuration file and then read them during
run-time.
4. There is a problem when a PPIdP is used for aggregating attributes: a PPIdP is only
accessible from a browser of the mobile phone where it is installed. This is not a
realistic assumption for wide-scale adaptation of the approach.
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8.7 Conclusion
With the proliferation of online services and social networks, more and more user attributes
will be stored online across multiple IdPs. In the future, innovative service scenarios would
definitely need a mechanism to allow users to aggregate attributes from multiple sources in
the simplest way. The existing models are complex and require preliminary steps which
are not intuitive. In this chapter, a hybrid model is presented to allow a user to aggregate
attributes from SAML and non-SAML IdPs in a single service session. The approach, based
on the Identity Proxying and Relay model, is simple and does not require a preliminary step
or complex user interactions like previous systems. Depending on the requirement, the user
can switch back and forth between the proxy and relay model by selecting or deselecting
a single checkbox. Unlike previous models, it allows the proxy and relay IdP to retain
the source of the aggregated attributes which would be beneficial for an SP to take any
authorisation decision.
A few additional modifications of SAML have been proposed. In addition, the lacking in the
current SAML specification prohibits an SP to inform an IdP regarding its attribute require-
ments while authenticating a user. The implementation illustrates how it can be rectified.
It has also been shown how the privacy of the user can hugely be improved by leveraging
the IR model and using a PPIdP. This essentially gives a user the ultimate control over her
data as no intermediate IdP knows the data released to an SP. The proposed mechanism not
only can be used to introduce novel service access scenarios but can also be used to improve
the privacy of users which has been not possible in any existing technologies. Hence, it is
strongly believed that the proposed approach has true potential to advance federated service
scenarios to the next level and to begin a new era of next generation federated services.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
This thesis has investigated the need for a novel Identity Management System since ex-
isting systems do not allow users to have sufficient control over their data and have limi-
tations which can drastically affect the privacy of users. To counteract this problem, this
thesis has proposed a novel Identity Management System, called User-controlled Identity
Management System, utilising a novel type of user-controlled IdP called Portable Personal
Identity Provider (PPIdP). Moreover, this thesis has showcased the additional usefulness
of a PPIdP by illustrating how its capabilities to retrieve data from different sensors can
be harnessed to introduce innovative service access scenarios and how it can be used for
privacy-preserving attribute aggregation from heterogeneous IdPs. The applicability of the
work has been demonstrated through a number of several use-cases. In addition, different
security, privacy and trust issues have been analysed throughout the thesis.
9.1 Contributions
The key contributions of this thesis are the following.
Mathematical Model of Identity and Identity Management. The thesis has introduced
a novel mathematical model of Identity and Identity Management covering a wide range
of related vocabulary. This is the first model of this kind and is aimed to tackle the issue
of inconsistency in different central topics of Identity Management. The definition of each
topic in the model has been used as the point of reference throughout the thesis. In addition,
the model has been used to analyse three issues related to Identity Management: the effect of
multiple partial identities, data ownership and Identity Theft. Furthermore, the applicability
of the model has been illustrated by utilising it to characterise the behaviour of an Identity
Management System and three popular IdM models mathematically.
Dynamic Identity Federations. The thesis has proposed a simple mechanism for managing
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a dynamic federation in a fully automatic fashion using SAML. The crucial benefit of the
proposed approach is that it can be easily adopted by any SAML implementation and requires
no modification of the SAML Protocol. A proof of concept has been implemented to show
the applicability of the proposed approach by illustrating several use-cases. The proposed
approach has been used extensively throughout the thesis to implement different prototypes.
User-controlled Identity Management Systems. The thesis advocates the need for a more
privacy-friendly IMS and puts forward the proposal of a User-controlled Identity Manage-
ment System to allow users to have better control over their data. To realise such a system,
a novel type of user-controlled IdP called Portable Personal Identity Provider has been pro-
posed and implemented using the mechanism of dynamic federations. The applicability of
such a system has been demonstrated through few use-cases. How a PPIdP can be used to
rectify several problems of existing Identity Management Systems have been analysed. Fur-
thermore, different functional, security, privacy and trust requirements have been analysed.
Context-aware Federated Services using PPIdP. The thesis demonstrates how a PPIdP
can be used to provide context-aware federated services. This is the first approach to com-
bine the two popular trends: context-aware services and federated services. The proposal
illustrates how the additional capabilities of a PPIdP can be leveraged to provide innovative
context-aware federated services. As above, the applicability of the system has been outlined
using several use-cases and different functional, privacy, security and trust issues have been
analysed in details.
A Hybrid Architecture for Attribute Aggregation. Finally, the thesis presents a hybrid
architecture for aggregating attributes from heterogeneous identity providers. This is the first
architecture for aggregating attributes from SAML as well as non-SAML IdPs in a SAML
federation. The architecture combines the advantages of the IP and IR models. This thesis
has also examined how the privacy of a user can be improved during attribute aggregation
by federating a PPIdP with the proposed architecture. A number of use-cases are considered
and different functional, security, privacy and trust issues have been examined. In addition,
it has been analysed how different design choices have addressed these issues.
9.2 Conclusions
This section outlines the major conclusions drawn from the research conducted in this thesis.
In particular, this section revisits the research objectives outlined in Chapter 1 and analyses
whether these objectives have been fulfilled.
The number of partial identities that any user needs to manage is growing with the increas-
ing number of online services introduced by different service providers. These identities
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are scattered across multiple providers making them increasingly difficult to manage. In ad-
dition, providers do not give users enough control over their stored data. The concepts of
Identity Management and different practical Identity Management Systems have been intro-
duced to tackle these issues. Unfortunately, the investigation in this thesis demonstrates the
following shortcomings.
• The very concepts of Identity and Identity Management are defined in different ways
and there lacks a consistency across these different notions and definitions of many
central aspects of Identity and Identity Management.
• The existing IMSs do little to help reduce the number of partial identities that users
have in different IdPs. The main reason for this is that users may not trust a single
third party IdP to hold all of their attributes. The after effect of this is that users end
up with different partial identities with different types of attributes in different IdPs.
• Since partial identities are scattered across different IdPs, there is not a central place
from where a user can manage her partial identities.
• IdPs do not empower users with enough control so that they do not know how their
attributes are being handled in the respective IdP.
• The existing IMSs do not satisfy certain privacy requirements which can drastically
affect the privacy of a user.
• The existing IMSs do not take advantage of many novel capabilities of smart mobile
devices to offer innovative services.
• Finally, the existing IMSs do not offer any effective mechanism to aggregate attributes
from different types of IdPs considering different privacy issues.
In this thesis, the aim is to address all these issues. Next, it is analysed how these issues have
been tackled and in doing so how the research objectives have been fulfilled.
In Chapter 3, a consistent vocabulary on Identity and Identity Management has been devel-
oped. The vocabulary has been used as a point of reference throughout the thesis. Then, a
mathematical framework has been developed to formally model the central aspects of IdM.
Furthermore, it has been shown how this framework can be used to model several aspects of
an IMS. This is the first model of its kind and it has the potential for rigorous reasoning and
formal analysis of IdM. In addition, four application scenarios are discussed illustrating how
the model can be used for analysis and to mathematically characterise popular IdM Models.
This fulfills research objectives RO1 and RO2.
In Chapter 4, a taxonomy of requirements has been built up and these requirements have been
used to compare three popular IMSs side by side. The analysis has identified the strengths
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and weaknesses of each system. Based on the analysis, SAML has been chosen for subse-
quent research. Thus, this chapter fulfils research objective RO3.
In Chapter 5 and 6, a proposal of a User-controlled Identity Management System has been
presented. It has been shown how such a system based on this concept can be developed.
The PPIdP takes the central stage in realising such a system. It has been discussed in detail
how a PPIdP has been developed. It has also been analysed how this approach can be used to
tackle the stated shortcomings of existing IMSs. In doing so, this chapter addresses research
objective RO4.
In Chapter 7, a framework for Context-aware Federated Services and in Chapter 8 a hybrid
architecture for attribute aggregation from multiple providers have been presented. Both
these chapters have showcased the additional advantages of a PPIdP. In such, these two
chapters fulfil research objectives RO5 and RO6 respectively.
Also, the PPIdP has been developed in such a way so that it satisfies almost all require-
ments presented in the taxonomy of Chapter 4. For functional requirements, the identifier
is represented using a username in a PPIdP. The context in a PPIdP is not only represented
using application domains, but also using locations and attributes of a user. It provides both
logging and history management functionalities and supports an attribute aggregation mech-
anism from multiple providers.
SAML satisfies all security requirements of the taxonomy (Authentication, Confidentiality,
Integrity and Non-repudiation) as discussed in Chapter 4. Being based on SAML, the PPIdP
also satisfies all these security requirements. As for the privacy requirements, the PPIdP re-
leases pseudonymous identifiers for each SP, like SAML. One of the ways data minimisation
can be achieved is to inform users what attributes are required for accessing any service.
The implemented mechanism illustrated in Chapter 8 enables any SAML implementation
to acknowledge a user regarding the requirements of attributes for accessing a service in
the consent module. This feature has been integrated with the implemented PPIdP as well.
The PPIdP and the SAML implementation used in this research have been equipped with
the functionality that allows a user to disclose attributes selectively and with explicit con-
sent. The only requirement that is not fulfilled in a PPIdP, like in SAML, is the support for
anonymous identifiers. This is just to be consistent with SAML. Next, Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are
revisited for comparing the proposed system with SAML, OpenID and OAuth. The result of
this comparison is outlined in Tables 9.1 and 9.2.
By fulfilling all research objectives, this research also validates the statement of the thesis.
It has been shown that smart mobile devices can be used to realise a novel User-controlled
Identity Management System which can tackle the privacy problems occurring in the exist-
ing IMSs. More precisely, it offers users the ultimate control over their data and provides
additional functionalities that can be utilised to offer novel online services.
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Table 9.1: Functional and Security Requirements.
Functional Security
I-R CD LOG HM AA AUTH STO CON INT NR
SAML X X 7 7 7 X X X X X
(IdP Specific)
OpenID X X 7 7 7 X X X X X
(URI/XRI)
OAuth X X 7 7 7 X X X X X
(IdP Specific)
PPIdP X X X X X X X X X X
(IdP Specific)
Table 9.2: Privacy and Trust Requirements.
Privacy
TRUSTSAP
DM
UE
ANON PSD SD EC
SAML 7 X X IdP Specific IdP Specific Federated
OpenID 7 7 X Provider Specific Provider Specific Open
OAuth X 7 7 7 Provider Specific Open
PPIdP 7 X X X X Federated
A User-controlled Identity Management System using a PPIdP is all about empowering users
to have ultimate control over their data. Since all attributes are stored in a PPIdP which
is under the full control of a user, she can trust it to store all their attributes. Storing all
attributes in a central place also makes them easier to manage. In addition, a PPIdP can
be used to replace all IdPs except any highly trusted IdPs. This will reduce the number of
partial identities a user needs to manage in the replaced IdPs. A PPIdP also enables a user
to release only those attributes that she wants to release to an SP and has many additional
advantages as demonstrated in this thesis. With all these advantages that the PPIdP offers,
it can be regarded as the next evolution of User-centric Identity Management where users
are empowered with the sufficient control to introduce a new era of privacy-friendly user-
controlled service provisioning.
9.3 Future Work
In this thesis, a novel approach for managing identities has been investigated and imple-
mented. Being a novel approach, the possible new directions for research inspired by or
stemming from this thesis are broad. In this section, a few of such possible directions for
future research are highlighted.
The mathematical model of Identity and Identity Management presented in Chapter 3 does
not deal with privacy properties. This is intentional as there are other works, e.g. [67, 68],
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that have formalised the privacy properties of an IMS. It will be interesting to investigate how
the proposed model can be integrated with these existing works. Currently, the model is static
in nature and is not able to capture the dynamics of a practical IMS. Such dynamics of prac-
tical systems can be captured by extending the model using the state-based Z language [153]
or the event-based Process Algebra CSP [154]. This will not only help in providing a rigor-
ous understanding of these practical systems, but also to formally compare the behaviour of
systems. For example, if the dynamics are captured using CSP, then the tool FDR3 [155] can
be used for automated verification (e.g. using refinement checking to compare specifications
of IMSs with their implementations). Furthermore, the model lays down a solid foundation
that can be used as the framework for an Identity Calculus which ultimately can be used
to study the change of identities or partial identities that users go through from systems to
systems and its effect in those systems. The topic of Internet of Things (IoT) is one of the
hotly anticipated technologies that has been envisioned to change the way users and objects
inter-connect and interact with each other. One of the major challenges in IoT is to man-
age the identities of different users and objects (things) in a dynamic fashion. The proposed
Identity Calculus can be an effective tool to study the notion of identity management in IoT.
One of the weaknesses of the current implementation is that a PPIdP allows a user access
only from a browser of the mobile device on which it is installed. This imposes a restriction
for any user who wants to access the service of the PPIdP using a browser in a PC or a laptop.
The implementation of PPIdP needs to be extended with additional capabilities so that it is
visible to any device within a local network. All smart mobile devices can be connected
to a PC or a laptop using a cable or with the equipped bluetooth functionality. Even if a
device and a PPIdP are not visible to each other inside a network, this facility can be used to
connect a mobile device, where the PPIdP is installed, with another device. In this manner,
the service of the PPIdP can be availed from a browser of any device. With this functionality,
the Personal Attribute Store (PAS), can be used to store additional information (e.g. contact
book and identifier/credential for different online services along with other user attributes
and their values) and make it available to any browser in any device.
In this thesis, it has been mainly focused on the investigation of existing systems to identify
their limitations as well as on the design and development of a new system to overcome these
limitations. Hence, the usability study of the proposed system has not been considered. The
wide-scale adoption of any new system will, in part, depend on its usability. To reach a wider
audience, it is therefore necessary to conduct a thorough usability study of the proposed
system. The challenge here is the lack of any existing work in this field within the scope
of Identity Management Systems. In addition, there is no guideline on how such a study
can be conducted and no evaluation criteria on how such a system can be evaluated. This
opens up the possibility of a new research area on how to conduct a usability study within the
scope of Identity Management Systems and on what criteria should be used for evaluation.
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Based on the guidelines and the criteria, the proposed system can be evaluated. In addition,
an empirical comparative analysis between the proposed system and existing systems can be
carried out to determine its usability against theirs.
The term Personal Identity Federation (PIF) has been used to denote a federation with a
PPIdP. The concept of PIF can be generalised with the concept of a (private) federation,
with or without a PPIdP, which is only valid within a private network. For example, such a
private federation will be useful to create a network of IoT within a home and the federation
will be the baseline to establish trust among different entities in the network. The very
dynamic nature of how different entities will be added and removed from such a federation
underlines that the federation must be managed in a dynamic fashion. The approach for
dynamic federation with some required modification will be an ideal choice for managing
such a federation.
As mentioned in Chapter 8, one problem that exists in almost every SAML system is the lack
of control over the attributes once they are released to the SP. One way to achieve control in
this regard could be the use of remote administration of policies between two entities. None
of the SAML implementation currently supports this mechanism. It will be interesting to
investigate how such mechanisms can be integrated within SAML.
The concept of trust plays a central role in Federated Identity Management as evident from
this thesis. The trust requirements of traditional FIM evolve and novel trust requirements
emerge as new types of federations (e.g. dynamic federations) are proposed or novel sys-
tems based on FIM (e.g. CAFS, Hybrid Attribute Aggregation architecture) are introduced.
Such novel trust requirements have been introduced in textual formats throughout the thesis.
The limitation of describing such trust requirements in textual formats is that they are diffi-
cult to analyse and compare against each other. A mathematical model will not only tackle
this problem, but also will enable formalism within this scope. There have been numerous
works on the mathematical representation, modelling and analysis of trust issues in online
services. Surprisingly, the mathematical representation, modelling and analysis of different
trust requirements in FIM have received very little attention so far. It is essential to address
this issue by developing a mathematical model of trust issues in FIM. Such formal modelling
can help to represent complex trust issues in a convenient way and can be used to analyse
and calculate trust among different entities qualitatively as well as quantitatively.
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